ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATION TO THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE

(25 October 2015)

Report by

Andrej PLENKOVIĆ, Chair of the Delegation

Annexes:

A - List of Participants
B - EP Delegation press statement
C - IEOM Preliminary Findings and Conclusions on 1st round and on 2nd round
Introduction

On 10 September 2015, the Conference of Presidents authorised the sending of an Election Observation Delegation, composed of 7 members, to observe the local elections in Ukraine scheduled for 25 October 2015.

The Election Observation Delegation was composed of Andrej Plenković (EPP, Croatia), Anna Maria Corazza Bildt (EPP, Sweden), Tonino Picula (S&D, Croatia), Clare Moody (S&D, United Kingdom), Jussi Halla-aho (ECR, Finland), Kaja Kallas (ALDE, Estonia) and Miloslav Ransdorf (GUE, Czech Republic).

It conducted its activities in Ukraine between 23 and 26 October, and was integrated in the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) organised by ODIHR, together with the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. On election-day, members were deployed in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk.

Programme of the Delegation

In the framework of the International Election Observation Mission, the EP Delegation cooperated with the Delegation of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, headed by Ms Gudrun Mosler-Törnström (Austria), while the OSCE/ODIHR long-term Election Observation Mission headed by Tana de Zulueta (Italy).

The cooperation with the OSCE/ODIHR and the Congress went as usual and a compromise on the joint statement was reached (see annex B).

Due to the fact that only two parliamentary delegations were present to observe the local elections, and had rather different expectations as regards meetings to be organised, it was agreed between all parties to limit the joint programme to a briefing by the core team of the OSCE/ODIHR.

The EP delegation carried out a separate programme of meetings which included meetings with President Poroshenko (for the Head of delegation only), Foreign Minister Klimkin, Chair of the Central Electoral Commission Okhendovskiy, and representatives of the entire Ukrainian political spectrum and of the civil society, as well as the EU Ambassador Jan Tombinski and Ambassadors of EU Member States' Embassies in Ukraine.

The EU Delegation facilitated all necessary contacts with the Ukrainian authorities and with representatives of political forces and of civil society, was very helpful in scheduling the programme and updating within very short time frames, and had a very good cooperation with the Members during the entire mission.

On Election Day, the EP Delegation split into four teams, and observed election operations in various polling stations, starting from the opening procedures, voting and closing procedures and counting of the votes. In line with the deployment plan that was established in cooperation with the long-term OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, the polling stations observed by the EP delegation were in Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. All EP teams deployed reached similar conclusions, which were in accordance with the IEOM observations.

On 26 October 2015, a joint Press Conference was held by the Heads of the EP, Congress of Local and regional authorities and the OSCE/ODIHR delegations. A detailed Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions was released (see Annex B). As Head of the EP Delegation, Mr Plenkovic
issued a separate EP press release, which restated key EP political messages regarding elections and EU-Ukraine relations (see Annex C). The EP election observation delegation had solid media echo in Ukrainian and European media.

The OSCE/ODIHR long-term mission remains in the country after the elections, notably to observe the counting and tabulation processes that take several days as well as the second round of elections in some cities counting more than 90,000 habitants scheduled on 15 November 2015. The final OSCE/ODIHR report will be issued some eight weeks after the completion of the election process, putting forward recommendations to further improve the electoral framework.

Political context

The political context in which the local elections took place was characterised by the fragility of the ruling coalition, a controversial public debate on decentralisation, efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and ongoing reform efforts especially in the field of anti-corruption and implementation of the European Association agenda.

The ruling coalition composed of the President’s Bloc Petro Poroshenko, the Prime Minister’s Popular Front, the Batkivshchyna party of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and the Samopomich (self-reliance) Party has been experiencing deep divisions since the end of August 2015 and the vote in first reading on constitutional amendments on decentralisation. This vote triggered the departure of the Radical Party from the coalition, and was not supported by Batkivshchyna and Samopomich, thus making very challenging the possibility of a vote in second reading requiring the constitutional majority (300 votes). The local elections were widely considered as a litmus test for the survival of the coalition and related consequences still need to be drawn.

The security and related humanitarian situation, in particular the illegal annexation of Crimea, the occupation of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the high number of Internally Deplaced Persons (IDPs) (more than 1.5 million people), heavily overshadowed the polling, with more than 5 Million Ukrainian citizens being not able to take part in these elections. The 2d October Paris Summit in “Normandy format” (Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany) established a roadmap for holding local elections in the temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Regarding the particular issue of voting of IDPs, the EP therefore took the position that they should be able to exercise their voting rights in their place of origin at upcoming elections in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation and in a secure environment.

The timing of the local elections also coincided with an inflamed debate on reforms, most of them connected with the European Association Agenda. This goes most particularly for reforms in the area of anti-corruption and reform of the judiciary, that are to a wide extend connected to the visa liberalisation action plan. The European Commission is expected to deliver an opinion on the matter in November.
25 October Elections

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15 November, Second Round Elections

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29 November elections in cities of Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk of Donetsk Oblast

**Krasnoarmiisk**

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Local elections were contested by 132 political parties. From the ruling coalition, the Bloc Petro Poroshenko party fielded most of its candidates under the partyname – the Bloc Petro Poroshenko Solidarnist (BPPS), while the People’s Front (PF), chaired by the Prime Minister, did not take part in the elections. Members of the once dominant and now dissolved Party of Regions (PoR) competed on other political party lists or as self-nominated candidates for mayoral positions.

On 15 November, second rounds of mayoral elections were held in 29 out of 35 cities where the law provided for a second round. Forty-five candidates representing 16 political parties and 13 self-nominated candidates, contested mayoral seats in the run-offs. On the same day, re-run elections were held for 617 councillors and 20 mayors in different villages and settlements.

Local elections scheduled for 25 October did not take place in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk in the Donetsk oblast. According to a CEC resolution, the electoral process in these two cities was systematically violated and the decisions of the respective TECs should be investigated by the prosecutor’s office. The law adopted by the parliament on 10 November mandated holding elections in these cities on 29 November.

The post-election period was marked by numerous withdrawals of elected councillors and subsequent changes in the composition of councils at oblast, city and district levels across the country, enabling some candidates who had not gathered enough votes to enter the councils substituting those who had been placed higher on the party lists. Some candidates (including some members of the Parliament) were also elected for several positions, leaving them to make a choice between positions to which they were elected.

**Political assessment and recommendations**

The local elections in Ukraine were conducted largely in line with the internationally recognised standards. As assessed by the International observation mission, they maintained the positive standards achieved at the 2014 early presidential and parliamentary elections.

Following the Maidan revolution and the subsequent early presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, the October local elections are yet another national poll in a new political landscape with heightened stakes due in particular to the ongoing decentralisation efforts.

These elections are obviously a clear milestone in the efforts of consolidated democracy, a third step for the renewal or confirmation of the Ukrainian authorities, in line with international standards.

This positive assessment is all the more significant given the delicate political, economic, social, as well as humanitarian and security context that Ukraine has been facing for the past 18 months.

The illegal annexation of Crimea and the temporary occupation of certain parts of the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Russia-backed illegal armed groups did not allow however for the vote to take place in these regions, and Internally Displaced Persons (more than 1.5 million) could not exercise the voting rights since no legal framework was provided for. Their future participation will however be guaranteed for the local elections in those regions, as soon as the relevant legislation is adopted in line with the Minsk Agreements and the environment secured.
The vote could not be organised either in some places (Mariupol, Krasnoarmiysk, etc.) due to contradicting decisions by the Central Electoral Commission and the relevant Territorial Electoral Commission, spoilt by suspicions of deliberate wrongdoings.

The legal framework for these elections was obviously complicated, and it appears that the drafting process could have been much more inclusive, thus avoiding potential discrepancies in its implementation. Although one has to admit that its late adoption last July did not allow for proper uniform interpretation, it appears that, on election-day, voters did not seem to be misguided in their choices, thanks an intensive public campaign of education.

All the shortcomings that have been identified in the Joint Statement on Preliminary Findings have to be addressed, and the civil society and the international community should feel committed to ensure that the Ukrainian authorities vigorously and without delay deliver on the matter.

The organisation of local elections, their calm and orderly conduct, as well as the commitment of the authorities to address the identified shortcomings are another step towards indefectible Europeanisation of Ukraine.

Recommendations:

- follow up closely the conclusions and recommendations of the final OSCE/ODIHR report, and stress in all relevant official and bilateral meetings between the European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada the importance to draft, in an inclusive manner, and implement a unified electoral code and other relevant pieces of electoral legislation.

- in that respect, make use of all available channels of cooperation and communication between the EU and the Ukrainian authorities to provide the necessary assistance in this process, including through synergies with the bodies of the Council of Europe, especially the Venice Commission; consider the drafting of such electoral code as a possible pilot area in the first phase of the implementation of the capacity building programme for the Rada, in the framework of the Comprehensive Democracy Support Approach.

- in the framework of interparliamentary relations, ensure particular follow up of the recently adopted or currently discussed laws whose final adoption and correct implementation would address the shortcomings on transparency of campaign finance and of free and fair access to media for all political forces, as identified in the OSCE/ODIHR report.

- ensure, in the framework of parliamentary scrutiny of the external financing instruments, that the programming of relevant EU instruments and in particular of the European Neighbourhood Instrument allows to provide financial and technical support for the implementation of the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations.
### Annex A: List of participants

**List of participants**

**Members**

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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>EPP</td>
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<td>Ms Anna Maria CORAZZA BILDT</td>
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Annex B : Press release

26-10-2015

**MEP Plenković: "Ukraine local elections largely in line with international standards"**

The 25 October local elections in Ukraine were conducted “largely in line with the internationally recognised standards,” concluded MEP Andrej Plenković, Head of the EP Election Observation Delegation, invited by the Verkhovna Rada. The polling “was conducted in a calm and orderly manner” in the cities visited, EP observers said and stressed their confidence that all electoral process shortcomings identified by the OSCE/ODIHR long-term observation mission would be vigorously addressed.

On behalf of the Delegation, its Head Andrej Plenković (EPP, HR), also Chairman of the Parliamentary Association Committee EU-Ukraine, issued the following statement:

“We are very pleased to be here, at the invitation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. This mission is another proof of the high priority the European Parliament attaches to Ukraine, as well of the importance of these elections for the consolidation of the Ukrainian democracy and the European path of the country.

In our view, the local elections in Ukraine were conducted largely in line with the internationally recognised standards. We must bear in mind the delicate political, economic, social, as well as humanitarian and security context. This entails the illegal annexation of Crimea and temporary occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Russia-backed illegal armed groups, where elections could not be held, thus over 5 million Ukrainian citizens could not take part in the voting. The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) should be able to exercise their voting rights in their place of origin at upcoming elections in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation and in a secure environment.

Following the Maidan revolution and the subsequent early presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, the October local elections are yet another national poll in a new political landscape with heightened stakes due in particular to the ongoing decentralisation efforts.

The new legal framework for the local elections has been adopted only in July, and it was required by the authorities to adequately explain the new electoral system to the voters. The EP observers noted that the polling was conducted in a calm and orderly manner in the cities they visited. The Long Term Observation mission of the OSCE-ODIHR will provide a detailed assessment of the elections, including the difficulties encountered in Mariupol, Krasnoarmiysk and Stavote. We are confident that all relevant actors will vigorously address the identified shortcomings in the electoral
process and implement the key recommendations as suggested in the final report. We commend the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities, the representatives of political parties, the electoral commissions, representatives of the civil society and international organisations we met during our mission.

The European Parliament firmly supports Ukraine in the realisation of its ambitious reform agenda. We will closely oversee the implementation of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area through the work of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee."

Note to editors:

The European Parliament sent a 7 Members delegation to observe the local elections in Ukraine on 25 October. Led by Andrej Plenković (EPP, HR), Chairman of the EP Delegation for Ukraine, it also comprised Anna Maria Corazza Bildt (EPP, SE), Tonino Picula (S&d, HR), Clare Moody (S&D, UK), Jussi Halla-aho (ECR, FI), Kaja Kallas (ALDE, ES) and Miloslav Ransdorf (GUE, CZ). MEPs were deployed in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk on Election day. The delegation was part of the long-term OSCE/ODIHR observation mission.
Kyiv, 26 October 2015 – This Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions is the result of a common endeavour involving the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (Congress) and the European Parliament (EP).

Tana de Zulueta (Italy) is the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM), deployed from 9 September 2015. Gudrun Mosler-Törnström (Austria) led the Congress delegation, and Andrej Plenković (Croatia) headed the EP delegation.

The assessment was made to determine whether the election complied with OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards, as well as international obligations and domestic legislation. Each of the institutions involved in this IEOM has endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. This Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions is delivered prior to the completion of the election process. The final assessment of the election will depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, including the tabulation of results and the handling of possible post-election day complaints and appeals. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM will maintain a presence in Ukraine for observation of the foreseen second rounds of mayoral elections. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report, including recommendations for potential improvements, some eight weeks after the completion of the election process. The Congress final report will be adopted at the next plenary session in March 2016. The EP will present its report at an upcoming meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The 2015 local elections were widely viewed as a barometer of the authorities’ intentions to maintain the positive standards achieved during the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections. The elections were competitive, well organized overall and the campaign generally showed respect for the democratic process. Nevertheless, the complexity of the legal framework, the dominance of powerful economic groups over the electoral process, and the fact that virtually all campaign coverage in the media was paid for, underscore the need for continued reform. Additional efforts are needed to
further enhance the integrity of and public confidence in the electoral process. The voting and counting process was transparent and orderly overall, despite the lack of clarity in the procedural provisions.

The elections took place in challenging political, economic, humanitarian and security environment, and against the backdrop of a constitutional reform process aiming at decentralization. The context was characterized by the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation and the temporary control of parts of the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by illegal armed groups. This made it impossible for over 5 million voters in these areas to vote. The Central Election Commission (CEC) made resolute efforts to organize elections throughout the country, but they could not be held in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and on the Crimean peninsula.

The election law was adopted less than four months before election day in an non-inclusive manner. Despite long-standing OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission recommendations, the legal framework continues to be fragmented, contains gaps and ambiguities and lacks clarity. Overall, the legal framework falls short of some OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and international standards.
The CEC operated collegially overall, meeting legal deadlines. Cases of decisions along political lines, of evasion of open discussion during sessions, of arbitrary decision-making, as well as abuse of authority by some Territorial Election Commissions (TECs), undermined confidence in these commissions. The complexity of the election law raised concerns among the commissioners and affected their performance. A number of interlocutors voiced allegations of corrupt practices related to the trading of seats in the Precinct Election Commissions (PECs).

OSCE/ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed general trust in the voter registration system. Voters who were away from their voting addresses on election day were not able to cast their ballots, except for those voting in special election precincts established in medical institutions. The law does not provide for voting by internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The restrictive interpretation and inconsistent implementation of candidate registration rules hindered the right for candidates to stand on an equal basis in several instances, contrary to OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international obligations and standards. These problems persisted throughout the pre-election period, affecting the equal opportunity to campaign. In a number of instances observed by OSCE/ODIHR EOM, TEC decisions with respect to the registration of certain candidates and party lists appeared politically motivated and designed to exclude certain political forces from participating in the elections. Often the CEC and the courts intervened to restore the rights of candidates.

The campaign environment was competitive and voters had a wide array of parties and candidates to choose from. However, it was dominated by wealthy donors and their associated business interests who focused their resources on the mayoral and oblast council races. The absence of ceilings on campaign expenditures further prevented the level playing field during the campaign period. Campaign finance regulations remained insufficiently transparent. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM received widespread allegations of vote-buying. In some areas the campaign was marred by threats and physical attacks targeting candidates and campaign workers.

The media sector with its vividness and turmoil reflects Ukraine’s overall political climate. The growing power and politicization of media groups affect both national and regional media. The political and business interests controlling the media often influence editorial policy, and the malpractice of paid-for journalism is widespread. The legal framework overregulates pre-election coverage, yet poorly defines provisions for it, at odds with OSCE commitments and international standards. The halting and incomplete transformation of the National Television and Radio Company (NTRC) from a state-owned to a public broadcaster hampered independence and editorial freedom of the NTRC called for by international obligations. OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring showed that only three registered parties were granted meaningful editorial coverage across the media landscape. Most of the monitored TV channels with a nationwide reach, including the NTRC, predominantly featured two to three political parties each within their prime time programming.

National minorities’ participation in these elections was affected by the crisis in the east and the temporary control of parts of the territory by illegal armed groups, and the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Representation of national minorities was further hindered by several aspects of the election legislation, especially the inability to self-nominate or run independently in local council races, as well as the increased five per cent threshold for party lists.

Most complaints filed with the CEC were considered in private by individual CEC members, which undermined the transparency and collegiality of the process. Courts handled complaints and appeals within the established timelines respecting due process. However, non-uniform interpretation of the law undermined legal certainty, as well as the principle of equality before the law.
Citizen observer groups and international organizations could register an unlimited number of observers who have broad rights, including the right to attend sessions of all election commissions and to receive documents, including results protocols. The inclusive accreditation of observers contributed to the transparency of the electoral process.

For the first time, the election law introduced the requirement of at least 30 per cent representation of each gender on a party list, but regrettably did not provide for any sanctions for failure to comply. According to the CEC, women comprised about 35 per cent of all registered candidates for the proportional races and 13 per cent in mayoral races. However, female candidates were largely absent from the media landscape, and a small number of them featured in the campaign across the country. Women are well-represented at the CEC and on the TECs, including in leadership roles.

The voting and counting process was transparent and orderly overall. Printing and distribution of ballots proved problematic in many parts of the country. Despite the lack of clarity in the procedural provisions, the PECs were generally able to organize the voting and counting well. Tabulation was ongoing at the time of publication. Party and candidate agents were present in large numbers during all stages of the process, while citizen observers were noted less frequently.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Background

These local elections were held against the backdrop of armed conflict in the East of Ukraine and a constitutional reform process aiming at decentralization. The planned transfer of a number of executive functions from central state administrative bodies to the elected local councils raised the stakes for political parties and candidates.

No elections took place in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and, as described in resolutions of the Central Election Commission (CEC), in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts) which are declared by the parliament as temporarily occupied territories. In addition, the CEC declared the holding of elections not possible for security reasons in some territories of the two oblasts that are administered by civil-military administrations of the Ukrainian authorities. This made it impossible for over 5 million voters in these areas to vote.

Local elections were contested by 132 political parties. The Bloc Petro Poroshenko party, joined by the United Democratic Alliance for Reform – UDAR, fielded most of its candidates under the new party name – the Bloc Petro Poroshenko Solidarnist (BPPS). The People’s Front (PF) chaired by the prime minister decided not to take part in the elections; its members mostly ran with the BPPS. The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was banned by court decision. Members of the once dominant and now dissolved Party of Regions (PoR) competed on other political party lists or as self-nominated candidates for mayoral positions.

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1 CEC resolutions Nos. 207 and 208 declared that it was not possible to organize elections for 91 local councils in Donetsk and 31 local councils in Luhansk oblasts. In addition no elections for regional councils were held in the two oblasts. According to the CEC, these decisions were based entirely on the information provided by military/civil administrations and affected 525,588 voters from both oblasts.

2 On 9 April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed the law “On condemnation of the Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and banning of propaganda of their symbols”. See the statement by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. In these elections former CPU members were running amongst others with the party New State (NS).

3 Former PoR members contested the elections amongst others with the Opposition Bloc (OB), Nash Kray (NK), Renaissance and the BPPS.
Legal Framework and Election System

Local elections are primarily regulated by the Constitution and the Law on Local Elections (hereinafter, the election law), as well as regulations of the CEC.\(^4\) The election law was adopted less than four months before election day in an expedited manner and did not provide for effective and inclusive public consultation, contrary to OSCE commitments and international good practice.\(^5\) However, it had broad support from the ruling coalition. In addition to criticizing the process of adoption of the law, most of OSCE/ODIHR EOM interlocutors voiced concerns regarding its complexity.

The election law introduced three electoral systems for the local elections, increased the threshold to five per cent, limited candidacy rights of independent candidates, provided for a possibility to recall elected mayors and council members by a petition initiated by voters, and, for the first time introduced the requirement of at least 30 per cent representation of each gender on a party list, but regrettably did not provide for any sanctions for political parties that fail to comply.\(^6\) The law does not provide for voting by internally displaced persons (IDPs).\(^7\)

Despite long-standing OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations, the legal framework continues to be fragmented. It contains gaps and ambiguities and lacks clarity with regard to candidate registration, campaign and campaign finance rules, electoral dispute resolution, and media regulations, among other issues. The CEC issued a number of regulations clarifying various aspects of the law, however, it did not fully address the existing uncertainties in a timely manner. These shortcomings were aggravated by inconsistent implementation of the legislation by election commissions and courts. A number of previous OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission recommendations remain unaddressed, including measures to ensure stability and impartiality of election administration, procedures for candidate registration, transparency of campaign finance, and effective electoral dispute resolution. Overall, the legal framework falls short of some OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international obligations and standards and does not ensure integrity of several key aspects of the electoral process.

Councillors in villages and settlements and mayors in cities with fewer than 90,000 voters are elected by a first-past-the-post system, while mayors in cities with at least 90,000 voters are elected by absolute majority, through a two-round system.\(^8\) Region, district, city, and city district councils are elected under a multi-member constituency proportional electoral system that Ukrainian lawmakers refer to as an “open list” system.\(^9\) This newly-introduced electoral system was difficult for voters to understand and for the election commissions to implement.

\(^4\) Other relevant legislation includes the Law on the CEC, the Law on the State Voter Register, the Law on Political Parties, the Code of Administrative Procedure, and the Criminal Code.

\(^5\) Paragraph 5.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that the legislation will be adopted at the end of a public procedure. The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) states that “the fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendments less than one year before an election”, see point II.2.b.

\(^6\) On 23 September the CEC adopted a regulation clarifying that non-fulfillment of the 30 per cent gender quota requirement cannot be the ground for rejection of registration of candidate lists. The Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals ruled that the clarification was illegal, which was later overruled by the High Administrative Court.

\(^7\) First instance courts rejected all complaints filed by the IDPs to be included in voter lists. In one instance Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the lower level court ruling that the IDP certificate is a proof of registration, and obliged the PEC to include an IDP from the Crimean peninsula in the voter list.

\(^8\) If no candidate for mayor’s office receives a majority of votes cast, a second round will be held no later than three weeks between the two leading candidates.

\(^9\) This electoral system cannot be considered an open list system, since voters are not given the possibility to choose among different candidates, which is the key feature of open list systems.
A total of 168,450 constituencies were established by the respective Territorial Election Commissions (TECs). The law clearly states that the boundaries of single mandate districts should be contiguous, but lacks clarity with respect to this requirement for multi-mandate districts.\footnote{All four electoral districts in Berehovo district in Zakarpattia \textit{oblast}, for example, lack contiguity among the administrative units that comprise each district.} By law, the number of voters should be equally distributed among the constituencies, however, the distribution of voters and delimitation of constituencies rests solely at the discretion of TECs with no criteria for legally permissible deviations. The law caps the share of councillors representing a city in a regional council at 20 per cent which disadvantages large urban areas, such as Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv and favours smaller municipalities in these regions. This is inconsistent with the principle of equality of the vote under paragraph 7.3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and international good practice.\footnote{In Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv \textit{oblasts} between 55 and 31 per cent of the population lives in the regional centers. According to point 1.2.2.2 of the Code of Good Practice of the Venice Commission, seats must be evenly distributed among the constituencies.}

**Election Administration**

These elections were administered by the CEC, 10,778 TECs, and 29,261 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). The CEC has been holding regular open sessions and operated collegially overall, meeting legal deadlines. Most CEC resolutions were passed unanimously, however issues related to candidate registration, IDP voting, and gender quota were passed either with dissenting opinions or with a split vote, reflecting the controversy and sensitivity of these issues.

Some stakeholders have challenged the legitimacy of the CEC on the grounds that mandates of most of CEC members have expired.\footnote{CEC’s 15 members, 5 of whom are women, are appointed for seven-year term by the parliament, on the president’s proposal. On 13 March 2014, the Law on the CEC was amended enabling CEC members to continue to fulfill their functions after their term expired.} Decisions along political lines, abuse of authority by TECs and evasion of open discussions on sensitive issues during sessions were reported to and observed by OSCE/ODIHR EOM. This undermined key principles of collegiality, transparency and impartiality, as well as confidence in some commissions.\footnote{Article 11 of the law stipulates that elections process is based on the principles of legality, political pluralism, collegiality, transparency and impartiality. For instance, Mariupol, Cherkasy, Berdiansk, Sloviansk, Krasnarmiisk city and Kharkiv region TECs were observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM as strongly politicized, while Dnipropetrovsk, Dniproderzhynsk, Melitopol, Yavoriv district TECs were reported to lack transparency.} In the later stages of candidate registration process, the CEC faced consistent resistance and even obstruction of the process by several TECs that refused to implement the CEC and court decisions. Consequently, the CEC requested the General Prosecutor’s office to ensure implementation of those decisions.

Aspects of the organizational preparations for elections proved difficult. Many TECs lacked sufficient financial and other operational resources, in particular printed materials, but overcame challenges and organized the process adequately.\footnote{The CEC had to terminate the powers of seven TECs that resisted the implementation of the CEC and court decisions. In some instances, the CEC had to replace some members in the newly formed commissions to resolve deadlocks on registration of candidates.} Ballots were printed at local level. In some areas printing of ballots was controversial and caused turmoil contributing to lack of trust in the process.\footnote{A high number of TECs expressed concern regarding the limited size of their financial allocation and the late transfers of funds. A few OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported that some TECs had to initially fund their operations from their members’ private funds.} In several regions TEC members reported intimidation and threats against them.\footnote{For instance, in Mariupol, decision of the city TEC regarding the selection of print house caused dissatisfaction among the stakeholders who challenged the legality of TEC decision alleging fraud. Dissatisfaction of local stakeholders grew into protests in front of the ballot printing company. In Ternopil city, the print house did not destroy extra ballots as per legal and contractual requirements, which led to police investigation.}
complexity of the election law raised concerns among the commissioners and affected their performance.

TECs and PECs are formed based on nominations from eligible political parties and candidates. The existing formula for the composition of TECs and PECs puts parties with parliamentary factions at an advantage, since in addition to the two guaranteed seats, they could also participate in the lottery for allocation of the remaining seats. Analysis of the distribution of executive positions among the 640 TECs formed by the CEC demonstrates that faction parties are over-represented.

A number of OSCE/ODIHR EOM interlocutors voiced allegations of corrupt practices related to the trading of seats in the commissions by so-called ‘technical’ candidates and parties. This raised questions regarding the integrity and impartiality of election commissions and further undermined the trust in election administration. By law, nominating subjects are free to recall their nominees from the commissions up until election day. Arbitrary replacements, for instance, of chairpersons, affected the work of several commissions.

OSCE/ODIHR EOM long-term observers (LTOs) reported that in most cases PECs were formed by the legal deadline of 9 October. However, the formation process varied from region to region, depending on the competence of election commissions and consistency of implementation of procedures. In some areas the PEC formation process mirrored local political party rivalries and resulted in partisan decision-making, causing mistrust and dissatisfaction among the stakeholders. The rate of replacement of PEC members in some of oblasts reached as much as 50 per cent.

Almost all TECs had to contend with a lack of nominees for PEC members, especially in rural areas. In order to respond to the shortfall, many TECs requested local authorities to identify qualified polling staff. This placed the independence of commissions in doubt since many acting mayors and councilors were running as candidates. In the absence of legal provisions on the matter, the TECs distributed PEC executive positions in varying ways.

For instance, Haysin district TEC in Vinnytsia, Kotovsk city TEC in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk city TEC and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi district TEC.

For instance, such allegations were conveyed to the OSCE/ODIHR EOM in Odesa and Kyiv cities.

For instance, the head of Holosiivskyi city district TEC in Kyiv city was recalled during the PEC formation process. This also occurred in Krasnoarmiisk city TECs.
Cascade training for TEC and PEC members was positively assessed by OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs overall. However, in some cases, commissioners found training of limited value and late in the process. Voter education in the monitored media with nationwide reach was virtually absent throughout the whole pre-election period leaving voters and stakeholders without comprehensive information on essential stages of the electoral process. 27

Voter Registration

Voter lists for every precinct are extracted from the database of the State Voter Register (SVR), which is overseen at the national level by the CEC. The SVR database is maintained by 669 Register Maintenance Bodies (RMBs). 28 As of 23 October 2015, the SVR contained 28,808,774 voters, of which 589,745 were registered as permanently homebound. Voters were able to check their entries through the CEC webpage. Preliminary voter lists (PVLs) were handed over to the PECs by 11 October together with personal invitations for voters. Thereafter, PVLs were posted at PECs for public scrutiny. Final voter lists were handed over to PECs by 22 October. OSCE/ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed general trust in the voter registration system.

The law does not provide for election day registration. 29 Voters who were away from their voting addresses on election day were not able to cast their ballots, except for those voting in special election precincts established in medical institutions.

Candidate Registration

Any citizen with the right to vote can stand for election irrespective of place of residence, except those with an unexpunged criminal record for a grave crime, a crime against citizens’ suffrage rights or for corruption. Candidate lists and candidates are put forward by local branches of political parties, as well as by self-nomination for mayoral and village and settlement council elections. 30 The law does not allow for independent candidacies at all levels of local councils (it is allowed at village and settlement levels and for all mayoral races) contrary to the OSCE commitments. 31 More than 350,000 candidates stood for 168,450 positions of mayors of cities, villages and settlements and for councillors of village, settlement, city, city district, district (rayon) and regional (oblast) councils. According to the CEC, women comprised about 35 per cent of all registered candidates for the proportional races and 13 per cent in mayoral races.

The election law provides for correction of mistakes and inaccuracies in candidate registration documents and does not allow for rejection of registration based on these grounds. However, it lacks clarity with respect to the resubmission of registration documents, the definition of mistakes and inaccuracies, and the gender quota requirement. 32 TECs rejected a number of candidates based

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27 Some regional media outlets have informed voters on procedural issues in respective localities. The CEC has also produced a voter education spot and published it on its website however without meaningful coverage on national broadcasters.
28 Excluding the territories where elections were not held. As a rule, one RMB serves one administrative district.
29 Only technical corrections could be made on the day of voting.
30 Out of the 142 parties that applied for registration with CEC, 132 were registered.
31 Paragraph 7.5 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document (1990) states that “The participating States will... respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination.”
32 The Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal in five cases upheld court decisions on non-registration and stated that mistakes and inaccuracies in the biographies and transfers of election deposits should be considered equivalent to the absence of such documents. However, in the majority of other cases the courts ruled the opposite. TECs in Olevsk, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Lviv, Lutsk denied registration of candidate lists based on non-compliance with the gender quota requirement; however, the courts overruled these decisions.
on those grounds.33 In most cases, courts provided an inclusive interpretation of the law and overturned a large number of TEC denials of candidacy on appeal.

Neither the CEC nor the courts were consistent in their decisions regarding non-registration of candidates, in some cases requesting TECs to reconsider the registration, but obliging TECs to register the candidates in other instances.34 Furthermore, some TECs repeatedly denied registration of certain candidates, despite decisions by the CEC and courts mandating approval of the candidates’ application.35

The restrictive interpretation and inconsistent implementation of candidate registration rules hindered the right to stand for candidates on an equal basis in several instances, contrary to OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international obligations and standards.36 Some of these cases continued throughout the pre-election period, with candidates being reinstated only by intervention of the CEC, in some cases shortly before election day, undermining the equal opportunity to campaign. Moreover, this at times conflicted with the legal deadline for printing of ballots. In a number of instances observed by the OSCE/ODIHR LTOs, including Mariupol, Cherkasy, Kherson, Kharkiv, Berdyansk and Kamanets-Podilsky, the decisions by TECs with respect to the registration of certain candidates and party lists appeared politically motivated and designed to exclude certain political forces from participating in the elections.

The Campaign Environment and Campaign Finance

The campaign environment was competitive. However, it was dominated by wealthy donors and their associated business interests who focused their resources on the mayoral and oblast council races. The campaign was more visible in urban than in rural communities, and especially subdued in government-controlled territories in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. It intensified in all regions closer to election day. Problems with the registration of some political parties and candidates resulted in the delay and interruption of candidates’ campaigns and shaped the campaign debate in certain regions, in particular in eastern and southern oblasts. Freedom of assembly was generally respected.

The campaign took place against a backdrop of growing disillusionment with the political establishment, an ongoing economic crisis and the slow implementation of anti-corruption policies. The campaign was dominated by national issues of reform, order and stability. Only a few contestants focused on local issues and on the actual powers and responsibilities of local councils.

Parties and candidates with ample resources, strong media connections and able to recruit active campaign staff used a variety of methods to campaign, including TV and radio advertisements,

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33 The OB was denied registration by Zaporizhzhia, Oleksandrivka, Kharkiv, Cherkasy and Berdiansk city TECs. Kherson, Zhytomyr, Staryi Sambir and Novomoskovsk TECs refused registration of NK. Kamanets-Podilskyi, Novomoskovsk, Lysychansk TECs refused registration of Batkivshchyna.

34 The CEC obliged to register the candidates in cases of Sloviansk, Kherson, Cherkasy city TECs and Kharkiv regional TEC. Administrative courts in Zaporizhzhia, Rivne, Odesa, Volynsk and Zhytomyr obliged the TECs to register candidates, while Kherson, Lviv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad courts were amongst those who requested reconsideration of registration.

35 Registration of the OB candidates was repeatedly denied by Kharkiv, Sloviansk, Berdiansk city TECs, of the NK by Kherson city TEC, and of the Free Democrats by Cherkasy city TEC. Article 99.8 of the election law prohibits election commissions to adopt decisions that in essence repeat the decisions recognized as illegal by the court.

36 Paragraph 15 of the General Comment No. 25 to Article 25 of the ICCPR states that “any restrictions on the right to stand for election ... must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria”. See also paragraph 24 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, which provides that any restrictions on rights must be “strictly proportionate to the aim of the law”. See also Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the right to participate in the affairs of a local authority.
billboards, campaign tents, print materials, free concerts and rallies. Many parties had an active digital campaign and held meetings with small groups of voters.

In some instances, government officials took an active role in the campaign, both as supporters and candidates. In other cases, incumbent mayors and councillors running for re-election initiated a series of amendments to council decisions in order to fulfill electoral promises of the last campaign. Incumbent candidates are allowed to campaign while in office, but campaign activities of these officials during working hours gave rise to a number of allegations regarding the misuse of administrative resources. The use of municipal websites for campaign purposes and distribution or posting of materials on public transport, which is prohibited by law, was observed by OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs.

Voters had a wide array of parties and candidates to choose from, with the exception of districts in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. New faces from various backgrounds, such as servicemen of the Ukraine Armed Forces, volunteer battalion commanders, police officers, civic activists, or representatives of regional business elites, emerged on the local political scenes as candidates. A number of so-called ‘clone’ parties and candidates with names similar or identical to those of other contestants entered mayoral and council races with the goal to dilute the votes.

The OSCE/ODIHR EOM received widespread allegations of vote-buying and observed candidates distributing food packages to low-income voters directly or through charity organizations. In some areas the campaign was also marred by threats and physical attacks targeting candidates and campaign workers. In some instances fear and intimidation were mentioned as reasons for candidates to withdraw, while some decided to contest mayoral races as non-partisan self-nominees as a consequence of pressure.

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37 The OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed 47 rallies, mainly held by mayoral candidates; of these 9 rallies by the BPPS, 7 by Samopomich, 5 by the NK an UKROP, 4 by Svoboda and the RP each, 2 by Batkivshchyna and 1 by the OB, Renaissance, Vinnytsia European Strategy (VES), Civil Position, Strong Ukraine, Sergey Kaplin Party of Ordinary People, People’s Control, European Party of Ukraine, For Ukraine and For Concrete Actions each and 2 rallies organized jointly by a group of parties. On average, 34 per cent young people and 45 per cent women were represented in the rallies.

38 During a press conference the speaker of the parliament endorsed the VES mayoral candidate. The Odesa governor actively took part in the campaign of the BPPS mayoral candidate; this resulted in a court complaint by the Renaissance mayoral candidate. The court did not satisfy the complaint.

39 The Kyiv city council published an order “On arrangement of providing funds for (...) fulfilment of pre-electoral programs and assignments of voters by the Kyiv city mayor and deputies of the Kyiv city council”.

40 Other cases were observed in Chernihiv, Kryvyi Rih, and Temopil.

41 For instance in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Vinnytsia.

42 Fewer parties participated in government-controlled election districts of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts than in other regions with candidates mostly from the OB, the BPPS, the NK and Batkivshchyna. For some district council seats these four parties nominated comparably low numbers of candidates for party lists. Parties indicated that they had difficulties finding candidates.

43 Among many cases reported in the media, OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs observed the following: in Kirovohrad, an NK mayoral candidate distributed food packages through his wife’s charity fund; in Kyiv, two candidates from Yednist sold potato packages at a subsidized price; the incumbent Chernivtsi mayor distributed food packages; in Mykolaiv, the NK candidate for city council sponsored a football match and distributed envelopes with cash.

44 The PC mayoral candidate in Kharkiv, sustained head injuries after an assault. The Samopomich candidate to the regional council of Lutsk, was severely beaten. An OB campaign tent was destroyed in Kyiv Dniprovskyi district. Two OB activists were attacked by unknown people in Mykolaiv. Two NK campaigners were attacked and splashed with disinfectants. Bomb exploded close to a house of Odesa mayoral candidate of the Maritime Party. He did not sustain injuries. A car with election campaign materials of the OB mayoral candidate for Dnipropetrovsk was burned.

45 In Rivne, the OB told the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that it decided not to engage in an active public campaign due to apprehension about possible intimidation. In Vinnytsia, Svoboda, the Agrarian Party and the OB claimed that several of their candidates were pressured to withdraw or change party affiliation in order not to lose their public sector jobs.
The use of lavish campaign funds by some contestants, coupled with the absence of ceilings on campaign expenditures, prevented the level playing field during the campaign period and is at odds with international good practice.\(^{45}\) The expenditures for political advertisement prior to the registration of candidates were not included in any reports, thus raising concerns about the alleged widespread use of undeclared funds. The absence of crosschecking mechanisms and sanctions weakened the effectiveness of campaign finance oversight. A number of previous OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations for strengthening the transparency of campaign finance are still to be addressed.

**The Media**

The media sector with its vividness and turmoil reflects Ukraine’s overall political climate. The growing power and politicization of media groups affect both national and regional media. The political and business interests controlling the media often influence editorial policy and the malpractice of paid-for journalism is widespread.\(^{46}\) The media often blur the line between political propaganda and news, thus compromising voters’ ability to make an informed choice.

The legal framework for the media comprises the Constitution and a plethora of laws that are generally conducive to freedom of expression. The election law governs the media’s conduct throughout the electoral period.\(^{47}\) It overregulates pre-election coverage, yet poorly defines provisions for it, at odds with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and international standards.\(^{48}\)

The halting and incomplete transformation of the National Television and Radio Company (NTRC) from a state-owned to a public broadcaster hampered independence and editorial freedom of the NTRC called for by international obligations.\(^{49}\) A decision to discontinue the contracts of the staff at the NTRC regional branches led to self-censorship and an arbitrary application of the election law.\(^{50}\) Sixteen of 25 regional branches broadcasted only those election-related programmes that were paid for by parties and candidates, and just 8 produced issue-oriented programmes at their expense.

The level playing field in the media was further compromised by the absence of comprehensive oversight or review of the media’s compliance with legal provisions, such as their obligation to clearly label paid-for political content. The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council (NTRBC) conducted media monitoring at the national and oblast levels. However, the NTRBC

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\(^{45}\) See the General Comment No. 25 to Article 25 of ICCPR and 2003 Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (III.9).

\(^{46}\) OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs in Berdiansk, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Hotyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Izium, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kremenchuk, Kramatorsk, Kirovohrad, Kryvyi Rih, Lviv, Lozova, Melitopol, Mykolaiv, Mukachevo, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Romny, Sumy, Sloviansk, Ternopil, Uzhgorod, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, and Yahotyn, report on biased coverage for or against particular candidates and/or local media’s direct affiliation with specific political parties or their sponsors.

\(^{47}\) The election law forbids reporting on the campaign in the news, does not foresee any free air-time, envisages the possibility to pay for debates and at the same time stipulates equal allocation of time to all contestants.

\(^{48}\) Paragraph 13 of the ICCPR General Comment 34 provides that “A free, uncensored and unhindered press or other media is essential in any society to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and enjoyment of other Covenant rights”; See also Paragraph 9.1.of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document.

\(^{49}\) Paragraph 16 of the ICCPR General Comment 34 provides that “State parties should ensure that public broadcasting services operate in the independent manner. In this regard, State parties should guarantee independence and editorial freedom. They should provide funding in the manner that does not undermine their independence.”

\(^{50}\) The OSCE/ODIHR visited 25 out of 26 local branches of the NTRC to assess the effect of the transformation. In 18 cases, the management admitted the persisting uncertainty, expected staff reductions and insufficient funding, admitted self-censorship.
lacked capacity and effective sanctioning powers and proved unable to take timely and resolute measures when necessary.\textsuperscript{51}

The OSCE/ODIHR conducted quantitative and qualitative media monitoring.\textsuperscript{52} Of the 132 political parties registered for elections, only 3 were granted meaningful editorial coverage across the media landscape and provided with the ability to address the voters directly within the news and editorial programmes.\textsuperscript{53} Key personalities in the mayoral races in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk were the most visible political figures in broadcast media’s election-related programming. Each of the TV channels with a nationwide reach, monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, predominantly featured two to three political parties within their prime time programming.\textsuperscript{54} ICTV was the exception to this, equitably covering seven parties and a number of self-nominated candidates during election related prime time broadcasts.

The parties with representatives in administrative positions, most notably the BPPS, as well as the incumbents, enjoyed additional coverage due to their institutional activities. The president alone received an average of 13 per cent of the total time allotted to political actors in the monitored broadcasters. Reports on his activities were largely positive in tone, especially on public television.

The pre-election coverage of print media did not provide for an alternative discourse in the form of independent or analytical editorial content. Newspapers devoted most of their space to five parties.\textsuperscript{55} The legally permitted, virtually unlimited purchase of paid for airtime transformed the national broadcasters’ prime-time election coverage to the propaganda platform with the amount of time devoted to the advertisement exceeding the time allotted to the election-related news. Moreover, the BPPS used the president’s appointed governors to promote the party logo. The bulk of paid-for advertisement was purchased by the BPPS, the NK, the UKROP, the MR and the OB. Female candidates were largely absent from the media landscape.

\textbf{Participation of National Minorities}

National minorities’ participation in these elections was affected by the crisis in the east and the temporary control of parts of the territory by illegal armed groups, and the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, which made it impossible to organize elections in those parts of the country.\textsuperscript{56}

Several aspects of the electoral legislation hinder the representation of national minorities, especially in local councils. National minority candidates with a strong base of support in an area of compact minority settlement may be disadvantaged by the fact that they cannot run independently for councillors’ seats. In addition, some minority communities may not be able to meet the requirements to register a political party, in which case they may not compete in proportional races.

\textsuperscript{51} The NTRBC reviewed 52 news items and no fines were imposed; the OSCE/ODIHR visited all 26 regional branches of NTRBC where on average two employees are monitoring 56 media outlets.
\textsuperscript{52} UA:First, 1+1, Channel 5, Inter TV, ICTV, TRK Ukraina, 7th Channel (Kharkiv), 34 TV Channel (Dnipropetrovsk), Glas TV (Odesa), Khmelnytskyi ODTRK (Khmelnytskyi), Zik TV (Lviv). Newspapers – \textit{Pakty i Kommentarii, Komsomoïskaia Pravda v Ukrainie, and Segodnia}.
\textsuperscript{53} The OB (19 per cent), the BPPS (18 per cent), and Renaissance (5 per cent).
\textsuperscript{54} 1+1 – Renaissance and UKROP, as well as the BPPS predominantly in negative tone; 5 Channel – the president and the governor of Odesa, BPPS, and Movement for Reform (MR); Inter TV – the OB, the BPPS and Party of Resolute Citizens; TRK Ukraina – the OB and the BPPS; UA:First – the BPPS, the OB and the government.
\textsuperscript{55} The BPPS (22 per cent), the NK (10 per cent), the MR (10 per cent), Renaissance (8 per cent) and the OB (7 per cent).
\textsuperscript{56} According to the 2001 census, ethnic Russians comprise 17.3 per cent of the population, while another 12.3 per cent identify as native Russian speakers. Of this total 14 million people, approximately 5.4 million live in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and 1.9 million live on the Crimean peninsula. UNHCR reports that there are 1.46 million IDPs in Ukraine as of 7 September, three-quarters of whom live in the eastern regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. About half of the 21,000 IDPs the State Emergency Service has recorded as Crimean are estimated to be Crimean Tatar.
for local councils at all.\textsuperscript{57} Those that do manage to register political parties, still may not meet the increased five per cent threshold for party lists; thus, candidates on the lists of these parties could win a decisive majority in areas of compact minority settlement, yet not be elected.\textsuperscript{58} Concerns about the boundaries of electoral districts in some communities also indicate that national minority candidates running on the lists of major parties also may be disadvantaged, as they need a large percentage of the vote in their districts to move ahead of others on the party’s list and obtain a council seat.\textsuperscript{59} The election law does not provide for any special measures promoting national minority representation.

Intolerant or xenophobic speech toward minorities was not observed during the campaign. Many national minority representatives, including those from the Roma community, informed OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs that members of their communities were included in the lists of major parties running in their districts.\textsuperscript{60} However, the platforms of small and national minority political parties were more focused on issues affecting local communities.

**Complaints and Appeals**

The election law and Code of Administrative Proceedings do not clearly define a single hierarchical structure of responsibility for the complaints and appeals process.\textsuperscript{61} Election commissions, first instance courts of general jurisdiction, as well as administrative courts all have jurisdiction to consider election-related complaints.

As of 24 October, the CEC received 155 complaints, which were mostly rejected on technical grounds. Only 12 of these were considered in a full session. All other complaints were considered in private and responded to by individual CEC members, thereby undermining the transparency and collegiality of the process. Decisions were communicated by letters that often lacked factual and legal reasoning and were not subject to appeal. This undermined the right of judicial appeal provided for by OSCE commitments.\textsuperscript{62}

Some 750 election-related complaints were filed with the courts before election day. The majority of these concerned candidate registration and were upheld by the courts. Other complaints referred to issues of formation of election commissions, district delimitation, violation of campaign regulations, vote buying, voter list inaccuracies, and registration of observers, and were mostly dismissed on procedural grounds or rejected on substance. Courts handled complaints and appeals within the established timelines respecting due process. However, non-uniform interpretation of the law undermined legal certainty, as well as the principle of equality before the law.

\textsuperscript{57} Article 10 of the Law on Political Parties (2001) requires that parties demonstrate a base of support in two-thirds of the country’s oblasts in order to register as a political party. The Party of Poles of Ukraine informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that the onerous process of collecting signatures was one reason it took the party three years to register.

\textsuperscript{58} Two parties representing the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia expressed concern to OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs that they may not meet the threshold for party lists at the regional level even though they have combined their party lists and anticipate winning the majority of the vote in one entire district and other electoral districts. Representatives of the Hungarian and Roma communities in Zakarpattia informed OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs that the boundaries of electoral districts disadvantaged candidates from their communities. Representatives of the Hungarian community submitted proposals for delimitation of districts in Berehovo to the TEC, yet received no reply to their proposal or opportunity to consult before the district boundaries were drawn.

\textsuperscript{59} NK and Unity Centre parties included Roma candidates on their party lists for the Uzhgorod city council; Roma candidates also ran in other council races in Zakarpattia and Odesa oblasts.

\textsuperscript{60} Article 172.4 of the Code of Administrative Proceedings stipulates that the decisions, actions or inaction of certain election commissions and their members with respect to the preparation and conduct of certain types of elections, shall be challenged in district administrative courts, while Article 172.5 provides that cases not specified in part 4 are to be appealed to first-instance courts of general jurisdiction acting as administrative courts.

\textsuperscript{61} Paragraph 18.4 of the 1991 OSCE Moscow Document states that “participating States will endeavor to provide for judicial review of [administrative] regulations and decisions.”

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Citizen and International Observers

The inclusive accreditation of observers contributed to the transparency of the electoral process. Citizen observer groups and international organizations could register an unlimited number of observers who have broad rights, including the right to attend sessions of all election commissions and to receive documents, including results protocols. The CEC registered 83 non-governmental organizations, including OPORA and the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, and a total 1,555 international observers.

Election Day

In most of the country election day proceeded calmly. Elections were not held in Krasnoarmiisk, Svatove and Mariupol. Party and candidate agents were present in large numbers during all stages of the process, while citizen observers were noted less frequently. The CEC reported turnout at 46.6 per cent.

Printing and distribution of ballots proved problematic. In some areas, candidate names were either misspelled or printed in bold. In other instances, ballots were delivered to wrong districts.

Polling stations opened late in 30 per cent of cases observed, largely due to protracted preparation procedures or missing election materials. In 5 per cent of polling stations visited, International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) observers were restricted in their observation. Overall, opening procedures were negatively assessed in 7 per cent of precincts.

IEOM observers assessed voting positively in 98 per cent of polling stations throughout the country. Transparency of the process was ensured and observers could follow procedures without restrictions in almost all polling stations observed. More than half of polling stations observed were not accessible to people with disabilities. Only isolated instances of tension, obstruction or intimidation were observed. Unauthorized people were present in 9 per cent of polling stations observed, and were seen interfering in 2 per cent. In 5 per cent of observations, not all voters marked their ballots in secrecy or folded them properly before depositing them in the ballot box.

Despite overall positive assessment, some procedural problems were noted by observers. Voter identification procedures were poorly conducted in 6 per cent of instances, mostly in small and rural communities. In 6 per cent of polling stations observed, the ballot boxes were not properly sealed. Few cases indicative of more serious procedural violations, such as proxy voting (9 per cent), instances of group voting (4 per cent), and instances of seemingly identical signatures on voter lists (1 per cent), were reported by the IEOM observers. Procedural violations were reported from some special polling stations where voters were provided with only one ballot contrary to the election legislation.

IEOM observers positively assessed 88 per cent of the 238 vote counts observed. The problems reported during the closing and counting were mostly due to failure of commissions to adhere to established procedures. In 18 per cent of cases, PECs experienced difficulties in filling in the protocols. In 12 per cent of counts figures did not reconcile in the protocols and the PECs had to revise figures established earlier, prolonging the counting. Unauthorized persons were present

63 In Krasnoarmiisk city, ballots were not delivered to polling stations up until election day. On election day the CEC adopted resolution obliging the city TEC to comply with the legislation and distribute the ballots, however TEC failed to convene the session and elections were not held. In Svatove, elections were cancelled during the day. The ballots were printed omitting the parties that did not assign candidates to respective districts. Therefore, city TEC considered such ballots as invalid and cancelled elections. In Mariupol, voting did not take place in all but 8 out of 213 polling stations.
64 In Khust, Zakarpattia, and Sumy.
65 In Khmelntski, Kharkiv and Chernivts
in 12 per cent of the counts observed, and often interfered in the process. Tabulation was ongoing at the time of publication.

**The English version is the only official document. However, this statement is also available in Ukrainian and Russian.**

**MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission opened in Kyiv on 9 September, with 17 experts in the capital, and with 80 long-term observers deployed throughout Ukraine.

On election day, some, 750 observers from 44 countries were deployed, including 675 long-term and short-term observers deployed by the OSCE/ODIHR, as well as a 57-member delegation from the Congress, including 28 observers from the Congress itself, 12 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and 4 from the EU Committee of Regions, and a 12-member delegation from the EP. Voting was observed in over 2,600 polling stations out of a total of 29,261. Counting was observed in 283 polling station across the country. The tabulation process was observed in over 100 out of 10,778 TECs, so far.

The observers wish to thank the authorities of Ukraine for the invitations to observe the election, the Central Election Commission for its co-operation and for providing accreditation documents, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other authorities for their assistance and co-operation. The observers also wish to express appreciation to the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and embassies and international organizations accredited in Ukraine for their co-operation and support.

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STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Kyiv, 16 November 2015 – Following an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and based on the recommendation of a Needs Assessment Mission conducted from 5 to 7 August, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the 25 October 2015 local elections. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM remained in the country to follow the 15 November mayoral second round contests.

The second rounds of the mayoral elections were assessed for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. This statement should be considered in conjunction with the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 26 October, after the first round of voting, by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. The overall assessment of the elections will depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, including counting and tabulation. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report, including recommendations for potential improvements, some eight weeks after the completion of the election process.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

The second round of the mayoral races in Ukraine confirmed the assessment of the 25 October local elections which saw business interests influencing the process in most contests. Many candidates focused their efforts on local coalition building more than on reaching out to voters. There was little active campaigning. In a positive development, debates were organized between the candidates in a number of regions. Frequent and late replacements of Territorial Election Commission (TEC) members raised serious concerns regarding their independence. Lack of confidence in the election administration and the deficient legal framework were at the root of most problems encountered during these elections, highlighting the need for an inclusive reform. Dedicated and capable polling station staff organized voting and counting in a commendable manner.

On 15 November, second rounds of mayoral elections were held in 29 cities. Local elections scheduled for 25 October did not take place in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk in the Donetsk oblast; the law adopted by the parliament on 10 November mandated holding elections in these cities on 29 November. The election results under the newly-introduced proportional “open list” system revealed a distortion in the representation of local communities. In certain districts the most popular candidates were not elected, while candidates who came in second and third places obtained seats, raising concerns whether the electoral system gives effect to the will of the voters.

Provisions of the election law related to the second round leave some important aspects of the process insufficiently regulated. The Central Election Commission (CEC) adopted a regulation clarifying aspects of the election law related to the conduct of the second round, although merely repeating legal provisions, thus missing the opportunity to address issues that proved to be problematic during the first round of elections.
The preparations for the second round were affected by the protracted tabulation process of the 25 October election results that went beyond the legal deadlines, and high turnover of Precinct Election Commission (PEC) members. Frequent replacements of TEC members, complexity of calculation of results, interference by party observers and candidates negatively affected the process. Moreover, information on the election results was not provided to the public by the CEC in a comprehensive or timely manner, which is at odds with Ukraine’s international obligations. The problems with tabulation process fostered the distrust of some stakeholders in the election administration.

Candidates were able to campaign freely and without undue restrictions. Campaign activities between the two rounds were limited and took place in an overall calm environment. The campaign was visibly influenced by powerful business interests and allegations of fraud were often voiced. Closer to election day, in a number of contests, unpredictable multi-party coalitions were formed in support of different candidates based on a variety of local interests. Not all TECs verified the financial reports submitted by candidates or made them publicly available within the deadline, which enfeebled the oversight over campaign finance and negatively impacted voters’ access to information.

Abundant reporting on the arrests of political figures and their alleged involvement in unlawful activities initially dominated the election coverage across the media landscape, reducing voters’ opportunity to assess the platforms of the candidates standing for elections. The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council remained passive and failed to establish a level playing field prior to the run-offs denying voters access to balanced reporting both at national and regional levels. Similarly to the 25 October elections, Bloc Petro Poroshenko Solidarnist and Opposition Bloc candidates were granted most of the airtime in the broadcasters’ election related coverage.

Most complaints filed with the CEC after the 25 October elections were considered by individual CEC members, whose decisions were communicated by letter and could not be appealed, which is not in line with OSCE commitments. Courts received a high number of complaints, most of which were rejected on substance or dismissed on technical grounds. Decisions of cases considered on substance at times did not provide sound legal justification, which undermined the right to an effective remedy provided for by OSCE commitments and other international obligations.

OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers assessed opening of polling stations, voting and counting positively. Transparency was overall ensured and observers could follow procedures without restrictions in almost all polling stations observed. Tabulation was assessed slightly less positively. Candidate representatives and citizen observers were present in large numbers during all stages of the process. The CEC announced turnout at 34 per cent.

**PRELIMINARY FINDINGS**

**Background**

On 15 November, second rounds of mayoral elections were held in 29 out of 35 cities where the law provided for the second round.² Forty-five candidates representing 16 political parties and 13 self-nominated candidates, contested mayoral seats in the run-offs.³ Two out of a total of 58 candidates

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² According to the law, in cities with at least 90,000 voters mayors are elected in two rounds. In Kharkiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Sloviansk, and Lysychansk mayors were elected by obtaining an absolute majority in the first round. Among the 45 political party nominated candidates 12 were from the Bloc Petro Poroshenko Solidarnist (BPPS), 5 each from the Opposition Bloc (OB), the Ukrainian Association of Patriots (UKROP) and Batkivshchyna, 4 from Samopomich, 3 from Svoboda, 2 from Nash Kray (NK), and 1 each from 9 other parties.

³ Two out of a total of 58 candidates
were women. One candidate withdrew from the race.\(^4\) On the same day, re-run elections were held for 617 councillors and 20 mayors in different villages and settlements.

Local elections scheduled for 25 October did not take place in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk in the Donetsk oblast.\(^5\) According to the Central Election Commission (CEC) resolution, the electoral process in these two cities was systematically violated and the decisions of the respective Territorial Election Commissions (TEC) should be followed up by the prosecutor’s office. The law adopted by the parliament on 10 November mandated holding elections in these cities on 29 November.

**Legal Framework and Election System**

Provisions of the Law on Local Elections (hereinafter, the election law) related to the second round leave some important aspects of the process insufficiently regulated. The election law does not allow for sufficient time for public scrutiny and introduction of corrections to voter lists before the second round.\(^6\) The law does not regulate the process for resubmitting requests for mobile voting. The CEC adopted a regulation clarifying aspects of the election law related to the conduct of the second round, although merely repeating legal provisions without adding further details, thus missing the opportunity to address issues that proved to be problematic during the first round of elections, including campaign and campaign finance regulations and media conduct.

Following the first round of local elections, on 27 October, the CEC adopted a resolution establishing that the second round should not be held in cities where the total number of eligible voters, according to the results protocols, fell under 90,000. This was challenged by the mayoral candidate in the city of Pavlohrad where the number of voters decreased to 89,810 before the 25 October election day. The Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals overruled the CEC clarification considering it to be contrary to the law, and stated that the electoral system cannot be changed after the start of the electoral process. The subsequent appeal of this decision by the CEC to the High Administrative Court of Appeals was unsuccessful.

The election results under the newly-introduced proportional “open list” system revealed a distortion in the representation of local communities. A number of electoral districts within the multi-mandate constituencies had no representation in councils, while other districts were represented by up to three councillors.\(^7\) Moreover, some regional capitals were not represented at all in the respective oblast councils.\(^8\) In addition, due to the nature of the electoral system, the most popular candidates in certain districts were not elected, while candidates who came in second and

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\(^4\) On 3 November, the NK mayoral candidate in Kherson withdrew his candidacy from the second round contest alleging falsifications in the first round and threats against him and his campaign workers. In accordance with the law, the candidate with the third largest number of votes took the vacant place in the run-off.

\(^5\) Voting was invalidated in Svatove of the Luhansk oblast, since some parties were omitted from the ballot. The TEC scheduled the repeat elections in Svatove for 27 December.

\(^6\) The law provides for two days to introduce corrections to the voter lists.

\(^7\) In Chernivtsi oblast 21 out of 64 electoral districts, in Kharkiv oblast 27 out of 120 electoral districts, in Zhytomyr oblast 21 out of 64 electoral districts, and in Lviv oblast 22 out of 84 electoral districts remained without representation.

\(^8\) According to point 1.2.2.2 of the Code of Good Practice of the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), seats must be evenly distributed among the constituencies. Chernihiv city is not represented in the respective oblast council; Chernivtsi city has 4 councillors out of 11 districts in the respective oblast council; Uzhgorod city has 1 councillor out of 6; Cherkasy city has 3 councillors out of 15.
third places obtained the seats. This raises concerns whether the electoral system gives effect to the will of the voters.

Election Administration

The preparations for the second round were affected by the protracted tabulation following the elections on 25 October and high turnover of PEC members. The initial stages of the results tabulation process were in general assessed positively by OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers. However, later stages of tabulating the results of proportional elections to the local councils proved problematic for the TECs to implement and for stakeholders to comprehend. Frequent replacements of TEC members, complexity of calculation of results, as well as interference by party observers and candidates, negatively affected the process. Moreover, information on the 25 October election results was not provided to the public by the CEC in a comprehensive or timely manner, which is at odds with Ukraine’s international obligations.

Tabulation was protracted and many TECs failed to establish and publish results within the legal deadlines. TECs were not provided with uniform official software for calculation of results for councillor elections. In at least two identified cases, the tabulation means used proved fraudulent. Many PEC protocols appeared to be of poor quality, and, as the figures in a number of them did not reconcile, many protocols were returned for corrections. OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported that in some cases PEC members, contrary to the law, changed PEC protocols in TEC premises.

Some TECs ordered recounts because of inability to establish results. In one instance a TEC used dubious grounds for recounts and later invalidated the PEC vote count protocol, which affected the

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9 For instance, two BPPS candidate for the Kyiv city council in electoral districts 61 and 113, the United Centre candidate for the Mukachevo city council in electoral district 7 gained majority of the votes but lost to other party list candidates when votes were transferred into percentage.
10 General Comment No. 25 to Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that “any system operating in a State party must be compatible with the rights protected by article 25 [of the ICCPR] and must guarantee and give effect to the free expression of the will of the electors.”
11 Party or citizen observers appeared to be more knowledgeable regarding the procedural issues, which allowed them to provide advice but also at times unduly interfere in the work of the commissions. Interference was observed in Slavuta city TEC and Horodok district TEC in Khmelnytskyi oblast, Dniproderzhynsk city TEC in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, and Svaliava TEC in Zakarpattia oblast.
12 Paragraph 19 of the General Comment No. 34 to Article 19 of the ICCPR states that “State parties should proactively put in public domain Government information of public interest. State parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information”.
13 The deadline for publishing mayoral election results was 30 October and the council election results - 4 November. By law, TECs are to work without breaks until the election results are established. In practice, however, the lengthy tabulation process was further delayed by breaks.
14 In Mykolaiv city, one of the city district TECs used an Excel spreadsheet to tabulate the results. Party observers identified that the number of votes from small parties and some of the invalid ballots were automatically transferred to the votes for the incumbent mayor. A similar method was used in Babushkinskyi city district TEC of Dnipropetrovsk city, where a number of votes from small parties were transferred to Renaissance and UKROP. This case was referred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs by the CEC.
15 According to the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers, problematic reconciliation was caused by poor preparedness, fatigue and overregulation of procedures stemming from legislator’s intention to prevent fraud. For instance, up to 50 per cent of protocols were returned for corrections in Dnipropetrovsk city, and Selydove TEC of the Donetsk oblast. In Vinnytsia, all but one protocol were returned.
16 Such instances were observed in Sloviansk in the Donetsk oblast and Bilovodsk in the Luhansk oblast. The election law requires PECs to reconvene for a formal session when the PEC results protocol contains errors and the TEC instructs the PEC to issue a corrected protocol.
17 In Prydniprovskyi and SOSnivskyi city district TECs in Cherkasy city, Svaliava TEC in Zakarpattia oblast, and Rodynskoe city TEC in Donetsk oblast.
Second round mayoral contests were held by the TECs established prior to the first round. However, respective city TECs had to form new PECs based on nominations from the run-off candidates ensuring their equal representation in these commissions. Almost all city TECs managed to form PECs by the legal deadline. On 3 November, the CEC passed a resolution, whereby executive positions had to be allocated proportionally. TECs applied different approaches to this task. In an attempt to meet the legal requirements and achieve fair distribution in the absence of proper clarification by the CEC, some TECs tried to equally distribute executive positions among the eligible candidates. Other TECs either disadvantaged one of the candidates or decided not to appoint deputy chairpersons of PECs in order to equally distribute positions of chairpersons and secretaries.

Voter lists were handed over to the PECs two days before election day by the State Voter Register local branches. Voters were able to check their entries at the CEC webpage. As of 13 November, 9,010,302 voters were included in final voter lists, 64,707 of which were permanent homebound voters.

The Campaign Environment and Campaign Finance

Official campaigns started on the day following the decisions on announcing the second rounds by the respective TECs. Some candidates resumed their campaigns before that. The late announcements of the first-round results effectively shortened the campaign period for the second-round contests.

Initially, the detention of UKROP leader affected the campaign discourse. The case was presented as an anti-corruption measure. The campaign was visibly influenced by powerful business interests and allegations of fraud were often voiced. Some candidates underlined their parties’ agenda such as utility tariffs, failing reforms in the justice and anti-corruption sectors, as well as peace, order and stability.

Candidates were able to campaign freely and without undue restrictions. Campaign activities between the two rounds were limited and took place in a generally calm environment, although their

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18 In Sviatohirsk city TEC ordered recounts primarily due to damaged seal of ballot box at TEC premises as well as due to lack of PEC stamp on the counterfoils, none of which are envisaged by the law. As a result, self-nominated candidate V.Moroz lost votes and hence the elections. The candidate appealed to court but lost the case.

19 In Uzhgorod, Kryvyi Rih, Dniprodzerzhynsk, Zhytomyr and Mykolaiv city TECs had shortfall of sufficient number of nominees due to unwillingness among the potential candidates for such positions.

20 The legal requirements are contradictory. Article 23.7 of the election law requires that executives be nominated by different eligible subjects, while Article 87.8 stipulates that PECs have equal number of members from two run-off candidates, however the law is silent on how the three executive positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and secretary are to be distributed among the representatives of the two run-off candidates.

21 Some TECs tried to assign three executive positions to both candidates by dividing PECs into odd and even numbers, thereby ensuring that candidates have equal number of executives within the given electoral district. For instance in Poltava, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Berdiansk city TECs.

22 For instance in Chernihiv, Kremenchuk, Zaporizhzhia, Pavlohrad, Uzhgorod, Lviv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy and Rivne city TECs.

23 In Lutsk the UKROP candidate, in Melitopol the BPPS candidate, and in Chernivtsi the candidate of Ridne Mist Party (Hometown).

24 Hemadi Korban was detained on 31 October on suspicion of involvement in organized crime, embezzlement and kidnapping. He was released 72 hours later as prosecutors’ office failed to issue an arrest warrant, but was immediately detained again. On 6 November, he was put under house arrest by the Kyiv district court.
intensity varied among the localities. The tone of the campaign became more acrimonious in the last week before election day as candidates levelled increasingly strong personal accusations against their rivals. In some regions the candidates relied on negative campaigning by distributing leaflets containing slanderous accusations against their rivals. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM received two reports of violence against campaign staff.

A number of recently formed political parties contested the elections and made major investments in the national media campaign, but proved to be largely regional in their support. Three political parties (Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and UKROP) publicly announced their agreement on mutual support of candidates in the second rounds. In a number of contests, unpredictable multi-party coalitions were formed in support of different candidates based on a variety of local interests.

All contestants of the run-offs had to submit interim financial reports five days before election day. Reports were submitted by 48 out of 58 candidates. Due to the absence of sanctions for non-compliance with the finance reporting requirements, the examination of the reports by TECs in most cases appeared to be a formality. Not all TECs verified the reports or made them publicly available within the deadline, which enfeebled oversight over campaign finance and negatively impacted voters’ access to this information.

The Media

Prior to the run-offs, the media’s abundant reporting on the arrests of political figures and alleged involvement in unlawful activities initially dominated the election coverage, thus reducing voters’ ability to assess the platforms of the candidates. The ambiguities in the legal framework for the conduct of media throughout the campaign period were not addressed. The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council (NTRBC) remained passive and failed to establish a level playing field across the media landscape prior to the run-offs. Thus, voters were denied access to balanced reporting both at national and regional levels.

With 19 incumbent mayors standing for the elections, the misuse of media owned by local administrations was aggravated. On the national level, the BPPS continued to enjoy additional coverage due to the ample time allotted to the president.

Between the two rounds, the National Television and Radio Company (NTRC) endeavoured to engage the candidates in debates focusing on policies and local issues. Only in Lviv did such a live face-off take place. In ten cities local broadcasters carried out debates on their own initiative. In

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25 Such leaflets were observed in Berdiansk, Lviv, Rivne, Lutsk and Bila Tserkva, and negative campaigning in Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, Poltava, and Zhytomir.

26 In Zaporizhzhia, campaign manager of the BPPS candidate was beaten-up. In Mykolaiv, campaign staff of OB candidate was attacked.

27 For instance, in Dnipropetrovsk, the Samopomich announced its support of UKROP candidate; in Mykolaiv, the BPPS candidate supported the Samopomich candidate; in Poltava, Serhii Kaplin Ordinary People Party supported the BPPS candidate; in Kherson, the Radical Party and Svoboda supported the self-nominated candidate.

28 For instance, only 10 out of 29 TECs published interim financial reports within the deadline.

29 Prior to the run-offs no cases concerning media conduct were reviewed by the NTBC. Prior to the 25 October elections, 69 cases of possible violations were noted, yet no resolute measures taken, and no fines introduced.

30 OSCE/ODIHR EOM long-term observers in Berdiansk, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Lutsk, Melitopol, Nikopol, Poltava, and Zhytomyr reported misuse of media owned/co-owned by local administrations. For instance, in Kremenchuk the oblast-owned broadcaster’s administration suspended news due to the biased reporting; in Melitopol the newly elected councillors tried to dismiss the director of the local state-owned television station MTV, as a result the debate between the candidates was cancelled and the daily work of the MTV’s news department was hindered.

31 In Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Kyiv one of the candidates refused to participate.
two cases one of the candidates refused to participate, in three cases the candidates had to pay for the participation in debates on the municipal channel. It is at odds with the fundamental principles of freedom of expression. Programmes, despite the shortcomings, were broadly appreciated and perceived as a first step towards issue-oriented political campaign.

Media monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM mirrored the tendencies observed prior to the first round. The same parties were granted most of the airtime in the broadcasters’ election related coverage. While 16 political parties whose candidates were standing for elections were mentioned in the media at least once, Oleksandr Vilkul (the OB mayoral candidate in Dnipropetrovsk) and Vitalii Klytchko (the BPSS mayoral candidate in Kyiv) were the most quoted political actors within the news. The print media’s editorial content was similarly tailored. None of the female candidates was quoted within the broadcasters prime-time election related programmes and the time-share allotted to them is below one per cent.

The campaign silence commences 24 hours prior to the polling. It was broadly respected, yet some local broadcasters broke the moratorium. Those violations remained unaddressed.

Complaints and Appeals

The CEC received 101 complaints following the 25 October election day. Out of a total of 304 complaints received since the start of the election process, most were rejected on technical grounds and only 19 were considered in session. All other complaints were considered by individual CEC members, whose decisions were communicated by letter and could not be appealed. This procedure is not in line with the OSCE commitments.

Following the 25 October elections, courts adjudicated some 435 cases. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM was informed of 118 requests for recounts related both to council and mayoral contests submitted to the courts. Courts ordered recounts in 25 cases and the rest were rejected as unsubstantiated or on procedural grounds. Additionally, in 140 cases, requests were made to declare elections invalid or as not held. Most of these were rejected on procedural grounds.
Twenty-nine complaints were filed with courts by internally displaced persons (IDPs) who sought to be included in the voter lists. In nine instances courts considered the IDP certificate as a proof of registration and obliged relevant PECs to include the claimants in the voter lists.40 Other complaints submitted to courts referred to issues of formation of election commissions, district delimitation, violation of campaign regulations, media conduct, vote-buying, and access of observers.

Whereas most of cases related to candidate and voter registration were considered on merits, almost all other cases were rejected on substance or dismissed on technical grounds. Decisions of cases considered on substance at times did not provide sound legal justification, which undermined the right to an effective remedy provided for by OSCE commitments and other international obligations.41

According to the information from the Ministry of Interior, as of 10 November, law enforcement agencies received 7,433 cases of alleged criminal offences and opened 525 criminal cases related to the elections.42 A large number of these concerned vote-buying, misuse of administrative resources, falsification of electoral documents and destruction of campaign materials.

**Election Day**

Dedicated and capable polling station staff organized voting and counting in a commendable manner. The CEC announced turnout at 34 per cent.

The OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers assessed opening of polling stations and voting positively in 99 per cent of observations. Voting procedures were largely followed and the process was calm and orderly, however a few technical irregularities were noted by OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers. In 3 per cent of polling stations observed the ballot boxes were not properly sealed. Unauthorized people were present in 8 per cent of polling stations observed, and were seen interfering in the process in a quarter of these. In 3 per cent of observations, not all voters marked their ballots in secrecy or folded them properly before depositing into the ballot box. In Dnipropetrovsk city, OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported cases of voters having invitation cards with bar codes allegedly with encoded personal details, which were collected by the activists of initiative “Vote” outside the polling stations.

Transparency was overall ensured and observers could follow procedures without restrictions in almost all polling stations observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM. In 2 per cent of cases, observers did not have a full view of the voting procedures largely due to inadequate layout or premises of the polling stations. About a third of polling stations observed were not accessible to people with disabilities.

Despite positive assessment some procedural irregularities of the counting process were nevertheless noted.43 In 19 per cent of observations, procedures were not strictly followed which led to counting discrepancies and in 17 per cent of observations PECs had to revise the figures publish the results. In the latter cases, the courts did not provide any further elaboration on the request to invalidate or declare elections as not held, and did not specify the consequences of their decisions.

40 According to the SVR the court decisions were not relevant for the second rounds and these voters have to apply again in order to be included in the voter lists.

41 Paragraph 5.10 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that “everyone will have an effective means of redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental human rights and ensure legal integrity.”

42 Out of the total number of cases, 5,983 were left without consideration on merits.

43 Procedural irregularities included cases when PECs did not announce number of counted counterfoils, unused ballots and number of signatures in the voter lists. In limited cases PECs did not vote on the contested ballots.
established earlier in the process. Unauthorized people were present in 6 per cent of polling stations observed. OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers were not provided with protocols in 8 per cent of cases and PECs did not post protocols at their premises in 29 per cent of observations, which limited transparency.

Candidate representatives were present during all stages of the process, while citizen observers were noted less frequently. It is noteworthy that OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported the presence of a relatively large number of so-called ‘journalists’ who at times could not name the organization they officially represented. These people in some cases interfered with the work of the commissions.

OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed tabulation in 67 out of 99 TECs. Tabulation was assessed positively in all but 4 TECs observed. The negative assessment could be linked to problems with transparency or general organization of the process. Access to data entry was limited for the OSCE/ODIHR EOM in 14 observations. Observers reported that not all PECs submitted complete protocols and that the figures did not always reconcile in 44 observations. In 10 cases, OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported that election material packs were tampered with.

The English version is the only official document. However, this statement is also available in Ukrainian and Russian.

MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The OSCE/ODIHR EOM opened in Kyiv on 9 September with 17 experts in the capital, and 80 long-term observers deployed throughout Ukraine. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM core team of experts and 52 long-term observers remained in the country to observe the second rounds of the 15 November mayoral contests. Tana de Zulueta (Italy) is the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM.

On election day of the second rounds, some, 320 observers from 44 countries, including 240 short-term observers were deployed. Voting was observed in over 1,100 out of some 5,000 polling stations. Counting was observed in 125 polling stations across the country. The tabulation process was observed in over 67 out of 99 TECs, so far.

The observers wish to thank the authorities of Ukraine for the invitation to observe the election, the Central Election Commission for its co-operation and for providing accreditation documents, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other authorities for their assistance and co-operation. The observers also wish to express appreciation to the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and embassies and international organizations accredited in Ukraine for their co-operation and support.

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