


Annual Risk Analysis 2015





Annual Risk Analysis 2015



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



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List of abbreviations used

APD	Asylum Procedures Directive
API	Advance Passenger Information
ARA	Annual Risk Analysis
BCP	border crossing point
CETI	<i>Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes</i> [Spanish Temporary Stay Centre for Immigrants]
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBF	External Borders Fund
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EPN	European Patrols Network
EU	European Union
eu-LISA	EU Agency for large-scale IT systems
EUR	euro
Eurodac	European Dactyloscopy
Europol	European Police Office
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IBSS	Bulgaria's Integrated Border Surveillance System
ID	identity document
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISS	Internal Security Strategy
JO	Joint Operation
JORA	Frontex Joint Operations Reporting Application
MS	Member State
NGO	non-government organisation
OCG	organised crime group
PHAME	Public Health Aspects of Migration in Europe
PNR	Passenger Name Record
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SIS	Schengen Information System
TB	tuberculosis
THB	trafficking in human beings
UK	United Kingdom
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA	United States of America
VIN	Vehicle Identification Number
VIS	Visa Information System
VLAP	Visa Liberalisation Action Plan
WHO	World Health Organization



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Executive summary

In 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing reached a new record, with more than 280 000 detections. The unprecedented number of migrants crossing illegally the external borders has roots in the fighting in Syria that has resulted in the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. Indeed, most of the detections at the borders concerned migrants from Syria, who later applied for asylum within the EU.

The record number of migrants detected at the external borders of the EU had several implications for border-control authorities and EU internal security:

- 1) Most of these detections were reported as part of search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean area. In 2014, border-control authorities saved the lives of thousands of people. However, facilitators increasingly utilised unsafe boats, with the inevitable result that migrants' lives were put at risk.
- 2) The very high demand for illegal crossing to the EU, fuelled by the record number of successful entries, also led to a new *modus operandi*. Since September 2014, the use of large cargo ships to transport migrants directly from the Turkish coast near Mersin to Italy has been reported. This is a multi-million-euro business for organised crime groups (OCG), which is likely to be replicated in other departure countries. Another

worrying trend has been the increasing number of deliberate attempts to involve merchant ships in rescuing migrants. This has prompted the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to voice the concerns of the shipping industry over its involvement in rescuing irregular migrants.

- 3) With record numbers of migrants crossing the border illegally, resources are devoted to their immediate care, rather than screening and obtaining information on their basic characteristics such as nationality. After they are rescued, they continue their journey to other Member States and not knowing who is travelling within the EU is a vulnerability for EU internal security.

The profile of detected irregular migrants remained relatively unchanged compared to 2013, being mostly adult males. However, the proportion of women (11%) and children (15%) reflects the fact that many migrants move to the EU with the intention of claiming asylum, thereby escaping violence in their own country.

Most migrants were detected in the Central Mediterranean area, where detections totalled over 170 000. On the Eastern Mediterranean route detections totalled over 50 800. Towards the end of 2014, detections sharply increased at the Hungarian land border with Serbia, making the Western Bal-



kan route (with 43 357 detections) the third most important irregular migration route towards the EU.

Detections of clandestine entry in vehicles increased strongly from 599 in 2013 to 3 052 in 2014. This rise was due to a tenfold increase in detections reported from the Bulgarian BCPs along the land border with Turkey.

In 2014, there were just over 9 400 detections of document fraud cases on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which represented a slight decrease compared to the previous year. By contrast, cases reported on intra-EU Schengen movements showed a marked increase from 7 867 in 2013 to 9 968 in 2014 (+27%). Thus, for the first time, there were more fraudulent documents detected on intra-EU/Schengen movements than during border checks on passengers arriving from third countries. This is partly due to the large number of migrants undertaking secondary movements within the EU, often with fraudulent documents obtained in the country of their entry into the EU.

The facilitation of illegal migration remains a significant threat to the EU external borders. Detections of facilitators rose from 7 252 in 2013 to 10 234 in 2014. The increase was mostly due to higher numbers reported in Spain, Italy and Bulgaria.

Member States reported more than 114 000 refusals of entry issued at the external borders of the EU, a decrease of 11% compared to 2013. The decrease is the consequence of the record high of 2013, when an exceptionally large number of Russians of Chechen origin were refused entry because they lacked a valid visa.

In 2014, there were 441 780 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which represents an increase compared to the year before. Most of the increase was due to a higher number

of detected Syrians and Eritreans who later applied for asylum.

A total of 252 003 third-country nationals were subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was a 12% increase compared to 2013.

In 2014, there were 161 309 third-country nationals effectively returned to countries outside the EU, which was broadly similar to the numbers returned in 2013. The UK was the Member State that conducted the largest number of returns (36 313), with steady trends to India and Pakistan. Greece reported an increase in effective returns, mostly of Albanians.

As regards the wider geopolitical context, two issues clearly stand out: the conflict in Syria and the continued volatility in North African countries, notably Libya, from where migrants often depart in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea. The large number of displaced Syrians in the Middle East and North Africa suggests that Syria will likely remain the top country of origin for irregular migrants and asylum seekers in the EU for some time to come. In Libya, migrants are in an extremely vulnerable situation, especially those in areas affected by the fighting. Migrants in Libya also face arbitrary detention and very poor conditions of detention, marked by overcrowding, poor sanitation and exploitation.

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine will continue to be an important factor affecting population movements. However, so far it has not resulted in marked changes in illegal migration movements towards the EU. The main development along the eastern land border has been the reduction in the number of regular passengers from the Russian Federation to the EU due to the economic downturn.

Looking ahead, the likelihood of a large number of illegal border-crossings to the EU is high and so is the probability of a large number of migrants needing assistance in terms of search and rescue operations (but also the provision of international protection), in particular in the southern section of the external border, on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Central Mediterranean routes. Many migrants who cross illegally and apply for asylum are not detained and thus continue making their journey within the EU.

Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU.

These risks are common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flows and border checks, which are a specific expertise of border-control authorities. Most cases of fraud are expected to involve EU travel documents and there are indications of a shift away from the use of passports towards less sophisticated documents such as ID cards and residence permits.

Overall, there is an underlying threat of terrorism-related travel movements especially due to the appeal of the Syrian conflict to both idealist and radicalised youths. The conflict in Syria has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters, including EU citizens, dual-nationality holders and other third-country nationals.



1. Introduction

The Frontex Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) 2015 presents a European summary of trends and developments along the external borders of the Member States of the EU. This analysis is based on information provided to Frontex by the EU Member States and Schengen Associated countries throughout 2014, as well as information collected during Frontex Joint Operations and from open sources.


The analysis starts with an overview of the situation before the border based on data for Schengen uniform visas. It then looks at the situation along the external border, based on trends in regular passenger flows, detections of illegal border-crossing, clandestine entries and refusals of entry. Finally, the report provides an update on the situation regarding persons staying illegally in the EU and third-country nationals returned.

Frontex operational activities aim at strengthening border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external

borders. The coordination of operational activities also contributes to better allocation of Member States' resources and protection of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The ARA 2015 concentrates on the current scope of Frontex operational activities, which focus on irregular migration at the external borders of EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. In line with the concept of integrated border management (IBM), border management should not be limited to controlling illegal migration but also cover threats to the EU internal security. Thus a full section is dedicated to the analysis of cross-border crime.

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) would like to express its gratitude to all members of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) in Member States for their efforts in providing data and information, as well as Europol, EASO and the WHO PHAME programme, which have contributed to the ARA 2015, and all Frontex colleagues involved in the preparation of this report.



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2. Methodology

Data exchange

A coherent and full analysis of the risks affecting security at the external borders requires, above all, the adoption of common indicators. Consistent monitoring of these indicators will then allow effective measures to be taken on the ground.

The backbone of the ARA 2015 is the monthly statistics exchanged among Member States within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). This regular data-exchange exercise was launched in September 2007 and then refined in 2008. Thanks to FRAN members' efforts, a much larger statistical coverage was achieved in 2011. Additional requirements were added in 2014, and active collaboration with EASO means that their data on asylum applications are now privileged over data collected through the FRAN. Thus, for the ARA 2015, the key indicators collected through FRAN were: detections of illegal border-crossing through the green border or at BCPs; refusals of entry; detections of illegal stay; detections of facilitators; detections of forged documents; return decisions and effective returns; and passenger flow (when available). Data on asylum applications are still being collected within the FRAN, but increasingly Frontex relies on data collected by EASO to analyse the situation regarding asylum.

Data on the number of EU visas issued and their places of issue would improve the characterisation of third-country passenger flows.

However, this information, which is collected within the Council's Visa Working Party and published by the European Commission, is not yet available for 2014. For the purpose of the ARA, data from 2008 to 2013 are discussed as an introduction to the general situation at the borders.

Member States were not requested to answer specific questions in support of this analysis. Rather, bi-monthly analytical reports and incident reports of Member States routinely collected within the FRAN were used as important sources of information, especially as regards the analysis of routes and *modi operandi*.

Open-source information was also effectively exploited, especially in identifying the main push and pull factors for irregular migration to the EU. Among others, these sources included reports issued by government agencies, international and non-governmental organisations, as well as official EU reports, such as the European Commission's reports on third countries, and mainstream news agencies.

In addition, Frontex organised an Annual Analytical Review to consolidate the risk analyses presented in the FRAN Quarterlies for 2014 and also to gather knowledge on likely risks of irregular migration at the EU's external borders. Participants of the FRAN were invited in January 2015 to review and comment on the risks identified at the external borders during a one-day exercise.



The data exchange was overseen by Frontex involving national border-control authorities. Data were categorised by border type (land, air and sea) and those on land borders were additionally categorised by border section with neighbouring third countries.

The data exchanged within the FRAN are compiled and analysed on a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the use of data for management purposes and to its fast sharing among Member State border-control authorities. Member States' data processed by Frontex are not treated as official statistics and thus may occasionally vary from those officially published by national authorities.

Throughout 2014, some FRAN members performed backdated updates of their 2013 statistics. These updates have been accounted for in this document and so some data presented herein may differ from the data presented a year ago in the Annual Risk Analysis 2014.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders, if any, between the Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders, if any, between the Schengen Member States and Member States not yet part of the Schengen area (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Cyprus) or Member States that have opted-out from Schengen (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU

and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals per airport.

Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variations in administrative data related to border control depend on several factors. In this case, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting irregular migrants and the actual flow of irregular migrants to the EU. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to a real increase in the flow of irregular migrants or may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect them. In exceptional cases, increased resources may produce a rise in reported detections while effectively masking an actual decrease in the flow of migrants, resulting from a strong deterrent effect.

Information on national-level resources for border-control authorities and their allocation is currently only partially known by Frontex. These data are provided by Member States themselves either within the Schengen evaluation mechanism or within the External Borders Fund (EBF) reporting. Without systematic and reliable information on resources allocated to border control and without estimates of irregular migration flows, it is not possible to assess the performance and impact of the border controls put in place and the analyses of the situation at the EU's external borders are limited to descriptive statistics of the administrative data provided by Member States.

Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

A key development in the CIRAM 2.0 update released in 2011 was the adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that

defines risk as a function of the threat, vulnerability and impact. Such an approach endeavours to reflect the spirit of the Schengen Borders Code and the Frontex Regulation,

both of which emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within the constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment.



3. Situational picture in 2014

3.1. Passenger flow across the external borders

Passenger flow is highly correlated with the volumes of checks that border guards have to perform at the BCPs. The composition and volume of passenger flow determine to a large extent the planning and allocation of resources that will be needed.

At a European level, there is no systematic reporting on passenger flows by BCP, border section or as a total for the EU's external border. Some external indicators can be used to raise awareness on the trend, like growth in air traffic movements, tickets sold by ferry companies, and the like. However, these external indicators are insufficient to properly and rapidly highlight the trend. Despite these shortcomings, some initiatives are being de-

veloped, such as the Smart Borders Package currently in the pilot phase. Hopefully, this may lead to the roll-out of an EU Entry/Exit System that will remedy this lack of reliable data. In parallel, Frontex and Member States, under the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), have started to report passenger flow on a monthly basis. This initiative is still in its infancy, and the data collection is done on a voluntary basis (13 Member States did not report any monthly data for 2014). Nevertheless, this reporting should shed some light on the broad characteristics of passenger flows across the external borders.

At the macro level, since 2008 two factors have contributed to significant changes in passenger flow: the first one was the economic crisis that translated into a decrease in passenger flow in 2009–2010, in particular at the air bor-

Table 1. Summary of FRAN indicators

FRAN indicator	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% change on prev. year
Illegal entries between BCPs	104 599	104 060	141 051	72 437	107 365	283 532	164
Clandestine entries at BCPs	296	242	282	591	599	3 052	410
Facilitators	9 171	8 629	6 957	7 662	7 252	10 234	41
Illegal stay	412 125	353 077	350 948	344 928	345 098	441 780	28
Refusals of entry ¹	113 029	108 651	118 277	116 524	129 235	114 887	-11
Persons using fraudulent documents ²	:	:	5 255	7 804	9 804	9 420	-3.9
Return decisions issued ³	:	:	231 385	269 949	224 305	252 003	12
Effective returns	:	:	149 045	158 955	160 418	161 309	0.6
Other indicators							
Issued visas (source: Commission)	10 270 107	11 857 352	13 521 706	14 263 225	16 196 350	:	n.a.
Passenger flow ⁴	660 000 000	675 000 000	701 000 000	:	:	:	n.a.

¹ In addition, Spain reported refusals of entry in Ceuta and Melilla, which totalled: 492 742 in 2008; 374 845 in 2009; 280 625 in 2010; and 215 021 in 2011.

² Decisions not available for France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. For 2014, data from Austria are not available. Data for France are not available for 2011 and 2012.

³ Figures provided by Member States to the European Commission in the framework of the EU External Borders Fund.

: not available
n.a. not applicable

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 9 February 2015



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der. The second was the visa liberalisation policy and local border traffic agreements that resulted in higher passenger flows, mostly at the land borders with Western Balkan countries, especially at the Hungarian land border with Serbia, i.e. along the main road connection of the Western Balkans to the EU. Even though the lack of passenger flow data does not warrant the comparison of flows at the land and air borders, since 2010, refusals of entry have been larger at the land borders than at the air borders, which suggests a heavier workload at the former type of border.

Air borders

At the air borders, Member State border-control authorities do not collect data on passengers going through border checks in a systematic way. Some Member States have national Entry-Exit systems in place that record the number and nationality of the passengers in detail, but most Member States do not directly collect detailed statistics but

rely on information provided by air carriers (flight manifests and/or API transmissions). At the air border, data from Eurostat on extra-EU arrivals are the best approximation of the flow of passengers, but this flow does not correspond to the total flow of passengers going through border checks as it does not take into account the flow between Schengen and non-Schengen Member States.

Eurostat annual totals for 2014 are not yet available but earlier data can also provide some valuable insights (see Fig. 1). In 2013 compared to 2012 the increase in arrivals requiring border checks (arrivals from third countries, as well as between Schengen and non-Schengen Member States and between non-Schengen Member States) was more pronounced (+20%) than in the case of arrivals not requiring any checks (+9%, within Schengen Member States). This means that border-control authorities saw their workload at airports considerably increasing in 2013. The rising trend in passenger flow is


Table 2. Arrivals at EU airports 2009–2013

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Arrivals intra-EU/Schengen	451 752 882	458 234 222	491 812 533	488 918 164	548 556 638
Arrivals from EU non-Schengen to EU non-Schengen	35 261 246	31 902 549	32 087 444	31 995 197	34 482 692
Arrivals from EU non-Schengen to Schengen	54 776 399	53 439 118	58 423 605	59 036 633	70 922 296
Arrivals from Schengen to EU non-Schengen	54 519 640	53 110 401	57 532 214	58 377 691	71 831 715
Arrivals from Schengen to Schengen	307 195 597	319 782 154	343 769 270	339 508 643	371 319 935
Arrivals from third countries	98 858 409	107 624 147	111 537 220	116 833 684	143 536 433
Arrivals from third country to EU non-Schengen	27 444 807	27 973 986	28 478 404	29 057 849	34 160 798
Arrivals from third country to Schengen	71 413 602	79 650 161	83 058 816	87 775 835	109 375 635
Arrivals and border checks					
Arrivals requiring border checks	243 415 694	246 076 215	259 580 483	266 243 205	320 773 136
Arrivals not requiring border checks	307 195 597	319 782 154	343 769 270	339 508 643	371 319 935

Source: Eurostat data as of 20 January 2015



Figure 1. Arrivals requiring and not requiring border checks at EU airports in 2009–2013



Source: Eurostat data as of 20 January 2015

mostly due to the growing passenger flow on major air routes.

Third-country airports of departure to the EU

The USA remains the main departure third country for arrivals in the EU, representing 19% of all arrivals from third countries in 2013 (with about 27 million passengers), yet the largest increase was observed for arrivals from Turkey: from about 16 million in 2012 to nearly 20 million in 2013 (+25%). In fact, two Turkish airports, Istanbul (more than 7 million arrivals) and the leisure airport Antalya (6.5 million arrivals), are in the top three airports for arrivals in the EU. The largest absolute increase between 2012 and 2013 was reported for arrivals from Dubai airport, which increased from 5.6 million in 2012 to nearly 7 million in 2013 (+25%).

Arrivals from the Russian Federation (mostly from Moscow Sheremetyevo airport) have also constantly increased since 2009, to reach a record high in 2013 with 11 million arrivals, but this trend is expected to stop in 2014, because of the economic downturn in the Russian Federation and the depreciation of the

ruble against the euro which have a negative impact on numbers of travellers to the EU.

Land borders

Information available on passenger traffic at the external land borders of the EU is scarce. Under FRAN data collection scheme on passenger flow, ten Member States reported data on passenger flow at their land border on a monthly basis in 2014. Information for some of the busiest land borders is still missing, notably at the Bulgarian and Greek land border with Turkey, and at the Croatian border with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.

In 2014, the ten Member States reporting data on passenger flow together totalled about 50 million arrivals at the land borders. The traffic was the heaviest at the borders with the Russian Federation (Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), with about 13 million passengers. On an annual basis, passenger flow from Ukraine followed. However, through the year, these two flows showed diverging trends, with passenger flow from the Russian Federation decreasing and passenger flow from Ukraine slightly increasing.

Indeed, passenger flow sharply dropped at all border sections with the Russian Federation after August 2014, as a consequence of the economic downturn in the Russian Federation and the depreciation of the rouble against the euro. This makes any purchase in the EU much less accessible for Russian customers. On the other hand, this situation is likely to favour the growth of petty smuggling across the border. Indeed, wider price difference in the rouble for products like cigarettes will make it more attractive for Russian smugglers to export illegally to the EU.

In terms of nationalities, Ukrainians were ranking first for passenger flow. The largest

increase was, however, reported for Moldovans after the introduction of visa liberalisation regime that entered into force in 2014.

Land BCP check practices and land BCPs themselves vary widely. This sets them apart from air borders, as airports constitute a controlled environment where practices can be more easily standardised. Moreover, the rate at which traffic flows across land BCPs are determined not only by Member States but also by the practices of neighbouring third countries. Bilateral cooperation is thus fundamental to facilitating transit. Unlike at the air border, early warnings at land BCPs are rarely available, which limits the ability of border management authorities to allocate resources in advance. Finally, land borders can be subject to massive or emergency flows, for which contingency planning is necessary.

3.2. Visas

The Community Code on Visas, which entered into force in April 2010, sets out the common requirements for issuing transit and short-term visas to enter the territory of Member States. There are currently over 100 nationalities that require a visa to enter the EU, covering more than 80% of non-EU population of the world. Nevertheless, about 1 billion nationals from approximately 40 third countries do not require an EU visa. These include Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the USA. As indicated in the Visa Code, statistical data are an important means of monitoring migratory movements and can serve as an efficient management tool.

Generally, a short-stay visa issued by one of the Schengen states (visa C) entitles its holder to travel throughout the 26 Schengen states for up to three months within a six-month period. Visas for visits exceeding that period remain subject to national procedures.

The data include visas issued by the Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), but do not include those issued by Croatia, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria, which have not yet joined the Schengen area, nor visas issued by the UK and Ireland, which are not part of the Schengen area.

Data on visa issuance by Member States and third countries of issuance are not yet available for 2014, but the European Commission, through its Directorate-General Home Affairs, has released the data for 2013. VIS data are collected on the basis of the place of application rather than the citizenship of the visa applicant. Thus, for instance, applications made in the Russian Federation do not necessarily represent only Russian nationals. However, for the purpose of the following overview, the country where the visas were delivered was used as the most suitable approximation of the visas issued to citizens of that country. Visas broken down by nationalities are available at the national level, where they can be used for operational purposes.

In 2013, a total of 16 196 350 short-term uniform visas were issued, representing an increase of 14% compared to 2012. Most of the visas (61%) were issued in just three countries: the Russian Federation, which alone accounted for 43% of all visas issued in 2013, with almost 7 million visas, as well as Ukraine (1.5 million, 9%) and China (1.4 million, 9%). There are, however, important differences between these three countries in the purpose of travel and frequency of trips. Multiple-entry visas accounted for 49% of all visas issued in the Russian Federation, but only for 13% of those issued in China. Indeed, many Chinese applied for short-term visas as part of their tourist package in the EU. According to the World Tourism Organization, China is now the leading nation in terms of tourism expenditure worldwide, and this trend will further consolidate.



Table 3. **Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders

Routes	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of parent row total	% change on previous year
Central Mediterranean route (ITA and MLT)	11 043	4 450	64 261	15 151	45 298	170 664	60	277
Syria	40	191	283	581	11 503	39 651	23	245
Eritrea	1 084	55	659	1 889	10 398	33 559	20	223
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals	0	0	0	0	0	26 340	15	n.a.
Eastern Mediterranean route (GRC, BGR AND CYP)	39 975	55 688	57 025	37 224	24 799	50 834	18	105
Sea	28 848	6 175	1 467	4 370	11 831	44 057	87	272
Syria	184	139	76	906	5 361	27 025	61	404
Afghanistan	11 758	1 373	310	1 593	4 080	11 582	26	184
Somalia	5 675	416	42	56	526	1 621	3.7	208
Land	11 127	49 513	55 558	32 854	12 968	6 777	13	-48
Syria	354	495	1 216	6 216	7 366	4 648	69	-37
Afghanistan	639	21 389	19 308	7 973	2 049	893	13	-56
Iraq	2 674	2 704	1 054	987	372	483	7.1	30
Western Balkan route	3 089	2 371	4 658	6 391	19 951	43 357	15	117
Kosovo*	705	372	498	942	6 303	22 059	51	250
Afghanistan	700	469	983	1 665	2 174	8 342	19	284
Syria	0	12	34	178	1 171	7 320	17	525
Circular route from Albania to Greece	40 250	35 297	5 269	5 502	8 728	8 841	3.1	1.3
Albania	38 017	32 451	5 022	5 398	8 592	8 757	99	1.9
FYR Macedonia	97	49	23	36	21	31	0.4	48
Georgia	12	16	21	7	23	14	0.2	-39
Western Mediterranean route	6 642	5 003	8 448	6 397	6 838	7 842	2.8	15
Sea	5 003	3 436	5 103	3 558	2 609	4 755	61	82
Cameroon	122	254	181	146	255	845	18	231
Algeria	3 190	1 242	1 037	1 048	536	734	15	37
Morocco	254	300	775	364	282	468	10	66
Land	1 639	1 567	3 345	2 839	4 229	3 087	39	-27
Mali	:	:	:	:	:	669	22	n.a.
Cameroon	:	:	:	:	:	652	21	n.a.
Syria	:	:	:	:	:	405	13	n.a.
Eastern borders route	1 335	1 052	1 049	1 597	1 316	1 275	0.4	-3
Vietnam	31	39	23	158	149	257	20	72
Afghanistan	163	132	105	200	149	209	16	40
Georgia	173	144	209	328	235	171	13	-27
Black Sea route	1	0	0	1	148	433	0.2	193
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	62	261	60	321
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	90	21	n.a.
Iran	0	0	0	1	0	45	10	n.a.
Western African route	2 244	196	340	174	283	276	0.1	-3
Morocco	176	179	321	104	104	52	19	-50
Guinea	304	0	4	2	12	50	18	317
Senegal	186	2	4	15	10	26	9.4	160
Other	20	3	1	0	4	10	0	150
Russian Federation	0	2	0	0	0	4	40	n.a.
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	3	30	n.a.
Serbia	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	n.a.
Total	104 599	104 060	141 051	72 437	107 365	283 532	100	164

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

In 2013, the Schengen Member State reporting the issuance of most short-term visas was France (2.3 million worldwide). For the first time, Italy (1.9 million) and Spain (1.89 million) issued more visas than Germany (1.85 million).

The granting of visa-free regime to Moldova in 2014 considerably increased passenger flows, but in contrast to the situation in the Western Balkans did not result in an increase in asylum applications.


3.3. Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs

In 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing reached a new record, with more than 280 000 detections. This was twice as many as the previous record of 140 000 detections in 2011, the year of the Arab Spring. This unprecedented number of migrants crossing illegally the external border has roots in the fighting in Syria that have created the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. Indeed, most of the detections at the borders concern migrants from Syria, who later applied for asylum within the EU.

The unprecedented number of migrants detected at the external border of the EU had several implications for border-control authorities and EU internal security:

- 1) Most of these detections were reported as part of search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean area. In 2014, border-control authorities saved the lives of thousands of people. Not all could be saved unfortunately, as facilitators have increasingly chartered unsafe boats, stretching to the limit the capacities of surveillance and rescue.
- 2) The very high demand for crossing to the EU has also created new *modus operandi*. Since September, there has been an in-

Figure 2. Detections of illegal border-crossing in 2014, by gender and age of detected migrants



Source: JORA data as of 9 February 2015


creasing use of large cargo ships to transport migrants directly from the Turkish coast near Syria to Italy. This is a multi-million-euro business for OCG, which is likely to be replicated in other departure countries. Another worrying trend has been the increasing deliberate attempts to involve merchant ships to rescue migrants. This has prompted the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to voice concerns over the involvement of the shipping industry in rescuing irregular migrants.

- 3) With a record level of migrants crossing the border illegally, resources are devoted to their immediate care, but not towards screening and obtaining information on basic characteristics like their nationality. As migrants quickly continue their journey to other Member States, increasing the movements of persons staying illegally within the EU, this puts the EU internal security at risk.

Similarly to last year, most of detected migrants were adult men (see Fig. 2). However,



Figure 3. Top increases and decreases from 2013 to 2014, by nationality of migrants detected for illegal border-crossing between BCPs



* In 2014, 99% were reported as unspecified sub-Saharan nationals

Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

the proportion of women and children reflects the fact that most migrants are seeking asylum in the EU, escaping violence in their own country.

Indeed, **Syrians** alone (79 169) represented more than a quarter (28%) of the total as shown in Figure 3. They were also the top nationality for other indicators, in particular asylum applications, reflecting the dire situation in Syria and the desperate plight of Syrian asylum seekers. However, the vast majority of Syrians did not apply for asylum in the Member States of entry but rather in other Member States for many different reasons, notably because they expect to receive more attractive welfare benefits.

Regarding **Eritreans**, their detections in 2014 reached a record level (more than 34 500, compared to 11 300 in 2013). They were mostly arriving through Libya on the Central Mediterranean route. Like Syrians, they did not apply for asylum in the Member States of entry, but rather continued to other Member States. Many of the Eritreans stated that they had lived for some time in Libya but decided to leave because of the violence.

Detections of **Afghans** sharply increased from about 9 500 in 2013 to more than 22 000 in 2014. Afghans were detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route (mostly crossing the Eastern Aegean Sea), and then once again on the Western Balkan route.

Detections of citizens from **Kosovo*** crossing the land border illegally between Serbia and Hungary sharply increased in November and December 2014. This trend coincided with rumours among Kosovo's population that it would be now easier to obtain asylum in the EU. By the end of the year their detections totalled 22 069.


Routes

■ Central Mediterranean route

In 2014, more than 170 000 migrants arrived irregularly in the EU through the Central Mediterranean route (see Fig. 4). As in 2013 and in 2011, the Central Mediterranean route was the main area for illegal border-crossing into the EU, representing 60% of all detections in 2014. Detections were the largest between June and September at over 20 000 per month, but throughout the year, monthly detections were larger than in 2013. Most migrants were Syrians and Eritreans departing from the Libyan coast.

The vast majority were rescued by border-control authorities after issuing a distress call; however, despite best efforts there were many fatalities. Smugglers typically make use of frail, overcrowded boats, with limited fuel available to maximise their profits, putting migrants' lives at considerable risk. The role of the Italian Navy and the JO Hermes/Triton was crucial in rescuing an unprecedented number of migrants. Despite these efforts, around 3 400 people died or went missing at sea in 2014 and around 2 800 since the beginning of July according to UNHCR estimates.

Figure 4. **Detections of illegal border-crossing in 2014 with percentage change on 2013, by route**




Besides naval assets, civilian vessels have been increasingly involved in the detection and rescue of migrants at sea (see Fig. 5). According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), more than 600 merchant ships have been diverted from their routes to rescue persons at sea in 2014. These deviations are, in the words of the Secretary General, detrimental to shipping and are not offset by any realistic prospects of salvage awards.

In addition to migrants leaving from Libya, since September 2014, an increasing number of cases have been reported of cargo vessels being used to smuggle migrants from Turkey directly to Italy. This new trend affects the Eastern Mediterranean route, as the departure area, and the Central Mediterranean area, as the arrival area. This practice is further developed under the section related to the Eastern Mediterranean route.



Figure 5. Relative shares of different vessels performing search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean in May–December 2014



Source: JORA data as of 9 February 2015

As migrants were rescued in high-sea, they were reported as part of the Central Mediterranean route. Many were disembarked in Apulia and Calabria, to alleviate the burden on reception capacity in Sicily. From a statistical point of view, these disembarkations artificially inflated the number of migrants usually reported on the Apulia and Calabria route. In 2014, there were fewer migrants departing from Egypt and targeting this area of the Italian coast than in 2013.

Nationalities

Once rescued, migrants declare their nationality and this information is used to determine the main countries of origin. Since June 2014, due to the large number of migrants arriving, this information has been either slowly or partially reported under the heading 'sub-Saharan' for many migrants coming from Africa (26 340, or 15% of arrivals in the Central Mediterranean in 2014). Migrants' declarations of nationality are also increasingly difficult to validate, as they often lack travel documents and, with border-control authorities working under increasing pressure there are fewer possibilities to check their validity.

Among the migrants who declared their nationalities, Syrians (nearly 40 000) and Eritreans (more than 33 500) were by far the largest group, together accounting for more than 43% of all arrivals in the Central Mediterranean.

■ Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a hotspot of irregular migration (see Fig. 6). In 2014, 50 800 detections were reported from the area, representing 18% of the EU total. This was twice as many as in 2013, mostly due to a sharp increase in detections in the Aegean Sea (from 11 829 in 2013 to 43 377 in 2014). Detections remained comparatively much lower at the Bulgarian and Greek land borders with Turkey (12 262 in 2013 and 5 938 in 2014).


Sea border

Aegean Sea

Compared to the previous year, the sharp increase in the Aegean Sea in 2014 meant that migrants departed from more areas, and also arrived on a larger number of islands. While the islands reporting the largest number of arrivals remained Lesbos, Chios and Samos, detections were also reported from small islands from North to South, stretching capacity of surveillance. Many migrants claimed to be Syrian, and were thus handed an administrative notice allowing them to stay in Greece for up to six months, even without applying for asylum.

Screening processes of some migrants revealed a high degree of falsely claimed nationalities to avoid return. Not knowing the nationality of migrants who are illegally crossing the border and travelling within the EU is evidently a vulnerability for EU internal security.

Figure 6. Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs on the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2009–2014 (graph) and in 2014, by border section (map)



Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

The presence of the screening teams also has a preventive effect. Migrants aware of being screened tend to state their true nationality. This could be indirectly established when comparing the proportion of migrants reporting to be Syrians in islands where screening teams were active, with their proportion in islands where no screening teams were present. In 2014, out of the total of 18 662 migrants arriving in Lesbos and Samos, two islands with screening teams, 36% declared to be Syrians. By contrast, over the same period, out of 14 802 migrants reported in the islands of Kalymnos, Kos, Leros, Limnos, Patmos, Rhodes and Symi, seven islands without screening teams, 86% declared being from Syria.

Increasing use of cargo ships

Since August 2014 the number of irregular migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean from Turkey sharply increased compared to earlier in the year and to the same period in 2013. This sharp increase was directly related to the use of cargo ships to facilitate migrants and asylum seekers from Turkey to Italy (for example, see Fig. 7).

To date, Mersin has been the place where those wishing to travel to the EU in an irregular fashion have made contact with the smuggling networks. Wooden boats, however, have departed from various points along south-eastern Turkish coast such as Mersin, Adana and Hatay provinces to reach cargo vessels waiting off shore.

Smuggling migrants from Turkey on board large cargo vessels is extremely profitable, and such funds are likely to be an important source of income for smuggling networks also engaged in other criminal activities. This means that the criminal networks might be financing other criminal activities by exploiting and putting at risk vulnerable groups of displaced families from Syria.



Specifically, the cargo ships, which are often bought as scrap, tend to cost between EUR 150 000 and 400 000. There are often as many as 200–800 migrants on board, each paying EUR 4 500–6 000 for the trip, either in cash a few days before the departure or by Hawala payment after reaching the Italian coast. The cost is high because the *modus operandi* is viewed as being safe and has been demonstrated as being successful.

Hence, the gross income for a single journey can be as high as EUR 2.5 or even 4 million depending on the size of the vessel and the number of migrants on board. In some cases, the profit is likely to be between EUR 1.5 and 3 million once other overheads such as recruiters, safe houses, shuttle vessels, crew and fuel have been taken into account. Given this level of financial gain it is important to act against this *modus operandi* not only to stem the flow of irregular migration but also to limit the financial assets of the smuggling networks.

Land border

Compared to detection at the sea borders, detections at the Bulgarian and Greek land border with Turkey have been much lower, totalling less than 6 000 detections.

In Bulgaria, as a consequence of increased Bulgarian operational measures, including an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS) and a special police operation, the level of detections decreased compared to 2013 and tended to be mostly reported from the eastern part of the border, not covered by the IBSS.

In Greece, while detections at the green border and at BCPs were low, some migrants were reportedly hiding in vehicles detected on the highways inside Greece. Similarly, some interviews with migrants conducted in Italy indicated that they had entered illegally without being detected at the border. While the reliability of these interviews is difficult to as-

certain, they point to the fact that a certain proportion of migrants who entered illegally went undetected.

■ Western Balkan route

For the second year in a row, detections in the Western Balkans strongly increased, from 6 391 in 2012, to 19 951 in 2013 and 43 357 in 2014.


The Western Balkan route remained largely a function of the transiting flow of migrants that enter the EU at the Greek-Turkish borders and later continue towards other Member States through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia. This is reflected in the large number of detections of Afghans and Syrians at the Hungarian land border, whose number increased five-fold compared to 2013, like they increased in the Aegean Sea.

However, nearly half the detections were citizens of Kosovo*, representing a distinct flow of migrants in the Western Balkans. Their detections surged from less than 1 000 per month before September 2014, to more than 9 000 in December. This ten times increase in a few months is one of the sharpest recorded in the FRAN data, comparable to pace of the increase in the Central Mediterranean that peaked in the summer. This trend could partly be attributed to rumours among the Kosovo* population that after France decided to remove Kosovo* from the national list of safe countries it will be much easier to obtain asylum in that Member State.

During 2014 most detected individuals immediately applied for asylum. As a result asylum applications in Hungary mirrored the increase in pressure at this border section, increasing to unprecedented levels for this country – more than 43 000 applications submitted in 2014, about half being submitted by Kosovo* citizens. These migrants were

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 7. Example of route taken from Turkey to Italy by the cargo ship *Sandy* in December 2014



only attempting to cross the green border into Hungary, rather than attempting to enter via the BCPs, as there is no indication of increased refusals of entry or use of fraudulent documents at any of the BCPs between Hungary and Serbia.

Despite the apparently tight relationship between illegal border-crossing and applications for asylum, it is not supposed that all migrants crossing this border section immediately ap-

plied for asylum in Hungary, as asylum applications submitted by citizens of Kosovo* also increased in Germany over the same period. This means that, for most migrants, Hungary is not their final destination and they will continue their journey through the Schengen area. It also means that, to avoid later return to Hungary, migrants will increasingly attempt to avoid detection at the border, and only apply for asylum in Hungary as a last resort option if detected by border-control authorities.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



■ Circular route between Albania and Greece

In 2014, Greece reported 8 841 detections of illegal border-crossing at its land border with Albania and with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of which 8 757 were associated with Albanians. This represented a stable trend compared to the previous year. Prior to visa liberalisation in 2011, detections at this border section had ranged between 38 000 and 30 000 a year.

The introduction of visa liberalisation went together with a small increase in refusals of entry as more Albanians crossed the border at BCPs. However, in 2014 refusals of entry decreased at this land border compared to 2013, probably due to the decreasing flow of seasonal workers to Greece. Indeed, many Albanians are attempting to travel to other Member States than Greece, as reflected in their increasing refusals of entry, notably due to document fraud, in several Member States. These trends may reflect a general migration trend for Albanians within the EU.

■ Western Mediterranean route

In 2014 there were 7 842 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast and the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla. This total shows an increase of 15% compared to the total of 6 838 reported in 2013.

Like in 2013, the first half of 2014 showed most detections being reported at the land border, mostly from Melilla. Indeed, the Spanish authorities reported several violent attempts to cross the fence.

As mitigating measures, the fence has been upgraded. As a result, in the second half of the year, Spain reported more detections at the sea border than at the land border.

Once in Melilla, migrants are turned over to Spanish Police Headquarters for identification, and many are transferred to the Temporary Centre for Immigrants (CETI – *Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes*). However, this centre only has a limited capacity and some migrants had to be transferred to mainland Spain.

In terms of nationality, most of the migrants are from Western Africa, in particular from Cameroon and Mali. Algerians and Moroccans have also been reported among the top ten nationalities, but mostly at the sea border.

Since November 2014, Spain also reported an increase in detections of illegal border-crossing of Syrians at the land border (more than 250 in November and December), then applying for asylum. This increase, combining with increasing detections of Syrians using forged document to enter to the EU, has prompted Spain to open asylum and international protection offices at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla in March 2015.

■ Black Sea route

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the Black Sea were extremely rare. However, since 2013, Bulgaria and Romania have reported an increasing number of detections, totalling 433 migrants in 2014.

These incidents still constitute isolated cases, and are possibly linked to the increased surveillance on the Eastern Mediterranean route and the increasing number of migrants waiting in Turkey to reach the EU illegally.

■ Eastern land border route

The eastern land border route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Despite the total length of all the bor-

der sections, detections on this route tend to be lower than on other routes, possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and many countries of origin. Also, according to several reports shared during 2014, visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing.

Detections of illegal border-crossing remained stable, with 1 275 detections (compared to 1 316 in 2013). In 2014, most detections were reported at the land border between Lithuania and Belarus. Most of these detections were of Vietnamese nationals arriving after transiting through Belarus.

By contrast to other routes, a large proportions of these detections were connected with the smuggling of goods rather than irregular migration. Several Member States also mentioned migrants or smugglers crossing the border illegally undetected, but these events are believed to be rare.

Detections of illegal border-crossing are also kept at low levels along the eastern land border thanks to the surveillance efforts of neighbouring third countries, in particular the Russian Federation and Belarus. Most part of the border with Belarus is fenced on the Belarusian side.

Regarding the border with Ukraine, Frontex monitors the situation, but in 2014 no important changes have been noticed. Detections for illegal border-crossing remains insignificant along all green border section with Ukraine and the number of refusals of entry remained comparable to previous years.

3.4. Clandestine entries

Detections of clandestine entry in vehicles increased strongly from 599 in 2013 to 3 052 in 2014. The increase was due to a tenfold increase in detections reported from the

Bulgarian BCPs along the land border with Turkey. The increase started in August, possibly as an indirect consequence of enhanced measures at the green border that might have caused a partial displacement of the flow from green border to BCPs, by way of clandestine entries. At the neighbouring Greek border section, BCP Kipi, data on clandestine entries is not collected on a systematic basis, but detections were much lower than at the Bulgarian border (see Fig. 8).


Clandestine hiding in vehicles was also reported in large numbers by Croatia and Hungary at BCPs along their land borders with Serbia, as well as on exit from Bulgaria to Serbia in transit to Hungary. The migrants For Croatia, 2014 was the first complete year of reporting, so comparison with previous year are not relevant. However, in Hungary, detections doubled compared to last year, in line with increasing pressure at the green border. This means that the Hungarian authorities are facing considerable challenges, having to deal with larger passenger flow in the wake of visa liberalisation in the Western Balkans, increased detections of illegal border-crossing and clandestine entries.

Spain reported 340 clandestine entries in 2014, at the BCP with Morocco in Melilla. This was the first annual report, so comparison with previous years is not possible.

Clandestine entry requires migrants to stay in confinement for long periods of time, and is known to put migrants' lives at risk of suffocation and dehydration. Therefore, most of the migrants detected hiding in vehicles at BCPs are single young males, rather than more vulnerable family groups.

Compared to detections of illegal border-crossings (283 500), the number of detected attempts at clandestine entry (3 052) appears very low, in particular considering the large volume of vehicle traffic, particularly lorries.

Figure 8. **Detections of illegal border-crossing and clandestine entries at the land border with Turkey in 2014**



Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

It is thus reasonable to assume that detections underestimate the actual number of clandestine entries.

3.5. Document fraud

In 2014 there were just over 9 400 detections of document fraud cases on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which represents a slight decrease compared to last year.

The introduction of the new security features into travel documents and the development of the new automated border-control systems did not translate into a significant decrease in the use of fraudulent documents. Fraudsters appear to have changed their *modi operandi* and instead of the simple alterations, tend to use more sophisticated methods.

Routes

The air borders remained the border type reporting the largest number of detections of document fraud in 2014, but on a decreasing trend compared to 2013 (-10%).

Considering all detections of fraudulent documents at the air borders in 2014, Istanbul Atatürk (IST) international airport in Turkey

remained the most reported last embarkation airport from third countries, even if the overall number of document fraud cases dropped down by almost 40% compared to 2013.


Murtala Muhammed (LOS) international airport in Lagos, Nigeria remained the second most common embarkation point of detected document fraudsters. In fact document fraud detections on flights to EU/Schengen countries increased by almost 20%. The majority of document fraudsters were Nigerians.

Other often reported last embarkation airports were located in Brazil, most notably Rio de Janeiro (GIG) and Fortaleza (FOR). Document fraud from these airports significantly increased.

For one-third of all detections made at the air borders on entry to the EU/Schengen area and involving passengers arriving from third countries the last embarkation airport was unknown (meaning not reported under the EDF data collection).

Detections of document fraud at the land border increased by 16% between 2013 and 2014, but remained significantly smaller than at the air borders (see Fig. 10). The increase at the land border was driven mainly by a sig-

Figure 9. Detections of document fraudsters on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries in 2014, by BCP and border type



nificant rise in document fraud detections at the Spanish-Moroccan land border section, involving almost exclusively Syrian and Moroccan nationals. The detections of Syrians using fraudulent documents to enter the EU by land border section between Morocco and Spain appeared for the first time in 2014.

Detections of document fraud also increased significantly at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey (by 30% compared to 2013)


mostly due to a larger number of detected Iraqi nationals. Detections also increased (+20%) at the land border between Hungary and Serbia, with mostly Serbian, Albanian and Kosovo* citizens detected using fraudulent documents at this land border section.

At the sea borders, fewer cases were reported. Almost half of the cases were connected to Moroccan nationals detected in Ceuta (Spain).

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Figure 10. **Detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area, by border type in 2013 and 2014**




Source: EDF-RAN data as of 4 February 2015

Nationalities

As in 2013, Syrians accounted for the largest share of detections of fraudulent document on entry to EU/Schengen countries, increasing from 1 200 detections in 2013 to over 1 400 detections in 2014 (see Fig. 11). In addition, more than 2 200 detections, representing a 70% increase compared to 2013, were also detected on intra-EU/Schengen movements, making Syrians by far the most

Figure 11. **Detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area, by nationality of the holder in 2013 and 2014**



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 4 February 2015

commonly detected document fraudsters across the EU/Schengen area in 2014.

Nigerians continued to rank high for detections of document fraud, with more than 500 fraudulent cases in 2014. Most detections were made after embarkation in Lagos.

The number of Iraqi nationals involved in document fraud more than doubled compared to 2013. They were mostly detected flying from Fortaleza (Brazil) and Istanbul (Turkey).

Claimed EU nationals detected with fraudulent documents rose by almost 20% from 945 fraudulent cases in 2013 to 1 140 fraudulent cases in 2014 including all travel types. Most detections were made on intra-EU/Schengen movements, often starting on Greek islands but the largest increase, by almost 50% compared to 2013, was recorded on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries.

Travel documents

Fraudulent passports were mostly detected on entry from third countries (4 953) followed by visas (1 616), residence permits (1 506), ID cards (1 414), stamps (1 047) and other documents (233). The overall decrease compared to 2013 was led mainly by the decrease in detections of fraudulent border stamps followed by residence permits and visas. The biggest increase was recorded in case of fraudulent ID cards. Most of the fraudulent documents detected on intra-EU/Schengen movements were ID cards (5 067) (+30% compared to 2013). Regarding impostors, most were using authentic EU passports.

3.6. Refusals of entry

Member States reported a total of more than 114 000 refusals of entry at the external borders of the EU, a decrease of 11% compared to last year. The decrease is the consequence of the record high in 2013 when an exceptionally


large number of Russians of Chechen origin were refused entry due to a lack of visa and then applied for asylum in Poland and Germany before overstaying in the EU. This *modus operandi* became less popular in 2014 thanks to successful media campaigns supported by Germany aimed at quelling the widespread rumours in Chechnya that it was possible to enter Member States without a visa and easily receive asylum once there.

As shown in Figure 12, since 2011, more refusals of entry were issued at the land border (56%) than at the air borders (40%). This is due to the increase in passenger flow at land borders following visa liberalisation in the Western Balkans, and the subsequent increased role of border-control authorities in checking entry requirements, which was previously the responsibility of consular authorities who issued the visa. At the same time, at the air border most refusals of entry used to be issued to citizens of Latin America. However, since this region has been enjoying economic growth and better employment rate since 2010, there has been a decrease in the number of passengers refused entry at the EU's external border.

Indeed, since 2009 (with the exception of 2013 when Russians of Chechen origins ranked first), most of the persons refused entry at EU borders were Ukrainians. Albanians have been ranking high since 2011, in the wake of the visa liberalisation. In particular, Albanians are now ranking first for refusals of entry at the air border. Altogether, citizens of Western Balkan countries granted visa-free regime accounted for 25% of all refusals of entry at the external border, or 28 140 persons.


As in previous years, the main reasons for refusals of entry were the lack of a valid visa (30%) and the lack of appropriate documentation justifying the purpose of stay (21%). The number of persons refused entry due to an alert in the SIS represented only 2% of the total, with 2 753 refusals issued in 2014.

Figure 12. Refusals of entry in 2008–2014, by border type



Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

Figure 13. Top increases and decreases in refusals of entry between 2013 and 2014, by nationality




Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

3.7. Detections of illegal stay

In 2014, there were 441 780 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which represents a generally increasing trend compared to the year before and recent reporting periods. However, in the following analysis of detections of illegal stay it has to be borne in mind that the Netherlands, since 2012, due to technical reasons, reported only detections on exit and not those inland, which in 2011 amounted to about 6 000. Also in Sweden, for administrative reasons, many asylum applicants were also reported as illegal stayers, raising the total number of detections of illegal stay in Sweden. Finally, data from Croatia cover the whole of 2014, whereas the 2013 data only re-



Figure 14. Main border sections (land in green, air in blue) with the greatest number of refusals of entry issued in 2014, with percentage change on 2013 and the share of the single most refused nationality




fer to the period between July and December 2013, after the country joined the EU.

The vast majority of illegal stayers were detected inland (383 507 detections, or 86% of the total) and so are presumed to be long term over stayers as they were making no

attempt to leave at the time of detection. The next most common location for detections of illegal stayers was the air borders on exit (33 789 detections) followed by the land borders (15 345 detections) where illegally staying migrants were leaving the EU or the Schengen area.

Figure 15. **Detections of illegal stay in 2014 with percentage change on 2013**



In terms of nationalities, the large number of Syrians detected staying illegally is artificially inflated by detections in Sweden and some other Member States as it includes people not meeting requirements for staying legally before they apply for asylum.

Looking at detections over the past few years, Moroccans stand out as one of the main na-

tionalties detected staying illegally (above 20 000 annual detections between 2009 and 2014), although their detections at the external borders remain much lower. This indicates that Moroccans tend to cross the external borders legally, but then exceed their legal period of stay within the EU. The same applies to Algerians, although in lower number (above 10 000 annual detections for il-



legal stay between 2009 and 2014). Afghans have also ranked high among the top nationalities since 2009.


3.8. Returns

In 2014, there were 252 003 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was a 12% increase com-

pared to 2013. The absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, inter alia, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, which only reported effective returns but presumably issued a high number of decisions.

Much of the change between 2013 and 2014 was due to an increase in return decisions issued by Spain, from 7 410 in 2013 to 40 386 in 2014. This increase in the number of return decisions did not concern any nationality in particular, but was spread among all nationalities, suggesting an increased use of return when detecting migrants illegally.

Figure 16. Effective returns in 2011–2014, by type



Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

Effective returns


In 2014, there was a steady trend of 161 309 third-country nationals effectively returned to countries outside the EU (see Fig. 16). The UK was the Member State conducting the largest number of returns, with steady trends of returned nationals from India and Pakistan. Greece reported an increase in effective returns, mostly of Albanians.

Type of return

It is difficult to evaluate the overall cost-effectiveness of return measures in comparison with other practical measures taken to reduce irregular migration. Forced returns are recognised as being more costly than voluntary returns, although Member States highlight the importance of return flights (including those co-ordinated by Frontex) in ensuring an effective return, as well as having a deterrent effect for future irregular migrants.

Within the number of effective returns to third countries in 2014, 40% were reported to be on voluntary basis and 43% were forced returns, while for 17%, the type of return was not specified (see Fig. 16).

Figure 17. Top nationalities of migrants detected for illegal border-crossing compared with those effectively returned in 2014



Source: FRAN data as of 9 February 2015

In terms of nationalities, there is a striking difference between the nationality detected crossing the border illegally or staying illegally in the EU, and the nationality effectively returned (see Fig. 17). Indeed, most people detected crossing the border illegally apply for asylum and thus are not returned.

3.9. Facilitators

The facilitation of illegal immigration remains a significant threat to the EU. Detections of facilitators rose from 7 252 in 2013 to 10 234 in 2014. The increase was mostly due to increases reported in Spain, Italy and Bulgaria.

The facilitation of irregular migrants by sea is carried out using increasingly diverse *modi operandi*, which often put the lives of migrants at risk. The Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes are particularly affected by growing and sustained flows of irregular migrants facilitated to the EU using various types of vessels. The recent incidents of large cargo vessels containing several hundreds of migrants is evidence of this evolution.

Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) provide facilitation services to an ever-increasing number of irregular migrants seeking to reach the EU. These OCG activities sustain and exacerbate the large-scale influx of irregular migrants to the EU. Driven by a profit-incentive, these OCGs callously disregard the safety and human rights of migrants. Large and increasing numbers of facilitated irregular migrants enter the EU along Europe's Mediterranean coast and engage in secondary movements to countries of final destination.

Irregular migrants are also facilitated to enter the EU by air relying on fraudulent documents. Other *modi operandi* include marriages of convenience as well as the abuse of visas/overstaying. However, it is difficult to quantify the scope of these activities.

OCGs provide various facilitation services for irregular migrants enabling the entry into the EU, secondary movements within the EU and the transition to legal stay in Member States.

Most OCGs operate on an international level relying on contacts in countries of origin and within diaspora communities in transit and destination countries. The proportion of facilitated irregular migrants remains difficult to assess.

Facilitation services related to the illegal immigration to the EU and secondary movements between Member States are in high demand and generate significant profits for the OCGs involved. People smuggling is a growing market prompting existing OCGs and criminals to adapt their business models and shift from other criminal activities to the facilitation of illegal immigration.

3.10. Cross-border crimes

Frontex promotes and coordinates European border management with a special focus on migration flows. In application of the concept of Integrated Border Management, it additionally supports Member States in combating organised crime at the external borders, including the smuggling of goods and trafficking in human beings. However, due to the legal and institutional national characteristics, border-control authorities along the external borders of the EU have different types and degrees of responsibilities in the fight against transnational crimes. The nature and extent of inter-agency cooperation at the external borders thus differs greatly between Member States. Regarding the prevention of smuggling of illicit goods, border-control authorities of certain Member States play only an assisting role, while border-control authorities in other Member States share their tasks with customs or are able to conduct investigations. Because of these differences, cross-border crime data reported by some national border guard insti-



tutions are partial and frequently do not include data collected by customs.

On the other hand, identifying cross-border movements of persons involved in criminal activities or victims thereof is a crucial task of border-control authorities. Either in the case of human trafficking or the travel of voluntary fighters with a jihadist background, border agencies are confronted with new challenges particularly in the field of international and inter-agency cooperation, profiling, identification, and assistance to victims.

3.10.1. Smuggling of illicit drugs

Cannabis from the Western Balkans and North Africa

The EU is the destination of several main routes for various narcotic drugs, coming from different regions of the world including Latin America, the Western Balkans, West Asia and North Africa. The EU also plays a role of a transit point for drugs destined for other regions. According to the EMCDDA European Drug Report 2014*, 80% of drug seizures in Europe were for cannabis in 2012, although indicators point to a trend of decreasing use.

Cannabis is smuggled into Europe in the form of two distinct products, cannabis resin ('hashish') and herbal cannabis ('marijuana'). The main provider of cannabis resin to Europe is Morocco, although its production capacities are in decline. Spain as an entry door for cannabis resin from Morocco reported around two thirds of the total quantity of resin seized in Europe in 2012.

Within the last years, the number of seizures of herbal cannabis have been increasingly exceeding resin seizures. The shift towards herbal cannabis was predominantly caused by an increase of domestic production in many European countries. This means that trafficking of cannabis products across the

EU external borders has decreased, with the domestic production increasingly satisfying national demand. An exception seems to be trafficking activities in southeast Europe, where mainly Albanian cannabis supplies the customer demand in countries such as Greece, Italy, Slovenia, and Hungary.

Cocaine from South America

According to EMCDDA calculations based on seizure data, cocaine shows to be the third most intensively smuggled drug in Europe after cannabis resin and herb. In 2012, around 77 000 seizures of cocaine amounting to 71 tonnes have been reported by Member States.* The number of seizures increased between the mid-1990s and 2007, but have been declining since 2009. Reported quantities in contrast have been slightly increasing in 2011 and 2012, mostly because of seizures made in transit countries including Spain and Belgium. Some of the cocaine seized in the EU was in fact destined for emerging markets in third countries such as the Russian Federation.

The drug is almost entirely produced in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, with the latter having substantially increased its supply to Europe.** Cocaine is smuggled from South America to the EU across the Atlantic by sea and air. Large shipments travelled by sea and air from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela to Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and increasingly also Belgium. Cocaine is smuggled by air freight, on pleasure boats and through container shipments, but to a large extent also by individual airline travellers.

In October 2014, the European Commission adopted two reports concluding that Colombia and Peru meet the criteria to start negotiating agreements allowing their citizens visa-free access to the Schengen area. An introduction of short-stay visa waiver agree-

* EMCDDA (2014), *European Drug Report: Trends and Developments*, p. 17ff.

** UNODC (2014) *World Drug Report*, p. 37

ments for citizens of Colombia and Peru, however, might allow OCGs to intensify their use of individual cocaine couriers.

Although a majority of shipments of cocaine continue to enter the EU through Western Europe, a diversification of trafficking routes away from the very dominant routes to the Iberian Peninsula drew a larger share of cocaine to the ports of the Balkans and the Black Sea. Between 2009 and 2011, four tonnes of cocaine have been seized in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey, accounting for 2% of the overall number of seizures reported in Europe.* Bulgarian and Romanian authorities have moreover reported an increased role of Nigerian OCGs in the trafficking of cocaine to these countries.**

Heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan

Seizure numbers and statistics on treatment of drug addicts suggest that heroin use in Europe has been decreasing over the last decade. Five tonnes of heroin were seized in 2012, which represents only 50% of the amount reported by Member States in 2002.*** Most of the heroin consumed in the EU is produced in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Iran and Pakistan. It is transported along a variety of routes to Europe, including the Balkan route, which runs through Turkey and the Balkan countries, the Northern route, which heads through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, and increasingly the Southern route via the Persian Gulf by sea, sometimes including passages through Africa.

In 2014, European border guards deployed along the Balkan route reported seizures totalling 86.4 kg of heroin – more than three times as much as in 2013. The largest quantities were seized at the BCP Kapitan Andreevo at the Bulgarian-Turkish border and at departure from the Greek ferry port of Igoumenitsa.

New psychoactive substances

New psychoactive substances comprise a wide range of drugs that are in many cases not yet under control of national or international drug legislation. In 2013, the Early Warning System of the EMCDDA and Europol listed a total of 81 new synthetic substances. Although new psychoactive substances represent only a small share of the illicit drugs market, they are particularly dangerous because limited information about their effects on the human body is available. These substances often come in the form of more openly sold 'Legal Highs', thereby giving the false impression of legality and lower consumer exposure to physical and mental health risks. Most new psychoactive substances or their precursors arrive in shipments from China or India.

The challenges for law-enforcement authorities at the external borders of the EU lie within the development of capacities to identify the rapidly developing diversity of new psychoactive substances. Drug control legislative measures within the EU also need a more coherent approach to prevent the exploitation of differences and gaps between national jurisdictions. The sale of new psychoactive substances through the internet and anonymised networks and the fact that manufacturers, retailers and other parts of the market chain are located in different countries pose additional challenges. In 2013, the EMCDDA has identified 651 websites shipping 'legal highs' to European consumers.****

3.10.2. Trafficking in human beings (THB)

The detection of persons trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour or other purposes represents a major challenge for border authorities, as victims themselves are often not aware of their fate when they arrive in the transit or destination countries.

* EMCDDA (2013) *EU Drug Markets Report: a strategic analysis*, p. 46

** UNODC (2014) *The Illicit Drug Trade through South-Eastern Europe*, p. 18

*** EMCDDA (2014) *European Drug Report: Trends and Developments*, p. 21

**** EMCDDA (2014) *European Drug Report: Trends and Developments*, p. 29



* It should be noted that 2008 data come from 22 Member States, whereas 2009 and 2012 data include figures from 29 EU countries.

** UNDP (2012) *Small Arms Survey 2010–2011 in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

*** Greek police investigating suspected ISIS gun supply routes, Ekathimerini, 20 November 2014.

In 2014, Eurostat presented its second statistical working paper on THB at EU level, including data on the years 2010–2012. It allows a more long-term comparison with data presented in the first edition of the report, which starts with numbers of 2008. Within five years, the number of identified victims, male and female, registered by police, NGOs and other agencies in the Member States increased from 3 691 in 2008 to 4 443 in 2012.* As Eurostat points out, more reported cases are not necessarily related to a higher number of actual victims. The upward tendency may also be caused by an improved reporting rate of the phenomenon.

Data disaggregated by types of exploitation in 2012 show that a majority of 66% of the victims were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation and 20% for labour exploitation. 14% were trafficked for forced begging, criminal activities, removal of organs and other purposes. Compared to previous years, the figures point to a clear trend towards a growing share of victims identified for sexual exploitation (2008: 58%), and fewer for labour exploitation (14%).

Important for border guards at the external borders is the fact that only a minority of 35% of registered victims came from non-EU countries in the years 2010–2012 (EU victims mainly come from Romania and Bulgaria). According to Eurostat, the main third countries of origin in 2012 were Nigeria, Vietnam as an emerging origin country, China, Albania, Brazil, Ukraine, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Dominican Republic and Cameroon. Notably, the number of victims from Asia has increased, with victims from the Philippines being registered in bigger numbers for the first time, and Vietnamese victims peaking, mainly for the purpose of labour exploitation. The re-emergence of victims of THB from Albania in 2012 may be connected to the visa liberalisation for Albania by the end of 2010. On the other hand, victims from Nigeria were

consistently strongly represented between 2008 and 2012.

3.10.4. Smuggling of weapons

The effective control of firearms is crucial in the fight against crime and it is clear that European law-enforcement authorities inland and at the external borders need to cooperate across the EU in the fight against trafficking of firearms. The threat emanating from the crime is measured not simply by the smuggling of the weapons but of the further crimes and damage they enable. The terrorist attacks of 7–9 January in France and successive police operations showed the availability of military-grade arms including AK-47s rocket-propelled grenade launchers on European illicit markets. Many of these weapons are illegally traded from former conflict regions such as the Western Balkans, where in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone around 800 000 weapons are estimated to be in illegal civilian possession.**

Taking into account increasing passenger flow and heavier workload of border guards at the EU external borders, and constantly evolving and refining *modi operandi* of weapon smugglers, the risk of seeing this criminal activity at the EU external borders is increasing. EU funding and action have been put in place to complement the work of Member States in addressing this phenomenon and to improve their capabilities in preventing these criminal ambitions and averting illicit weapons entering the EU.***

Smuggled arms might be employed to facilitate organised crime groups involved in the trafficking of human beings, facilitation of illegal immigration, illegal drugs trade and more. Arms trafficking might also be linked to such crimes as corruption, falsification of documents, money laundering and thefts from not sufficiently secured weapon storages or ammunition stockpiles outside the EU. Ter-

rorist groups might also seek weapons from criminal groups to be used in attacks staged in the EU. Presumably, criminal groups explore already existing smuggling routes used for other criminal phenomena for smuggling small arms and light weapons.

In case of firearms seizures it is important to distinguish if the weapon was only trafficked for criminals' protection – e.g. smuggling drugs, stolen vehicles – or if it was intended to be smuggled to the EU. The differences in legislation among Member States and between third countries and Member States create legal loopholes that might be exploited for the secondary distribution of weapons within the EU. Lack of firearms deactivation standards and ease of converting gas, alarm, signal and pneumatic guns imported legally to the EU into lethal weapons adds additional risk. Legal channels of distribution of weapons might also be abused (arms trade, legal weapon transits and purchases).

3.10.5. Exit of stolen motor vehicles

According to Eurostat, the total number of vehicles including cars, motorcycles, buses, lorries, construction and agricultural vehicles stolen in the EU has been steadily falling between 1998 and 2010. In 2013, statistical data published by UNODC counted more than 750 000 vehicles stolen in 29 of the EU and Schengen Associated Countries, compared to 1.4 million in 2005.* Among the reasons for the decline were the advanced technical protection technologies developed by the producers and intensified international law-enforcement cooperation.

Only a small share of the vehicles stolen in the EU are detected at its external borders, often in the context of Frontex Joint Operations. In contrast to the overall theft statistics, detections at the borders reported to Frontex showed a decrease from 519 in 2013 to 487 in 2014. These cases included cars, lor-



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 18. A Polish border guard inspecting a vehicle driven by a Turkish national at the BCP of Korczowa, which was allegedly stolen in Italy


ries, trailers, boats, excavators, agricultural machines and motor bikes.

Most car thefts were detected by querying SIS II, the Interpol and national theft data with the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) specified on the engine, frame and major parts of most motor vehicles. Car thieves applied various *modi operandi* to cloud the identity of their stolen vehicles at the external borders. Reports indicated frequent manipulation of the VIN, or departure from the EU with rental or very recently stolen cars before authorities are notified of the theft. In other cases, vehicles were disassembled into parts to obscure identification or vehicle registration papers were counterfeited.

The brand preferences did not change during the last years, as more than 40% of the private vehicles detected were produced by Mercedes Benz, Volkswagen and BMW. A majority of the persons driving the stolen vehicles on exit from the EU were nationals of the country which they intended to enter. For example, 70% of the persons caught with a stolen vehicle at the borders with Ukraine

* Crime and criminal justice statistics, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html>

Figure 19. Main routes of stolen vehicles crossing the external border in 2014 (map) and the number of theft cases reported in 2014, by type of vehicle (chart)



were of Ukrainian nationality, while only 17% were EU citizens.

3.10.6. Smuggling of excise goods


Most excise goods smuggled across the EU external borders are tobacco products. According to estimates of the European Commission, the illicit trade in tobacco products costs the EU and its Member States EUR 10 billion a year in lost tax revenues. Not only individual consumers and small scale

smugglers from economically weak border regions try to make use of existing price differences. Large scale criminal businesses illicitly import cigarettes especially to Western European markets from as far away as Asia.

In 2014, many governments increased the taxes on excise goods to improve their budget situation. Between January 2013 and July 2014, 22 Member States increased their excise duties on cigarettes, in average by EUR 0.10 per pack of cigarettes.*

* European Commission. (2014). *Excise duty tables. Part III - Manufactured tobacco. Shows the situation as at 1 July 2014* (Ref 1041).

Figure 20. Average cigarette prices (pack of 20) in the EU and neighbouring third countries



Currently, a customer would pay EUR 5 for an average pack of cigarettes in Finland, whereas across the Russian border, the same good would cost him only around EUR 1. A new law would see a 40% increase in the minimum price for cigarettes by 1 April 2015, but that price hike was already compensated by the recent loss in value of the Russian rouble against the euro. The negative economic growth in the Russian Federation is expected to increase the illicit trade of tobacco products to the EU, by both individual 'ant-smugglers' from the border regions and OCGs.

On 9 January 2014, the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, was closed for signature by the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. At this time, it was signed by 53 States, including 15 Member States, and by the EU. The Protocol will enter into force 90 days after the 40th ratification. To assist in the investigation of illicit cross-border trade in tobacco products, it requires States to implement a global tracking and tracing regime through unique, secure and non-removable identification markings, such as codes or stamps on



cigarette packages. Within the EU, this and other measures for public health are implemented through the revised Tobacco Products Directive, which entered into force on 19 May 2014 and will apply after a transposition period of two years.

A tracking system that assists law-enforcement authorities in determining if cigarettes were traded illegally was already agreed upon between the EU and the four largest tobacco manufacturers, which cover 80% of the world market. Through these agreements the companies committed themselves to sell to legitimate clients only. However, smaller companies outside the EU currently still sell large quantities to third-country markets where only an insignificant share of these cigarettes can be absorbed by the local demand. Much of the rest is then smuggled out to Member States. In particular seizures of 'cheap white brands' have been showing a strong upward tendency over the past years. An example is the Jin Ling cigarette brand produced in Kaliningrad, which grew so popular among western consumers that this brand itself started to be counterfeited.

3.11. Asylum applications

Data on asylum applications are not related to law-enforcement activities, but provides contextual information on movements of persons towards the EU. The analysis of asylum applications for international protection provides useful information on the push and pull factors at play in mixed migration flows. It is also important for border-control authorities because they are often the first authorities prospective applicants meet, before being referred to asylum authorities. Border-control authorities also play a role in the implementation of the Dublin system. As mentioned in recital 3 of the Eurodac Regulation (and in recital 4 of the recast Eurodac Regulation), for the purposes of applying the Dublin Regulation, it is necessary to establish the identity

of applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders.

Finally, unfounded applications for international protection inevitably delay the examination and subsequent provision of protection for those third-country nationals with genuine claims. When applications are made after an unsuccessful attempt to illegally enter the territory (illegal border-crossing, document fraud, refusal of entry, clandestine entry), it overloads border-control authorities and dilutes allocated resources.

In 2014, Frontex has developed its collaboration with EASO, which notably contributed to the analysis of the data on asylum applications, based on the data they collected through their newly established network.

Approximately 615 000 applicants for asylum (+41% compared to 2013) were registered in 2014, which marked the highest level received in the EU since EU-level data collection began in 2008. 90% of applicants people applying for the first time in the EU.

The main nationalities of applicants were Syrians (over 120 000) and those of Western Balkan countries (>107 000 considered together). After a sudden rise in the number of applications at the beginning of spring, Eritrea became the second most common country of origin of asylum claimants in the EU and Schengen Associated Countries, with over 40 000 applicants in 2014. Significant (over 50%) increases were also seen in applications from citizens of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The situation in Ukraine caused a particularly significant change in relation to previous years. A total of over 14 000 claims were received in 2014 in the EU – a 14-fold increase compared to 2013 – but the applications were not limited to countries bordering Ukraine, but spread across all Member States. In parallel, many Ukrainians sought alterna-

tives to asylum via family reunification or visas and residence permits for work.

Compared to last year, 21 Member States reported more applications for international protection than in 2013. Among these, three Member States, all of which are located at the EU external borders, saw particularly sharp rises: Italy (+146%), Hungary (+125%) and Bulgaria (+54%).

EASO's new Early warning and Preparedness System (EPS) data collection, which started in March 2014, includes the numbers of implicit withdrawals of asylum applications: this covers cases where a person applies in a Member State and then absconds and is no longer contactable by the Member State. Many of such persons later apply again for international protection in another Member State and may eventually be returned in accordance with the stipulations of the Dublin III Regulation. From the initial data it appears that the proportion of asylum applications that are implicitly withdrawn is particularly high (above 30% of all applications) in several States at the EU external land border (Poland, Latvia, Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia

and Lithuania). Notwithstanding a more detailed analysis of the links between border-crossing indicators, asylum applications and withdrawn applications, this pattern might indicate potential misuses of the asylum procedure whereby an individual may make an application for international protection in order to circumvent obligations applicable to regular border-control.

This can also be an issue with those arriving in an irregular manner by sea. Large numbers of potential applicants for asylum can lead to severe difficulties in registration. In summer of 2014 legal and administrative questions led to the non-fingerprinting of some asylum-applicants in Eurodac in Italy leading to the non-application of Dublin for those who absconded from reception centres in Sicily and other areas and then travelled north to lodge asylum claims in other Member States. Italy resolved this issue by issuing instructions to *Questure* to take fingerprints of all arrivals even forcibly, if necessary, after the correct legal interpretation issue was clarified by the Commission and Member States in the autumn.



4. Situation in the EU

4.1. European Commission's priorities in 2015

The 2015 European Commission programme of work was adopted in December 2014 and set out the main actions the Commission intends to take throughout the coming year. Included here was the European Agenda on Migration, the objective of which is to develop a new approach to legal migration to make the EU an attractive destination for talents and skills, as well as to improve the management of migration by intensifying cooperation with third countries, fostering burden sharing and solidarity and fighting against irregular migration and smuggling. The agenda includes the review of the Blue Card Directive, the EU-wide work permit for highly skilled workers.

The Commission Communication on the Work Programme states:

'To tackle the growing pressure at our external borders the Commission is developing a European Agenda on Migration, which will balance a fairer and responsible approach to legal migration, in order to make the EU an attractive destination for talent and skills, with firm measures against irregular migration and people trafficking and smuggling. Improving the management of migration means better linking our migration policy with our external policy, fostering greater internal and external cooperation, offering protection to persons in need, based on responsibility and solidarity and preventing tragic events such as those recurrently happening in the Mediterranean.'

4.2. Renewed Internal Security Strategy

The EU Strategic Guidelines for the Justice and Home Affairs Area were adopted in June 2014 and included a call for the renewal of the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) by mid-2015 as part of the efforts to promote operational police cooperation and to prevent and combat serious organised crime, including human trafficking and smuggling, as well as corruption. Furthermore, the Council Conclusions of December 2014 on a renewed Internal Security Strategy call for an update of the EU IBM Concept. The European Commission will, on the basis of opinions given by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, present a Communication on the renewed ISS by spring 2015. The five strategic objectives which were agreed upon for the initial ISS will remain as priorities. These objectives are: the disruption of international criminal networks; the prevention of terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment; raising levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace; strengthening security through border management; and increasing Europe's resilience to crises and disasters.

4.3. State of play concerning an EU Passenger Name Record proposal

In February 2011, the Commission presented a proposal for an EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive. The proposal would oblige Member States to set up PNR systems and establish strict data protection safeguards for the processing and collection of PNR data from flights to and from the EU. The Commission has declared its commitment to ensuring the proposal, which should



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include high fundamental rights protection for EU citizens, gets adopted. The European Commission, European Parliament and the Council are currently in negotiations to this end.

4.4. New Schengen Evaluation Mechanism

Preparations are ongoing as regards the implementation of the new Schengen evaluation mechanism. In line with Regulation 1053/2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen *acquis*, the standard evaluation questionnaire was adopted in July 2014. In October, the annual evaluation programme for 2015 was approved on the basis of the multi-annual evaluation programme 2014–2019, taking into account the risk analysis provided by Frontex as well as information made available by relevant EU agencies and bodies such as Europol and the Fundamental Rights Agency. The first evaluations under the new mechanism (concerning announced visits) started in February 2015 in Austria. In the meantime, a particular focus has been put on further developing training for the evaluation experts, including updating the existing training curricula by including aspects that have not been covered previously, such as return.

4.5. EUROSUR Handbook

The first edition of the EUROSUR Handbook, as required by Article 21 of the EUROSUR Regulation, was agreed upon by the end of 2014 in meetings between the Member States, the Commission and Frontex. The Handbook will

provide technical and operational guidelines, recommendations and best practices, including on cooperation with third countries. The European Commission shall adopt the Handbook in the form of a recommendation in the course of 2015.

4.6. Roll-out and impact of Visa Information System

The Visa Information System (VIS) will be rolled out, region by region, until all Schengen states' consulates worldwide are connected. So far, the VIS has started operations in North Africa in October 2011; in the Near East in May 2012; in the Gulf region in October 2012; in West and Central Africa in March 2013; in East and Southern Africa in June 2013; in South America in September 2013; and in Central and South East Asia and in the occupied Palestinian Territory in November 2013. The year 2014 saw the introduction of the VIS in Turkey and the Western Balkans.

A new timetable was agreed upon for the final VIS roll outs during 2015. The latest time frame for the roll-out in regions 17–23 is as follows:

- June 2015 for region 17 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine);
- September 2015 for region 18 (the Russian Federation);
- October 2015 for region 19 (China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan);
- November 2015 for region 20 (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka), 21 (Andorra, Holy See, Monaco, San Marino), 22 (Ireland and the UK) and 23 (Schengen Member States).



4.7. Schengen visa policy developments

On 17 March 2014, the European Parliament endorsed the Agreement between the EU and the **Republic of Azerbaijan** on the facilitation of the issuance of visas.

Progress reports on **Kosovo***, **Turkey** and **Georgia** were published. Whilst the second progress report regarding Kosovo* notes good progress, the Commission considered that further efforts are required to obtain visa-free travel for Kosovo* citizens. Turkey's first progress report on fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap was presented by the Commission on 20 October 2014. The Commission's second progress report on Georgia's implementation of Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) has concluded that the first-phase requirements of the visa dialogue have been met and the second phase where implementation of benchmarks will be reviewed can therefore be launched.

In 2014, an amendment to Regulation 539/2001 was adopted which included additional 17 countries (**16 Pacific and Caribbean island nations**** and the **United Arab Emirates**) to the list of third countries whose nationals are exempt from the EU visa requirement. However, before this exemption can come into force the Commission must negotiate visa waiver agreements with each of these 17 countries. The processes for the various countries are currently ongoing and once negotiations are completed, they will be submitted for approval to the European Parliament and Council. Following this, and once the ratification procedures are completed in both the EU and the concerned third country, the visa waiver agreement will enter into force for the citizens of those countries, thus enabling visa-free travel. Negotiations for the various countries are at differing stages, but it is hoped that the visa-free travel for these

countries will become a reality at various points in 2015. It is unlikely that visa-free status for these 17 countries will bring any additional risks in terms of migration and security.

In the aforementioned amendment of Regulation 539/2001, **Peru** and **Colombia** were also included in the visa-free list. Following this, on 29 October 2014 the Commission adopted two reports concluding that **Colombia and Peru** met the criteria to start negotiating agreements allowing their citizens visa-free access to the Schengen area. They are now preparing a recommendation for a mandate from Council to open negotiations on the visa waiver. Once granted, the Commission will begin negotiations with both countries. Only after the short-stay visa waiver agreements enter into force will visa-free travel for the citizens of these countries become a reality. This could happen, at the very earliest, in the second half of 2015.

The **EU-Ukraine** Association Agreement was signed in late 2014. Among other rules, the deal provides for greater movement of workers and sets targets for establishing a visa-free travel regime and aligning the two sides' regulatory systems by laying down detailed timetables for Ukraine to transpose parts of the EU *acquis* legislation into its national laws and put them into effect.

As a result of the Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine of 6 March 2014 following the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the **Russian Federation**, the visa liberalisation dialogue with the country was suspended.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

** Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

4.8. State of play concerning the 'Smart Borders Package' (entry/exit system and the registered traveller programme)

The proposal for a Smart Borders Package was first examined by the European Parliament and Council in February 2014 and there they voiced technical, operational and cost concerns, mainly related to the overall feasibility of the proposed new systems. To counter these, the Commission subsequently initiated the proof of concept exercise which consisted of two stages.

The first stage, consisting of a Commission-led Technical Study aimed at identifying and assessing the most suitable and promising options and solutions, was completed by late 2014. The results of which then fed into the second stage of the proof of concept: an eu-LISA run pilot project. This pilot project which will last for most of 2015 is aimed at verifying the feasibility of the options identified in the Technical Study and validating the selected concepts for both automated and manual border controls. This Pilot will be undertaken at various border crossing points of volunteering Member States/Schengen Associated Countries.

Once the results of this pilot project are published by the end of 2015, legislative deliberations will restart in the European Parliament and the Council. However, it is not expected that any eventual system would be in place at the borders before 2020.

4.9. Recast Eurodac Regulation

The amendment of the Eurodac Regulation to allow law-enforcement authorities to consult the Eurodac database for the purpose of prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences was adopted in 2013. The new rules

will only become applicable though from 20 July 2015. The comparison of fingerprints in the possession of Member States' designated law-enforcement authorities and Europol against those stored in the Eurodac database will only be possible where such a comparison is necessary in specific cases, under well-defined circumstances and conditions, and following prior checks of other databases.

4.10. Asylum Procedures Directive changes

The recast asylum *acquis* package brought about significant changes to the previous framework. Its updated requirements created a new environment for asylum systems of participating Member States and will continue to transform them as remaining transposition deadlines approach in July 2015.

Of particular relevance are the revisions to the Dublin system, new rules regarding access to procedure, as well as a revised framework concerning border and accelerated procedures, including the situation of vulnerable applicants and applicants in need of special procedural guarantees.*

The revised Dublin Regulation** is already applicable and it introduces additional guarantees to persons in a Dublin procedure (obligatory personal interview and information on the procedure for establishing the Member State responsible, extended options for reunifying family and relatives, and additional guarantees for minors, including best interest of a child determination and family tracking). The transfer to the Member States responsible under Dublin can now be appealed and a motion for suspensive effect of the appeal may be submitted (granting the right to remain within the territory while the court is determining the motion for suspension). Legal assistance free of charge is to be provided upon request and the overall duration of detention is strictly limited. More pre-

* A comprehensive overview of changes brought about by the recast asylum *acquis* is available in the EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU 2013, in particular section 3.1.1. Legislative: completion of CEAS (<http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EASO-AR-final.pdf>)

** The recast Dublin Regulation is already applicable to applications for international protection lodged as of 1 January 2014 and to all requests to take back or take charge starting 1 January 2014. An amended Dublin Implementing Regulation was adopted by European Commission on 30 January 2014 and is applicable as of 9 February 2014.



close deadlines are introduced for procedures between States. The Dublin Regulation, in its revised form, also covers applicants who could otherwise fall under the Return Directive as irregular migrants and be returned as such.

* The recast Eurodac Regulation will take effect on 20 July 2015.

The revised Eurodac Regulation* improves data protection standards and sets new time limits for transmitting fingerprint data to the central unit of Eurodac. National police services and Europol can access Eurodac data for the purposes of comparing Eurodac data with fingerprints linked to criminal investigations (though only if specific requirements are met, and only as concerns the most serious crimes as a last resort after checking other available databases. There is no possibility to share information with third countries).


Article 6 of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) clarifies the responsibilities of state authorities in regard to ensuring access to the asylum procedure for those wishing to make an application, in particular the necessity for states to register all expressions of intent to apply made to whichever national authority is the first point of contact for the potential applicant. Article 8 stipulates that training must be provided to officials who may come into contact with persons seeking international protection (in particular during the surveillance of land or maritime borders or during border checks) so that they are able, *inter alia*, to provide information on where and how an application can be lodged.

The recast APD also states clearly that persons present in the territorial waters of a Member State who made an application for

international protection should be disembarked on land and have their applications examined. Moreover, the conditions and safeguards for applying border and accelerated procedures have now been clarified and, in particular, the grounds under which such procedures can be applied have been made exhaustive.

New rules regarding identification and treatment of vulnerable groups have been put in place in the recast Reception Conditions Directive (obligation to conduct an individual assessment to identify the particular reception needs for vulnerable persons and ensure access to psychological support, legal assistance and information, as well as restrictions on detaining vulnerable persons, including minors). Applicants in need of special procedural guarantees, e.g. due to their age, disability, illness, sexual orientation or traumatic experiences, should be identified in due time and provided with adequate support such as sufficient time to make their claims in line with provisions of the recast APD. In practical terms, those new requirements combined may substantially limit the use of border and accelerated procedures with regard to certain groups of applicants.

The recast Reception Conditions Directive also sets forth rules concerning qualifications required of the representatives of unaccompanied minors. This may be particularly relevant for Member States experiencing high numbers of unaccompanied minors who abscond after lodging an application, which may be linked to child trafficking and child smuggling.



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5. Outlook

Based on the descriptions of the situation in 2014 and a review of the main factors, be it economic, legal or technical, that can contribute one way or another to irregular migration to the EU, this chapter reviews the possible evolution of the situation along the external border of the EU in the coming years. While some developments are likely to materialise, others seem possible, based on current knowledge. Finally, past experiences demonstrate that there are a large number of unforeseeable events and factors that can have a profound and unpredictable impact on the situation at the border.

5.1. Illegal border-crossing expected to remain concentrated in southern and south-eastern borders of the EU

The best forecasts – those likely to materialise and have a direct bearing on the situation at the external borders – are the continued use of the Mediterranean area as the main crossing points for irregular migration. At the same time, border-control authorities are expected to be increasingly engaged in search and rescue operations covering vast areas of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as being the first interlocutors for a growing number of persons presenting themselves at the EU borders in search of international protection.

Irregular migratory flows are expected to follow known routes from North Africa and the Middle East to the EU, mostly by sea and through the south-eastern land border via Turkey. The main uncertainties concern the timing, as well as the size and composition of the flows. The composition and/or the size of the flow will vary in response to the developing situation in North Africa and in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and neighbouring countries.

Swift diversification of *modi operandi*, possible displacement between routes or border types, and escalating attempts to evade detection or identification are all likely to occur in response to enhanced surveillance.

Based on the location of the main countries of origin for irregular migration to the EU for the past five years, the border areas that are most likely to deal with illegal border-crossing remain the Southern Mediterranean coast, and the borders with Turkey. Migrants living in or having relatively easy/facilitated access to Turkey and/or North Africa will continue to be overrepresented in the flow of irregular migrants to the EU. In particular, departures of sub-Saharan migrants from Libya across the Central Mediterranean to reach Italy and arrivals of Syrians crossing the border illegally to apply for asylum in the EU – two phenomena already present in 2013 and 2014 – are likely to continue in the near future.



In addition, the increasing likelihood of family units crossing the border, means that border-control authorities need to be prepared to manage flow of vulnerable people, including numerous children. This makes it necessary to focus on the further development of specific mechanisms and procedures to tackle the needs of this vulnerable group at the EU external borders, including all air, land and sea borders.

Central Mediterranean area

In the Central Mediterranean, many areas on the North African coasts may be used as departure points for illegal border-crossing to the EU. North African countries may be used as transit countries for migrants from more southern African countries to sail across the Mediterranean. They may be used as transit by migrants from many different countries of origin, which complicate further predictions in terms of volume. However, with Egypt and Algeria now requiring visa for Syrian nationals, these countries are no longer practical transit countries on the way to Libya, the typical departure point in 2014. Turkey has no such visa requirements for Syrian nationals and this country may now become the main country of departure.

The increasing complexity of irregular arrivals are expected to absorb significant resources. The broadening of the surveillance area along with increasing trend in boats seeking assistance, result in border assets being increasingly mobilised in support of search and rescues activities. In addition, the profits generated by the use of old cargo ships for smuggling migrants may increase their use, including in the Central Mediterranean.

Eastern Mediterranean area

On the Eastern Mediterranean route, enhanced surveillance along the land borders with Turkey has resulted in a displacement

on the Eastern Aegean Sea. This is expected to put further pressure on the limited local reception facilities for undocumented migrants. The large number of migrants expected to cross illegally the external borders will also undermine systematic screening and debriefing activities. Nationality swapping is expected to remain an issue.

In addition, an increasing number of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East are expected to transit to Turkey via the air border, before attempting to cross illegally the border to the EU, also by using forged document. Istanbul airport (IST) is an important hub for irregular migrants travelling by air to several Member States, with continuous increase in passenger flows for the past several years and Turkish Airlines' expansion strategy towards Africa and the Middle East. Turkish airports are thus likely to remain common embarkation points for irregular migrants arriving in the EU.

As a consequence, the number of migrants undertaking secondary movements through the Western Balkans is also expected to rise.

5.2. Increased workload at the border

Regular passenger flows across the external border will increase significantly in the coming years due to rising global mobility. Visa liberalisation processes and local border traffic agreements are placing also increasing responsibilities on border-control authorities.

Increasingly, while movements across the external air borders are managed through a layered approach, where the border is divided into four components (in departure countries, at embarking airports, at the border and after border-crossing), the physical border is increasingly becoming a secondary layer for risk assessment, meaning that checking and screening start well before passengers

cross border-control posts at airports. Border management will increasingly be risk-based, to ensure that interventions are focused on high-risk movements of people, while low-risk movements are facilitated smoothly.

Air travel environment is becoming more complex with the growth of low-cost carriers. In addition, advances in travel complexity and increasing sophistication of criminal activities result in increasing workload for border-control officers and increasing difficulties in developing planes and passengers risk assessments.

In addition, the EU continues to receive a high number of asylum seekers. A substantial number of economic migrants appear to use the asylum procedure to try entering or staying on the territory of the EU. Their first interlocutors are often border-control authorities.

5.3. Increased abuse of fraudulent breeder* documents

Given the increasing level of security features in modern travel documents and stricter migration policies across Member States, the misuse of genuine travel documents (which includes impersonation and fraudulently obtained documents) is likely to be an entry method which will steadily rise.

Some of these issues will be addressed by the Visa Information System (VIS), which is operational and used by issuing authorities in 11 regions as of November 2013, and will be rolled out to additional regions in 2014 and 2015.

The systematic check on arrivals of VIS visas is likely to result in increased abuse of fraudulent breeder documents required to obtain genuine VIS, as well as EU passports which do not require systematic biometric controls at the border. In addition, the use

of specific fraudulent techniques to fool biometric checks, like spoofed fingerprints, is also likely to increase.

5.4. Movement of terrorists

Overall, there is an underlying threat of terrorism-related travel movements especially due to the appeal of the Syrian conflict to both idealist and radicalised youths. The conflict in Syria has attracted thousands of foreign fighters, including EU citizens, dual-nationality holders and other third-country nationals.

Turkey has become the country most often used by foreign fighters to enter or exit Syria primarily because of its geographical location plus the availability of legal and cheap travel options.

It is possible that foreign fighters use irregular migration routes and/or facilitation networks (irrespective of whether this is recommended by terrorist structures or not), especially when the associated risks and costs are perceived as low in comparison to legal travel options.

Frontex is not in a position to identify, nor does it have any information that suggests, any nexus between terrorist travel and irregular migration routings and/or facilitation networks. Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded that EU-based fighters change their *modi operandi* of travel when faced with administrative and/or legal measures upon their return; or that they may be reluctant to return home in fear of reprisal, which may induce them to resettle elsewhere.

5.5. Health risk assessment

The main focus of Frontex is on strengthening border-control cooperation to facilitate bona fide migration management, combat cross-border crime and prevent threats to the Member States. This includes the pre-

* supporting documents, such as birth certificates, presented to the authorities to obtain an authentic travel document



vention of threats to public health, as defined by the International Health Regulations of the World Health Organization. For the first time, the Annual Risk Analysis 2015 presents the WHO Regional Office for Europe's review of the potential public health risks associated with the migration phenomena and ways to adequately address them, prepared under the project 'Public Health Aspects of Migration in Europe' (PHAME).

As human mobility in Europe rises, health security attracts increasing attention as a means of safeguarding the health of the population. Health security has been traditionally considered a domestic concern. However, the public health challenges of human mobility and large migration have been as well recognised as foreign policy matters, claiming for a need of international cooperation to safeguard public health as a global common good. The analysis of health risks requires an overview of the health hazards arising in the countries of origin and transit, at the border and within the countries of destination.

Migrants are exposed to a number of different health risks during the migration process. However, the impact of the journey varies depending on the category of the migrant, undocumented migrants being among the most vulnerable given the often harsh conditions of the journey and the limited access to health services. The following analysis, therefore, focuses on undocumented migration. The public health aspects of migration affect both health care and non-health care workers involved in the various stages of the migration process, as well as resident communities. In the countries of destination, migration often stretches the capacity of health care systems to adapt to the additional demand for health services, and the unfamiliar and changing health profiles and needs. Due to the common lack of proper preparation and information, the health risks posed

by migrants are often overestimated by the receiving communities.

5.5.1. Migrants

Pre-departure

The risk of acquiring vaccine-preventable diseases depends on the presence of susceptible individuals in the population and their epidemiological profile. In many countries of origin and transit the health care systems are weakened by civil unrest, wars, economic crisis and natural disasters. The provision of public health services including vaccination to the population is often interrupted or even withheld, resulting in a dramatic reduction of the immunisation coverage. For instance, in the Syrian Arab Republic, the immunisation coverage has fallen from 91% registered in 2011 to 68% in 2012. Although efforts have been made to improve immunisation coverage, there are still deep concerns on the immunisation status of Syrians, including those asking for asylum in European countries.

In countries with high tuberculosis (TB) incidence and prevalence, large portions of the population have a status of latent TB infection that can be developed to TB disease, often contagious, in case of decreased immune response. Such situation may be created by the hard conditions of a journey which may start before crossing the border of the country of destination.

Travel and transit

Health risks at this phase vary depending on the conditions and duration of the travel. The conditions to which migrants are exposed to during the journey as well as in the countries of destination put them at risk of sexual victimisation, violence and sexual ill-health. Refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, especially women, infants and children, were identified as the most vulnerable

ones. Other risks arising throughout the journey and specially during rescue operations include drowning, traumatism, burns, hypothermia, dehydration, heatstroke, foodborne diseases, respiratory and skin infections.

Host community

At reception centres, overcrowding and inadequate hygiene and sanitary conditions coupled with limited access to health care are well known risk factors for acquiring a variety of communicable diseases. The risk of measles, diphtheria and whooping cough is enhanced in the presence of susceptible individuals. Furthermore, scarce hygiene and sanitary conditions increase the risk of gastro-intestinal and skin infections.

Mental health disorders and chronic diseases can be left undiagnosed and untreated, leading to further deterioration of the health condition of the migrants, even after reaching their destination. Even if chronic diseases are detected during the first screening procedures, lack of communication between reception centres where migrants are transferred to may cause the suspension of treatments with serious consequences. Potentially long and unspecified periods of stay, unclear legal status, communication difficulties and past-traumatic experiences expose the migrants to mental health risks.

Social, economic and political factors in origin and destination countries influence the risk of HIV infection of migrants. Isolation and stress may lead migrants to engage in behaviours – such as unsafe casual or commercial

sex and drug use – which increase HIV risk. This risk is exacerbated by inadequate access to HIV services and fear of being stigmatised for seeking HIV-related information or support. Female migrants may be particularly vulnerable to HIV and susceptible to exploitation and/or physical and sexual violence.

Migrants in a vulnerable situation may experience poor housing and working conditions, as well as limited access to health services, which may cause TB infection or the reactivation of a previous TB infection into disease. Same conditions can be cause of delays in diagnosis and premature interruptions of their treatment, which eventually could develop into a multi-drug resistant form of TB. Proper education and complete access to cultural-sensitive quality and supportive services are of paramount importance.

5.5.2. Workforce at the border and in the reception centres

Health risks for health and non-health workforce vary depending on the resistance and vulnerability of each individual, the working conditions as well as the potential exposure to biological agents. Rescuers may be exposed to trauma, injuries, hypothermia, drowning and heatstroke during rescue operations. Due to their difficult working conditions, psychological support to the workers both at the border and in the migration centres is also relevant. Adequate screening procedures focused on communicable, non-communicable diseases as well as mental health should be performed when required and with full respect to human rights.



6. Selected recommendations for risk mitigation

In an EU migration environment characterised by increasing pressures at the borders coupled with often decreasing resources for their handling, the challenge for border-control authorities is to become more effective and efficient whilst maintaining the necessary quality standards. Risk analysis must then be able to provide both short- and longer-term recommendations for decision makers. The following chapter provides a concise description of a selection of areas where risk mitigation initiatives could take place. Clearly there exist many areas where this could be recommended but the following chapter consists of one selection of issues identified and chosen on the basis of the Frontex risk analysis carried out throughout this year. The objective of this chapter is to ensure high-level awareness of selected areas for potential action and can serve as a practical example of how to follow on from risk analysis into corresponding risk mitigation decisions.

6.1. Security aspects of border management

Given the threats visible at the external borders of the EU, it is evident that border management has an important security component. Indeed, according to the Schengen Borders Code, officials at the borders are charged with helping to 'combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent any threat to the Member States' internal security'.* However, in view of the increasing security threats witnessed at the external borders during the past year, it is necessary to further clarify the role of, and tools available to border management authorities in this area.

What useful function can be played by the border authorities in the area of counter-ter-

rorism or combatting smuggling of weapons for instance? The threat of terrorist activities and the methods of entry into the EU have been much discussed during the past year due to several incidents which occurred within the EU in 2014 and early 2015. Delineating the tasks and the potential tools of those working at the borders in helping to combat this threat is an important discussion which should be undertaken. Given that 2015 will also be the year in which the EU renews and updates the EU Internal Security Strategy and the European Commission will adopt a European Agenda on Security, this discussion would also be very appropriately timed.

Certain cross-border crimes, such as trafficking in human beings, and the role to be played by border authorities in tackling them have been well addressed. Other areas could also benefit from further attention, for instance in the fight against smuggling of firearms and ammunition into the EU. Taking into account the dual circumstances of larger passenger flows at the borders and an increasing threat of small amounts of firearms and ammunition being smuggled by individuals, rather than as part of dedicated and larger shipments, it is clear that this represents an increasingly challenging phenomena for border guards to handle. There is a need then to address border management's function in thwarting these criminal ambitions and preventing an increasing numbers of illicit firearms, its parts and ammunition from entering the EU.

With the above issues in mind, specialised and integrated trainings across the EU and improved intelligence gathering and analysis would certainly help to provide for stronger cross-border crime prevention and detection. A stronger emphasis could be placed on increasing risk analysis capacities at a national

* Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, Schengen Borders Code, Recital 6



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level. This could then be employed in, for instance, developing risk profiles of potential offenders and assessing passenger information. Improved knowledge on the security threats faced at the borders with information on the modalities, actions, and the *modus operandi* typically employed at the borders by offenders could all prove useful additions to the border control authorities' cross-border crime tackling toolkit. These measures would all fall under the broader umbrella exercise of better defining and designing the security aspect of border management.

6.2. Full identification of individuals entering the EU

As previous chapters have discussed, 2014 saw increased arrivals at the external borders of the EU, often in large, mixed and sometimes overwhelming influxes at particular borders. The corollary of this was the strain placed on border control authorities which left them with fewer resources available for identifying those attempting to enter the EU. This then resulted in some of the figures seen in the past year, where high numbers of entrants were not attributed a nationality. Pressures faced at a border can also lead to increases in the phenomenon of nationality swapping for the purposes of fraudulent entry to the EU. Additionally it is an obligation stemming from the Schengen Borders Code that entrants must have their nationalities identified.

The importance of this issue is two-fold; there is both a humanitarian and a security rationale. Firstly, granting international protection to those in need is a legal obligation. Hence

why there is a strong need to ensure the correct and full identification of those arriving at the borders so as to provide the full necessary protection, where required. Secondly, the identification issue concerns the potential threat to internal security. With large numbers of arrivals remaining essentially unclassified for a variety of reasons – false or lack of identification documents, concerns over the validity of a claimed nationality etc. – there is clearly a risk that persons representing a security threat enter the EU. However, the challenge for the border guard is clear: how to differentiate for example, between the asylum seeker who arrives at the external border with no papers and the economic migrant or a migrant who might pose a security threat attempting to abuse the system by claiming a false nationality? This difficulty is clearly exacerbated in situations of intense migratory pressure.

It is clear that in response to these challenges, greater emphasis must be placed on increased screening and debriefing teams. Second-line checks on arrivals are a crucial step in the identification process. They also provide an important source of information which can be further used for intelligence and risk analysis purposes. Improving intelligence and analytical capacities are thus also of great importance. The development of risk profiles of arrivals and training for border guards involved in these areas would also help to ensure greater identification.



6.3. Knowledge management at operational and policy levels

One improvement which has been evident in the preceding years has been the increasing sources of information and data from the external borders. Information is key to situational monitoring and for analytical purposes and so the improved availability of information is of significant importance. However, with greater information comes a greater challenge in effectively utilising it. This is especially the case in emergency situations when large amounts of information are available but time is scarce. It is in this context that data and situational information is sometimes not enough, but authorities will require the analysis and intelligence derived from it to make the fully informed decisions. The management of this knowledge process is critical.

Methods for ensuring that the available and appropriate information reaches the authorities must be assured and must also be able to perform even in the context of time pressure. The cycle of information is an essential process for informed decision making: Ensuring that reliable and stable information from the screeners, debriefers and all those working on the front line is efficiently extracted and then analysed by the analytical services and transformed into workable and relevant knowledge for onward and timely transmission to decision makers is crucial. This process supposes the existence of capable analytical services and timely data collection. Also important in this regard is an exchange and sharing 'culture', where relevant information is transmitted amongst differing national and EU services.

Another aspect of this issue can be seen at a higher policy level. It is still unclear how to transfer sufficient and relevant information and knowledge from border management into the articulation of informed and coherent

migration policies. The knowledge gained by border management officials, from the bottom up, should help feed into the devising of the higher level strategic policies taken at national and EU level. The analysis and intelligence should be a constant and reliable source when deciding on the future approaches in the area of migration management.

6.4. Specific third-country border management and border security risks

Building relations with countries outside the EU represents a very important method for effectively tackling irregular migration and cross-border crime and forms an important part of the EU's Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept. Operational cooperation, regional capacity building projects and information exchange have all been of huge importance in ensuring efficient and effective border control systems for both the EU Member States and their counterparts. However, in these relations there has, at times, been a tendency to address the risks that the third countries' border management circumstances represent to the EU borders. For instance, the focus might be overly placed on the third countries' weak capacities, porous borders and population movements. It is a legitimate concern but it also can lead to a lack of incentive for third countries to cooperate if the approach is too EU-centric. The approach could be more focused on directly benefitting the specific border related needs of those third countries. The consequence of this would be to assist in improving and enhancing their border management in relation to the threats and needs of these third countries.

Identifying the risks faced by third-country partners in terms of their border management and border security concerns, and then recommending local and regional actions for risk mitigation would then likely cascade and spread out to create reciprocal positive ben-

efits for the EU borders. It would also help to ensure increased incentive for cooperation with the EU. This could be achieved through targeted capability building and technical assistance projects in third countries, based on a national appreciation of risk, which would aim to strengthen third-country migration management capacities, whilst, all the while, still imparting EU border management standards. As an initial proposal, Turkey would appear to be a reasonable candidate with whom to implement this working method of increased and targeted cooperation. This does not preclude the necessity to cooperate with other countries of origin and transit who play important roles and are crucial partners in the EU neighbourhood.

6.5. Multidisciplinary integrated training for EU border-control authorities

It has been seen in this year's Annual Risk Analysis that the geopolitical environment surrounding the EU is becoming ever more complex. Given the proximity of conflict areas to the external borders of the EU, there is no doubt that the threat level to EU border security increases. With the situations in certain neighbouring countries constantly evolving, sometimes for the worse, so too the nature of the challenge for border authorities proves to be constantly shifting. This can be seen also in the sudden influxes faced at the external borders which have proved difficult to predict and thus, demand an effective and timely response. It can be a challenge to provide for the continuous functioning of border-control activities in a situation where thousands of migrants, of mixed backgrounds, circumstances and nationalities, arrive at the border in a very short space of time. It implies a certain level of inherent risk and vulnerability at the external borders.

In response to constantly evolving location and scale of the threats witnessed, the au-

thorities at the borders must have a capability for risk mitigation during moments of emergency. Often the response in such situations calls for intensified interagency cooperation. This is an important tool for responding when a particular border is under an inordinate strain. The difficulty that this method presents though is that the officials tasked with working in closer collaboration, whether they are from customs, security services, asylum authorities, or indeed border guards, are not trained to know the work of the other. The border guard will likely not have the necessary knowledge of the customs official's functions and likewise, the police officer will not know all the procedures of the asylum official's work – and vice versa. This can lead to misunderstandings, difficulties and delays when these authorities are required to assist one another during crises. When time is of the essence, and a potential humanitarian crisis is unfolding, processes must be as streamlined and as dependable as possible.

A potential mitigation for this issue could be to complement interagency cooperation through an integrated multidisciplinary training. An integrated training for all officials working at the borders would aim to provide them with the skills found in one another's respective disciplines. This could comprise of specialised courses to enable those undertaking them to gain a knowledge of the processes behind the work of their counterparts in the field. Ensuring that a border guard would be well versed in the work of a law-enforcement security officer, and have a secure grasp of the issues going into the fight against smuggling of weapons, for instance, would ensure that in his own work he could contribute to the work of the other. A better understanding of the needs of the other authorities in the field would certainly lead to an enhanced interagency cooperation which could help to mitigate the threat arising during emergencies at the borders.



7. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 9 February 2015, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
All Borders						
Syria	1 616	7 903	25 546	79 169	28	210
Eritrea	1 572	2 604	11 298	34 586	12	206
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals	0	0	0	26 341	9.3	<i>n.a.</i>
Afghanistan	22 994	13 169	9 494	22 132	7.8	133
Kosovo*	540	990	6 357	22 069	7.8	247
Mali	2 602	657	2 887	10 575	3.7	266
Albania	5 138	5 651	9 021	9 323	3.3	3.3
Gambia	599	553	2 817	8 730	3.1	210
Nigeria	6 893	826	3 386	8 715	3.1	157
Somalia	3 011	5 038	5 624	7 676	2.7	36
Others	96 086	35 046	30 935	54 216	19	75
Total all borders	141 051	72 437	107 365	283 532	100	164
Land Border						
Kosovo*	540	990	6 350	22 069	35	248
Syria	1 254	6 416	8 601	12 471	20	45
Afghanistan	20 396	9 838	4 392	9 445	15	115
Albania	5 076	5 460	8 833	9 268	15	4.9
Palestine	652	1 195	723	984	1.6	36
Iraq	1 094	1 027	413	939	1.5	127
Mali	118	235	651	786	1.2	21
Cameroon	152	80	125	755	1.2	504
Pakistan	13 781	3 344	3 211	555	0.9	-83
Guinea	123	64	161	394	0.6	145
Others	26 693	20 534	13 732	5 672	9	-59
Total land borders	69 879	49 183	47 192	63 338	100	34
Sea Border						
Syria	362	1 487	16 945	66 698	30	294
Eritrea	680	1 942	10 953	34 323	16	213
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	26 341	12	<i>n.a.</i>
Afghanistan	2 598	3 331	5 102	12 687	5.8	149
Mali	2 484	422	2 236	9 789	4.4	338
Gambia	511	514	2 722	8 642	3.9	217
Nigeria	6 380	575	2 870	8 490	3.9	196
Somalia	1 513	3 480	5 054	7 440	3.4	47
Palestine	251	448	1 351	6 418	2.9	375
Senegal	453	145	1 391	4 769	2.2	243
Others	55 940	10 910	11 549	34 597	16	200
Total sea borders	71 172	23 254	60 173	220 194	100	266

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported by top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type						
Land	159	476	558	2 972	97	433
Sea	123	115	41	80	2.6	95
Top Ten Nationalities						
Syria	6	36	181	1 091	36	503
Afghanistan	58	190	128	1 022	33	698
Algeria	55	61	48	120	3.9	150
Iraq	14	14	12	85	2.8	608
Myanmar	0	0	2	83	2.7	4 050
Guinea	0	8	4	66	2.2	1 550
Eritrea	0	1	1	66	2.2	6 500
Pakistan	10	24	30	63	2.1	110
Mali	1	5	2	62	2	3 000
Iran	5	5	3	33	1.1	1 000
Others	133	247	188	361	12	92
Total	282	591	599	3 052	100	410

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Place of Detection						
Inland	5 146	5 076	5 057	6 828	67	35
Land	625	903	695	1 214	12	75
Land intra-EU	365	494	566	811	7.9	43
Sea	324	471	394	585	5.7	48
Not specified	130	320	267	457	4.5	71
Air	367	358	273	339	3.3	24
Top Ten Nationalities						
Morocco	390	455	366	959	9.4	162
Not specified	255	514	693	681	6.7	-1.7
Spain	320	498	241	510	5	112
Italy	568	513	675	487	4.8	-28
France	404	351	271	417	4.1	54
Albania	221	241	279	413	4	48
Syria	40	79	172	398	3.9	131
Turkey	204	232	185	396	3.9	114
Egypt	173	188	397	352	3.4	-11
Bulgaria	178	157	211	322	3.1	53
Others	4 204	4 434	3 762	5 299	52	41
Total	6 957	7 662	7 252	10 234	100	41

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Place of Detection						
Inland	283 308	278 438	291 188	383 507	87	32
Air	33 126	35 410	31 009	33 789	7.6	9
Land	17 640	19 883	17 677	15 345	3.5	-13
Land intra-EU	9 230	5 832	3 216	3 929	0.9	22
Not specified	2	56	38	2 372	0.5	6142
Between BCPs	1 049	724	574	2 160	0.5	276
Sea	6 593	4 585	1 396	678	0.2	-51
Top Ten Nationalities						
Syria	3 746	11 967	26 374	74 723	17	183
Eritrea	6 803	5 024	8 486	34 477	7.8	306
Morocco	21 887	21 268	26 254	25 329	5.7	-3.5
Not specified	6 814	9 126	20 598	24 461	5.5	19
Afghanistan	25 296	24 395	16 851	23 393	5.3	39
Albania	10 207	13 264	16 175	20 283	4.6	25
Ukraine	12 847	13 081	12 472	16 744	3.8	34
Algeria	15 398	15 776	14 474	12 993	2.9	-10
Pakistan	12 621	18 334	14 209	11 650	2.6	-18
Kosovo*	2 728	3 949	6 349	10 900	2.5	72
Others	232 601	208 744	182 856	186 827	42	2.2
Total	350 948	344 928	345 098	441 780	100	28

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
All Borders						
Ukraine	15 811	18 108	16 380	16 809	15	2.6
Albania	15 983	12 060	11 564	12 999	11	12
Russian Federation	9 225	10 113	22 698	10 776	9.4	-53
Serbia	6 672	5 652	8 181	8 657	7.5	5.8
Belarus	5 983	5 035	4 572	5 172	4.5	13
Georgia	2 801	8 846	8 100	5 100	4.4	-37
Morocco	4 168	4 256	5 372	4 439	3.9	-17
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 762	1 693	3 523	4 010	3.5	14
Turkey	3 353	3 086	2 999	3 048	2.7	1.6
Algeria	1 270	1 407	2 075	2 730	2.4	32
Others	51 249	46 268	43 771	41 147	36	-6
Total all borders	118 277	116 524	129 235	114 887	100	-11
Land Border						
Ukraine	14 697	17 007	15 375	15 573	24	1.3
Russian Federation	5 913	7 306	20 236	9 013	14	-55
Serbia	5 550	4 810	7 405	7 868	12	6.3
Albania	8 978	7 378	6 504	7 005	11	7.7
Belarus	5 840	4 912	4 430	5 009	7.9	13
Georgia	2 571	8 535	7 742	4 716	7.4	-39
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 519	1 532	3 363	3 843	6	14
Morocco	2 827	2 738	3 938	2 975	4.7	-24
FYR Macedonia	2 648	1 781	1 758	1 707	2.7	-2.9
Turkey	1 779	1 479	1 514	1 634	2.6	7.9
Others	7 270	7 627	6 341	4 358	6.8	-31
Total land borders	59 592	65 105	78 606	63 701	100	-19
Air Border						
Albania	3 303	2 689	3 159	3 760	8.1	19
Algeria	1 191	1 330	2 001	2 642	5.7	32
United States	2 219	1 966	2 305	2 307	5	0.1
Brazil	4 697	2 980	2 481	2 275	4.9	-8.3
Not specified	1 499	1 948	1 910	1 668	3.6	-13
Nigeria	1 544	1 709	1 647	1 653	3.6	0.4
Russian Federation	1 459	1 650	1 812	1 588	3.4	-12
China	1 124	1 195	1 186	1 422	3.1	20
Turkey	1 303	1 422	1 257	1 226	2.6	-2.5
India	1 049	952	838	1 181	2.6	41
Others	30 031	26 222	26 189	26 570	57	1.5
Total air borders	49 419	44 063	44 785	46 292	100	3.4
Sea border						
Albania	3 702	1 993	1 901	2 234	46	18
Morocco	334	521	471	571	12	21
Turkey	271	185	228	188	3.8	-18
Russian Federation	1 853	1 157	650	175	3.6	-73
Tunisia	126	128	139	136	2.8	-2.2
Syria	102	129	125	133	2.7	6.4
Not specified	150	251	165	126	2.6	-24
Ukraine	156	136	84	117	2.4	39
India	135	258	151	83	1.7	-45
Algeria	55	45	46	72	1.5	57
Others	2 382	2 553	1 884	1 059	22	-44
Total sea borders	9 266	7 356	5 844	4 894	100	-16

Annex Table 6. Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry reported at the external borders

	Total Refusals	Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	16 809	260	146	6 085	21	6 242	1 174	1 087	730	84	1 155	16 984
Albania	12 999	125	145	228	24	3 016	536	2 505	5 569	223	793	13 164
Russian Federation	10 776	165	22	7 932	32	915	254	382	190	720	493	11 105
Serbia	8 657	165	46	423	6	1 708	2 889	1 555	1 776	132	48	8 748
Belarus	5 172	223	2	2 575	3	886	239	544	170	214	368	5 224
Georgia	5 100	8	14	4 599	19	300	18	44	135	4	17	5 158
Morocco	4 439	1 354	94	958	107	475	72	164	726	487	72	4 509
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 010	957	3	132	0	177	72	1 472	1 092	83	32	4 020
Turkey	3 048	245	25	1 758	32	366	361	109	121	61	113	3 191
Algeria	2 730	85	49	597	8	1 304	7	580	16	11	87	2 744
Others	41 147	2 746	1 506	9 554	887	9 178	1 597	2 428	2 157	734	11 594	42 381
Total	114 887	6 333	2 052	34 841	1 139	24 567	7 219	10 870	12 682	2 753	14 772	117 228

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;



Annex Table 7. **Reasons for refusals of entry**

Reasons for refusals of entry reported at the external borders by border type

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
All Borders							
							Nationality
C) No valid visa	29 930	35 966	50 030	34 841	30	-30	Russian Federation (23%)
E) No justification	25 947	25 309	26 511	24 567	21	-7.3	Ukraine (25%)
Reason not available	12 861	11 127	12 449	14 772	13	19	United States (13%)
H) Alert issued	20 255	15 712	10 787	12 682	11	18	Albania (44%)
G) No subsistence	11 633	11 029	11 128	10 870	9.3	-2.3	Albania (23%)
F) Over 3 month stay	5 490	5 367	5 045	7 219	6.2	43	Serbia (40%)
A) No valid document	7 851	7 866	8 997	6 333	5.4	-30	Morocco (21%)
I) Threat	2 835	3 271	3 077	2 753	2.3	-11	Russian Federation (26%)
B) False document	2 801	3 767	2 571	2 052	1.8	-20	Not specified (14%)
D) False visa	1 824	1 842	1 552	1 139	1	-27	Morocco (9.4%)
Total all borders	121 427	121 256	132 147	117 228	100	-11	
Land Border							
							Nationality
C) No valid visa	18 495	25 054	40 163	25 195	39	-37	Russian Federation (28%)
E) No justification	9 429	11 849	12 724	10 688	17	-16	Ukraine (55%)
H) Alert issued	13 767	11 258	7 289	9 094	14	25	Albania (43%)
G) No subsistence	7 695	7 486	7 517	6 594	10	-12	Albania (25%)
F) Over 3 month stay	4 577	4 518	4 018	5 566	8.7	39	Serbia (49%)
A) No valid document	3 514	3 498	5 071	3 275	5.1	-35	Morocco (39%)
I) Threat	2 095	2 073	1 803	1 615	2.5	-10	Russian Federation (38%)
Reason not available	1		595	1 427	2.2	140	Ukraine (58%)
B) False document	382	1 407	498	393	0.6	-21	Ukraine (35%)
D) False visa	505	640	434	176	0.3	-59	Morocco (14%)
Total land borders	60 460	67 783	80 112	64 023	100	-20	
Air Border							
							Nationality
E) No justification	15 880	12 807	12 930	12 885	27	-0.3	Albania (12%)
Reason not available	12 362	10 713	11 372	12 641	26	11	United States (15%)
C) No valid visa	9 184	8 651	8 372	9 029	19	7.8	Russian Federation (10%)
G) No subsistence	3 482	3 297	3 332	3 649	7.6	9.5	Algeria (16%)
H) Alert issued	3 354	2 697	2 335	2 556	5.3	9.5	Albania (37%)
A) No valid document	2 324	2 612	2 647	2 443	5.1	-7.7	Not specified (31%)
B) False document	2 311	2 239	2 009	1 600	3.3	-20	Not specified (16%)
F) Over 3 month stay	879	834	949	1 565	3.2	65	Turkey (19%)
I) Threat	709	1 121	1 149	1 014	2.1	-12	Suriname (15%)
D) False visa	1 190	1 126	1 043	854	1.8	-18	Senegal (7.7%)
Total air borders	51 675	46 097	46 138	48 236	100	4.5	
Sea Border							
							Nationality
E) No justification	638	653	857	987	20	15	Albania (68%)
H) Alert issued	3 134	1 757	1 162	982	20	-15	Albania (72%)
Reason not available	498	414	482	704	14	46	Albania (27%)
G) No subsistence	456	246	279	626	13	124	Albania (84%)
A) No valid document	2 013	1 756	1 279	615	13	-52	Turkey (13%)
C) No valid visa	2 251	2 261	1 492	610	12	-59	Morocco (16%)
I) Threat	31	77	125	124	2.5	-0.8	Albania (82%)
D) False visa	129	76	75	106	2.2	41	Morocco (53%)
F) Over 3 month stay	34	15	78	88	1.8	13	Morocco (63%)
B) False document	108	121	64	55	1.1	-14	Not specified (47%)
Total sea borders	9 292	7 376	5 893	4 897	100	-17	

Annex Table 8. Document fraudsters – external borders

Detections on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by border type or nationality

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type					
Air	4 401	7 057	6 477	69	-8.2
Land	2 994	2 141	2 484	26	16
Sea	405	596	425	4.5	-29
Unknown	4	10	34	0.4	240
Top Ten Nationalities					
Syria	485	1 209	1 447	15	20
Morocco	397	666	767	8.1	15
Not specified	188	1 197	742	7.9	-38
Albania	2 108	1 008	574	6.1	-43
Ukraine	283	536	519	5.5	-3.2
Nigeria	276	481	516	5.5	7.3
Iraq	129	149	338	3.6	127
Sri Lanka	154	126	315	3.3	150
Turkey	190	190	294	3.1	55
Iran	243	321	263	2.8	-18
Others	3 351	3 921	3 645	39	-7
Total	7 804	9 804	9 420	100	-3.9

Annex Table 9. Fraudulent documents

Detections of fraudulent documents on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by country of issuance and type of documents

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
Top Ten Countries of Issuance						Document Type
France	689	1 335	1 164	11	-13	Visas (30%)
Italy	982	1 048	1 154	11	10	Visas (30%)
Spain	488	761	1 019	9.5	34	ID cards (34%)
Greece	2 136	1 390	918	8.5	-34	Stamps (38%)
Morocco	113	116	515	4.8	344	Passports (98%)
Poland	237	597	492	4.6	-18	Visa (74%)
Germany	436	560	396	3.7	-29	Visa (41%)
Belgium	255	465	383	3.6	-18	Residence permits (36%)
Turkey	243	451	320	3	-29	Passports (74%)
Sweden	145	374	298	2.8	-20	Passports (60%)
Others	3 433	4 251	4 110	38	-3.3	Passports (73%)
Type of Document						Type of Fraud
Passports	3 161	5 046	4 953	46	-1.8	Forged (41%)
Visas	789	1 816	1 616	15	-11	Counterfeit (52%)
Residence permits	1 391	1 763	1 506	14	-15	Counterfeit (44%)
ID cards	879	1 112	1 414	13	27	Counterfeit (36%)
Stamps	2 674	1 411	1 047	9.7	-26	Counterfeit (75%)
Other	263	200	233	2.2	17	Counterfeit (63%)
Total	9 157	11 348	10 769	100	-5.1	

Annex Table 10. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities						
Syria	2 672	8 129	12 599	26 483	11	110
Albania	8 210	15 356	17 983	21 286	8.4	18
Morocco	11 184	15 436	12 486	19 785	7.9	58
Pakistan	26 604	24 707	16 567	13 715	5.4	-17
Afghanistan	27 274	23 147	9 301	11 857	4.7	27
Ukraine	8 453	9 255	9 242	11 107	4.4	20
India	8 817	10 628	10 193	8 856	3.5	-13
Algeria	12 336	13 771	8 732	7 786	3.1	-11
Nigeria	7 357	9 345	8 549	7 136	2.8	-17
China	4 603	5 746	5 309	5 535	2.2	4.3
Others	113 875	134 429	113 344	118 457	47	4.5
Total	231 385	269 949	224 305	252 003	100	12

Please note the nationality of returned migrants does not necessarily correspond to the country of return.

Annex Table 11. **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities						
Albania	12 699	13 149	20 544	26 442	16	29
Pakistan	6 253	10 488	12 127	9 609	6	-21
Ukraine	6 500	7 645	7 763	9 582	5.9	23
Morocco	6 905	7 667	6 758	8 595	5.3	27
India	7 667	8 946	8 958	7 609	4.7	-15
Russian Federation	6 221	6 894	8 216	6 652	4.1	-19
Serbia	4 948	7 520	6 512	6 243	3.9	-4.1
Kosovo*	3 196	3 666	4 537	4 744	2.9	4.6
Nigeria	5 327	4 658	5 234	4 349	2.7	-17
China	5 145	5 254	4 837	4 268	2.6	-12
Others	84 184	83 068	74 932	73 216	45	-2.3
Total	149 045	158 955	160 418	161 309	100	1

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Please note the nationality of returned migrants does not necessarily correspond to the country of return.

Annex Table 12. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year
TYPE OF RETURN						
Forced	80 809	82 061	87 465	69 400	43	-21
Enforced by Member State	69 982	71 568	76 062	50 418	73	-34
Not specified	9 527	8 759	9 832	17 014	25	73
Enforced by Joint Operation	1 300	1 734	1 571	1 968	2.8	25
Voluntary	57 170	65 596	64 588	63 896	40	-1.1
Others	32 140	36 433	34 615	37 488	59	8.3
Not specified	11 122	13 746	13 938	15 083	24	8.2
IOM-assisted	13 908	15 417	16 035	11 325	18	-29
Not specified	11 066	11 298	8 365	28 013	17	235
Total	149 045	158 955	160 418	161 309	100	0.6
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES						
Forced						
Morocco	2 852	3 275	2 943	7 158	10	143
Albania	12 232	11 944	19 296	6 306	9.1	-67
Serbia	2 668	2 943	3 353	3 164	4.6	-5.6
Tunisia	7 279	5 137	3 123	3 048	4.4	-2.4
Pakistan	3 938	7 178	8 369	2 942	4.2	-65
Algeria	2 072	2 521	2 617	2 811	4.1	7.4
Kosovo*	1 626	2 063	2 266	2 708	3.9	20
Nigeria	3 112	2 714	2 707	2 488	3.6	-8.1
India	2 866	3 427	2 898	2 314	3.3	-20
Egypt	2 307	1 650	2 349	2 197	3.2	-6.5
Others	39 857	39 209	37 544	34 264	49	-8.7
Total Forced Returns	80 809	82 061	87 465	69 400	43	-21
Voluntary						
Ukraine	4 716	6 079	6 248	8 122	13	30
India	4 763	5 462	6 032	5 111	8	-15
Russian Federation	4 944	5 532	6 715	5 018	7.9	-25
Pakistan	2 230	3 076	3 663	3 507	5.5	-4.3
Serbia	2 265	4 552	3 126	3 020	4.7	-3.4
China	2 850	2 702	2 796	2 391	3.7	-14
Kosovo*	1 570	1 603	2 271	2 035	3.2	-10
Albania	414	1 100	1 171	2 013	3.2	72
Nigeria	1 956	1 642	2 321	1 767	2.8	-24
Bangladesh	1 110	1 427	1 872	1 402	2.2	-25
Others	30 352	32 421	28 373	29 510	46	4
Total Voluntary Returns	57 170	65 596	64 588	63 896	40	-1.1

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Please note the nationality of returned migrants does not necessarily correspond to the country of return.

Annex Table 13. **Passenger flow on entry (reported on voluntary basis)**

Data reported border type and top ten nationalities

	Air	Land	Sea	Total 2014
Top Ten Nationalities				
Not specified	118 020 985	12 808 360	11 862 354	142 691 699
EU MSs and SACs	8 131 727	10 913 256	417 549	19 462 532
Ukraine	193 219	10 285 108	50 207	10 528 534
Russian Federation	579 054	9 554 369	303 693	10 437 116
Belarus	45 696	4 925 467	2 030	4 973 193
Serbia	15 298	2 460 948	3 387	2 479 633
Moldova	9 148	1 028 245	418	1 037 811
United States	250 836	34 880	84 770	370 486
Israel	321 532	22 305	6 443	350 280
Turkey	147 642	157 063	11 211	315 916
Others	938 734	688 820	441 812	2 069 366
Total	128 653 871	52 878 821	13 183 874	194 716 566

Please see notes in sources and methods on the final page

Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

The term Member States refers to FRAN Member States, which includes the 28 Member States and the three Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain, and in Greece these detections are included in the data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway only include detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators are not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions

(not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land Intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections on exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK. For Greece, only detections of illegal stayers with false documents are reported at the air border as detections of illegal stay on exit. Data on detections of illegal stay inland have not been available from the Netherlands since 2012.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on passenger flow (shared on voluntary basis) are not available for Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. Data on passenger flow at the air border are not available according to the definition for Spain. Data at the sea border are not available for Spain, the Netherlands, Romania and Denmark.

For Ireland, data on persons using false documents are only available from February 2011 (FRAN Indicator 6). In Sweden, the data on false document use are not presented since the reported detections do not distinguish between apprehensions of persons using false documents at the external border and those apprehended inland.





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