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# Interesting reads from the European Parliamentary Research Service for the European Youth Event

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The European Youth Event 2014 (EYE) will take place from 9th to 11th May 2014 at the European Parliament's seat in Strasbourg. With the motto "Ideas for a better Europe" this event will bring together several thousand young Europeans aged between 16 and 30. In support of the event the European Parliamentary Research service has prepared the following short "At a glance" notes and selections of "Key sources" for several of the workshops around which the event will be centered:

### YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

#### "Life on hold" – the state of play of youth unemployment in the EU

##### Youth employment: Mobility of young workers

With almost 6 million jobless young people in the EU, policymakers are under pressure to find solutions to combat high youth unemployment. Whilst Youth Guarantees have been widely discussed and are currently being developed in many Member States, mobility – another strand of the European Commission's (EC) Youth Employment Package – has received much less attention. This keysource brings together published material on the various aspects of mobility of young workers, in particular how mobility can impact youth employment. In the publications analysed, mobility is often described as a way to address skills mismatch and labour demand by allowing greater access to employment opportunities.

##### Youth Employment Initiative

(InfoGraphic) The European Youth Initiative is a tool set up to help regions that had youth unemployment rates of more than 25% in 2012, and regions with youth unemployment rates of more than 20% in 2012 in Member States where youth unemployment rate had increased by more than 30% in 2012.

#### The Youth Guarantee – magic formula for youth employment?

##### Coup de pouce européen en faveur des jeunes

Avec plus d'un jeune européen sur cinq au chômage, l'Union européenne (UE) a fait de l'insertion de sa jeunesse une priorité. Pour venir en aide aux 15-24 ans en difficulté, la mise en place d'une "garantie pour la jeunesse" – offrir à chaque jeune de moins de 25 ans un emploi de qualité, une formation continue, un apprentissage ou un stage dans les quatre mois suivant la fin de sa scolarité ou la perte de son emploi – constitue un nouveau dispositif phare.

#### Youth unemployment and the increasing skills gap – Do universities prepare for the job market

##### Are universities fostering graduate employability?

EU faces a paradox: the youth employment rate stands at 23% while there are around 2 million unfilled vacancies across Europe, and a high number of employers cannot find the right mix of skills in the job market, especially with regard to e-skills. Many employers hold the inability of the educational system to provide work-related skills responsible for this increasing 'mismatch'. Higher Education (HE) Authorities around Europe have put employability at the centre of their national HE strategies. However students contend that higher

education should be steered by the needs of society rather than that of the job market and ask whether employability should be part of the university mission. HE institutions and academics, asked to prove the relevance or utility of their teaching and research for societal and economic needs, have concerns about preserving academic freedom and autonomy.

## Promoting and entrepreneurial spirit – support and different approaches across Europe

### Young entrepreneurs

In the aftermath of the crisis, youth unemployment rates have reached new heights across Europe. In January 2014, 23.4% of young Europeans were without a job. Following an EU wide initiative, 'youth guarantees' are being implemented in many EU countries. At the same time youth entrepreneurship is moving into focus, as entrepreneurship is known to be a driver for economic growth and job creation. While only 4% of 15-24 year-olds were self-employed in 2011, the interest in self-employment and entrepreneurship seems to be much higher according to a Flash Eurobarometer Survey from 2012. The survey found that around 44% of 15-24 year-old Europeans think that self-employment is feasible and would like to set up their own business. Lack of skills and financial resources are the most common barriers to youth entrepreneurship. In order to address these issues and encourage entrepreneurship a number of initiatives at both EU and National level have been introduced in recent years.

## DIGITAL REVOLUTION. THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET

### Eagle Eye – Big data under control?

#### Big data: opportunities and privacy concerns

As datasets grow larger and increasingly complex, tools for processing them have become indispensable. However, their growing use has serious implications for privacy. Hence a heated debate has arisen over "big data", with contrasting voices stressing either the gains or the risks involved and the difficulties in striking the right balance between the two.

### Criminal Scene Internet

#### EU approach to cyber-security

Fighting cross-border crime affecting information and communications networks (cybercrime) is a priority in the EU's internal security strategy. To counter so-called cyber-attacks in a borderless space, the European Union and the Council of Europe have drawn up common strategies, operational measures and legislation.

### Digital opportunities for education?

#### Digital opportunities for education in the EU

The world of education is currently undergoing massive transformation as a result of the digital revolution. In the European Union (EU), children become active online from the age of 7, and 76% of EU households have access to broadband Internet. However, research shows that early use of digital technologies is not necessarily linked to good digital competencies. As jobs are becoming more 'knowledge and digital skills-intensive', continued investment in upgrading education and training systems will be instrumental to maintaining the EU's competitiveness and attractiveness.

### Social media – the end of politics behind closed doors?

#### The role played by social media in political participation and electoral campaigns

Social Media has rapidly grown in importance as a forum for political activism in its different forms. Social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube provide new ways to stimulate citizen engagement in political life, where elections and electoral campaigns have a central role. Personal communication via social media brings politicians and parties closer to their potential voters. It allows politicians to communicate faster and reach citizens in a more targeted manner and vice versa, without the intermediate role of mass media. Reactions, feedback, conversations and debates are generated online as well as support and participation for offline events. Messages posted to personal networks are multiplied when shared, which allow new audiences to be reached.

## **FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. EUROPE IN TRANSITION**

### **Kiss and Ride – political power in Europe or with the MS?**

#### **EU subsidiarity check by National Parliaments**

The position of national parliaments in the EU was strengthened in various ways by the Lisbon Treaty in order to enhance democratic legitimacy. Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty introduced a mechanism of subsidiarity scrutiny by national parliaments on draft EU legislation. The so called early warning system including the yellow and orange card procedures give them a direct role in assessing compliance of draft legislation with the principle of subsidiarity (TEU art. 5). The chambers of national parliaments may each give a reasoned opinion and collectively they can influence the legislative procedure if a certain threshold is attained in the set time limit.

### **Get Brussels Moving – the European Citizens' Initiative**

#### **L'initiative citoyenne européenne**

Premier instrument de démocratie participative transnationale au monde, l'initiative citoyenne européenne (ICE) a été instaurée en 2009 par le Traité de Lisbonne. Elle vise à permettre aux Européens de participer plus activement à la vie démocratique de l'Union européenne (UE) et à renforcer la légitimité démocratique de celle-ci. Concrètement, l'ICE octroie aux citoyens un droit d'initiative législative similaire à celui dont disposent le Parlement européen et le Conseil de l'UE conformément aux articles 225 et 241 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'UE (TFUE).

### **Strasbourg Calling – EU-US Common Free Trade Area?**

#### **Towards an EU-US trade and investment deal**

The European Union (EU) and United States (US) are currently negotiating a trade and investment deal, which would create the world's largest free trade area. But the many challenges faced and increasing public opposition put successful conclusion of an agreement in doubt.

## **SUSTAINABILITY. NEW EUROPEAN LIFESTYLE - SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS AND LIVING**

### **Out of the Shadows – Speculation, shadow banks, tax evasion, corruption**

#### **Lutte de l'UE contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales**

La fraude et l'évasion fiscales pèsent sur les budgets et les contribuables de l'Union européenne (UE) car, en permettant à certains de ne pas payer ou de moins payer d'impôts, elles privent les budgets de recettes fiscales. Pour réintégrer les recettes fiscales non perçues, la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales doit être coordonnée, puisque les flux d'argent ne connaissent pas de frontières, ni nationales ni communautaires. L'UE organise cette lutte par l'établissement et le renforcement d'un cadre fondé sur la transparence, la coopération et la coordination.

### **We've got the power... – energy politics in the future**

#### **Secure, clean and affordable energy for Europe**

The EU is developing energy policies that aim to ensure security of supply, affordable energy for households and industry, and a reduction of carbon emissions in line with EU climate commitments.

### **The programmed collapse – overfishing against unemployment?**

#### **Overfishing and employment in fisheries**

What news about overfishing? According to the FAO report World review of fisheries and aquaculture 2012, "most of the stocks of the top ten species, which account in total for about 30 percent of the world marine capture fisheries production, are fully exploited and, therefore, have no potential for increases in production". Unfortunately, this is not a recent observation. Facing this problem of overfishing, the European Union has put in place measures to fish in a more sustainable way in previous years. However, these measures have had an impact on employment: between 1990 and 1997 employment in the fishing industry declined by 19% in the EU (from 313,000 to 252,000). The fall was the result of measures taken to conserve stocks and reduce the extent of overfishing by modernising the fishing fleet. This keysource gathers several sources on overfishing and



employment in fisheries sector both at the international level and European level. The first part gives an overview and two studies are presented in the second one, the third part is dedicated to stakeholders' views on these issues and some examples by countries are given in the fourth part. This file is completed by a statistical part and a little bibliography.

## Stable money in the long run - monetary policy of the European Central Bank

### The European Central Bank: stable money

The [European Central Bank](#) has a growing portfolio of responsibilities, but its essential job is to keep our common currency stable. The ECB has been responsible for the monetary policy of the euro area since 1999. On the 1st of January of that year, 11 national central banks transferred this power to the ECB. In the following years more countries joined them: Greece in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011 and Latvia in 2014. The legal basis for EU monetary policy is the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The European System of Central Banks comprises all national central banks of all the EU member states and the ECB, not to be confused with the co-existing Eurosystem, which includes the 18 countries of the euro area and the ECB.

## EUROPEAN VALUES

### On the search for a better life in Europe – the state of asylum seekers and immigration in the EU

#### Asylum and irregular immigration in the EU: state of play

Recent events in the Mediterranean have seen many migrants dying off the shores of Italy, Malta and Spain. Many voices call for a more coherent approach to asylum and irregular immigration in the EU to achieve a balance between the legitimate interests of people seeking security and/or better living conditions, and the need to keep national infrastructure from being overwhelmed, as well as to ensure citizens' trust in an area of free movement without internal borders.

### 50/50 – gender balance in the future EU?

#### 50/50 formula – gender balance

Equality between women and men is one of the European Union's main values and reaches back to 1957 when the principle of equal pay for equal work became part of the Treaty of Rome. The European Union's efforts in fostering gender balance have helped to change the lives of many Europeans for the better. Although many inequalities still exist, progress over the last decades can be seen. This is mainly thanks to equal treatment legislation; gender mainstreaming (integration of the gender perspective into all other policies); and specific measures for the advancement of women. This Keysource brings together a selection of studies on gender balance in education and research, career, politics and family life.

### Hunger for energy versus World Hunger

#### Food versus fuel

Biofuel production that uses plants otherwise available for consumption is a debate that requires caution. Some studies gathered in this keysource see a direct link between both and the reason for food price increases (leading to hunger), but a lot of other studies underline the complexity of their relationship. On 17/10/2012, the European Commission published a proposal for Directive (COM(2012) 595 final) that recommended "the introduction of a limit to the contribution made from biofuels and bioliquids produced from food crops" and also "an enhanced incentive scheme to further promote sustainable and advanced biofuels from feedstocks that do not create an additional demand for land". Land use change is an indirect way of increasing food prices as land previously dedicated to consumer food production is shifted to plants for energy production. On 11/09/2013, the EP amended the Commission's proposal, leading to the Fuels and energy from renewable sources: transition to biofuels to deliver greenhouse gas savings resolution (2012/0288(COD)), awaiting the Council's first reading.

## Fairness instead of bargain hunting - alternative trade models, changing consumer behaviour?

### Fair trade and consumers in the European Union

Fair trade seeks to promote sustainable development by providing a fair return to primary producers and workers in developing countries. Although fair trade goods may have difficulty competing with other products solely on the basis of price-quality ratio, many consumers consider ethical and environmental factors, particularly when purchasing commodity products like coffee. Support for fair trade products continues to increase in Europe.



## Youth Employment: Mobility of young workers

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1gW3Kbb>

With almost 6 million jobless young people in the EU, policymakers are under pressure to find solutions to combat high youth unemployment. Whilst [Youth Guarantees](#) have been widely discussed and are currently [being developed](#) in many Member States, mobility – another strand of the European Commission's (EC) [Youth Employment Package](#) – has received much less attention.

This keysource brings together published material on the various aspects of mobility of young workers, in particular how mobility can impact youth employment. In the publications analysed, mobility is often described as a way to address skills mismatch and labour demand by allowing greater access to employment opportunities. For a young worker, mobility offers the chance to gain experience in an international work environment and improve job and language skills. At the same time, it can help reduce the burden on welfare systems in the countries the jobless are leaving, whilst hosting countries can place human resources where they are needed. Germany and Spain have recently signed an agreement on [enhanced cooperation](#) in vocational education and training. Moreover, the German government runs an [initiative](#) to fill posts for which there are not enough applicants – so-called bottleneck vacancies – with skilled young workers from abroad.

Young people's interest in mobility is clearly shown by the success of programmes such as [Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs](#) and [Leonardo Da Vinci](#). Several studies show that young people are the group most likely to move to another country. Yet there are a number of obstacles that hinder mobility, such as problems with the recognition of vocational qualifications or language barriers. Some of these require a coordinated approach at EU level. Since 2011, the EC has put a focus on mobility with schemes such as [Youth on the Move](#) and the [Youth Opportunities Initiative](#). Moreover, a [European credit system for Vocational Education and Training](#) was introduced. The Commission's latest approach is an upgrade of the [EURES](#) platform, which helps around 100 000 jobseekers per year find a job abroad. This would include an enhancement of the job mobility scheme "Your First EURES Job", which currently runs as a pilot project for [5000 young people](#).

For more material see also the Keysource "[NEETs: Young people not in employment, education or training](#)".

### Overview

[EU measures to tackle youth unemployment](#). European Commission, 8 November 2013.

This memo summarises EU activities on youth unemployment. It explains how mobility can benefit young people and what the EC does to unleash the potential of mobility through EURES and Your first EURES job.

[EU Employment and Social Situation: Quarterly Review highlights advantages of traineeships; latest migration trends](#). European Commission, Press release, 25 June 2013.

This brief update on EU labour migration explains that mobility from Southern to Northern EU countries is on the rise as an increasing number of Southern Europeans is looking for a job abroad.

[EURES revamped, a modernised tool to help jobseekers in Europe](#). dpa insight EU, Fernando Heller, 15 May 2013.

This article describes the EURES reform plans and its focus on young people. It quotes Commissioner Andor by saying that "the trend of young Europeans to migrate for work to non EU-countries cannot continue".

### Analysis

[Youth Unemployment in Europe: What to Do about It?](#) Werner Eichhorst, Holger Hinte, Ulf Rinne, IZA policy paper No. 65, July 2013, 20 p.

This paper recommends the stimulation of labour mobility and temporary migration of young people through incentives rather than job-creation schemes. The authors conclude that mobility programmes, legal harmonisation and a real European labour market are needed to unleash the full potential of mobility, in which EURES should become the main source for jobseekers and trainees.

[Migration strategies of crisis-stricken youth in an enlarged European Union](#). Martin Kahanec, European Review of Labour and Research, 2013, 17 p.

This paper explores migration patterns and “push and pull” factors of young people from new EU Member States. It describes the typical labour migrant as young, male, single without children. The study finds that whilst education doesn’t affect migration, age does: the older a worker is, the longer he intends to stay abroad. Married persons are the least likely to move for work. Those with children prefer to stay either short or long-term, whilst those without children are more open for medium-term migration. Young people migrate mostly in hope of better labour market opportunities and a different political, economic and social situation in the receiving country.

[Education to employment: Getting Europe’s youth into work](#). McKinsey, January 2014, 118 p.

This McKinsey report analyses the main obstacles for young jobseekers in Europe and describes interventions needed at EU level. It takes reference to mobility on p. 97 and calls for a EU level labour market monitor and a system to make vocational qualifications transferable across the EU.

[Do Study Abroad Programs Enhance the Employability of Graduates?](#) Giorgio Di Pietro, IZA DP No. 7675, October 2013, 28 p.

This study based on data from recent Italian graduates investigates the impact of international educational mobility schemes on the employability of graduates. It concludes that studying abroad has a relatively large and statistically meaningful effect on the probability of being in employment 3 years after graduation.

## Stakeholder opinions

[Unemployment is the scourge, not youth unemployment per se. The misguided policy preoccupation with youth](#). Mikkel Barslund; Daniel Gros. CEPS Policy Brief, 26 June 2013, 11 p.

This policy brief calls for more political action on labour mobility, especially for young people as they are less attached and find it easier to move. The authors ask for more initiative by the European Commission, also in respect to Your First EURES job to use the full potential of bringing jobseekers and employers together across borders.

[The Mobility Challenge for Growth and Integration in Europe](#). Klaus F. Zimmermann, IZA policy paper No. 69, September 2013, 20 p.

Zimmermann, winner of the EIB prize for excellence in economic/social research argues that Europe needs “a common labor market that is characterized by mobility, flexibility and innovative entrepreneurship” and that policy-makers should invest in enhancing cross-border mobility as one response to high youth unemployment.

## EU programmes

[Erasmus+](#): In 2014, Erasmus+ was launched as the new EU programme for Education, Training, Youth and Sport. Mobility schemes are broadly funded in the new programme. Overall, 735.000 students including trainees and vocational students will have the chance to study or work abroad.

[Your First EURES Job. Making it easier to move and work to recruit young people in Europe](#). 2012-2013, European Commission Guide, 18 p.

This guide describes Your First EURES Job, the job mobility scheme targeted at young people which run as a pilot project until 2013. It looks into the objectives, the structure, the financing and the implementation of the scheme.

## Related legislative procedure

[Moving Youth into Employment](#). COM (2012) 727 final, 5 December 2012.

[Youth Opportunities Initiative: first steps taken](#). SWD (2012) 98 final.

[Youth Opportunities Initiative](#). COM (2011) 933 final, 20 December 2011.

[Youth on the Move](#). COM (2010) 477 final, 15 September 2010.

# Youth Employment Initiative

## Eligible regions

### SWEDEN:

Mellersta Norrland, Norra Mellansverige, Sydsverige

### BELGIUM:

Hainaut Province, Liège Province, Région Bruxelles Capitale

### IRELAND:

Border, Midland and Western, Southern and Eastern

### UNITED KINGDOM:

Inner London, Merseyside, South West, Eastern Scotland, Tees Valley and Durham, West Midlands

### FRANCE:

Aquitaine, Auvergne, Centre, Champagne-Ardenne, Haute Normandie, Languedoc-Roussillon, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Picardie, Mayotte, Guadeloupe, Guyane, Martinique, Réunion

### PORTUGAL:

Alentejo, Algarve, Centro (PT), Lisboa, Norte, Região Autónoma da Madeira, Região Autónoma dos Açores

### SPAIN:

Andalucía, Aragón, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalunya, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla, Comunidad de Madrid, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Illes Balears, La Rioja, País Vasco, Principado de Asturias, Región de Murcia

### ITALY:

Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Toscana, Umbria, Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste

### POLAND:

Dolnoslaskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Łódzkie, Lubelskie, Lubuskie, Malopolskie, Podkarpackie, Swietokrzyskie, Warminko-Mazurskie, Zachodniopomorskie

### CZECH REPUBLIC:

Severozápad

### HUNGARY:

Dél-Alföld, Dél-Dunántúl, Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország

### SLOVAKIA:

Stredné Slovensko, Východné Slovensko, Západné Slovensko

### ROMANIA:

Centru, Sud-Muntenia, Sud-Est

### BULGARIA:

Severen tsentralen, Severoiztochen, Severozapaden, Yugoiztochen, Yuzhen tsentralen

### SLOVENIA:

Vzhodna Slovenija

### CROATIA:


Jadranska Hrvatska, Kontinentalna Hrvatska

### GREECE:

Anatoliki Makedonia - Thraki, Attiki, Dytiki Ellada, Dytiki Makedonia, Ipeiros, Kentriki Makedonia, Kriti, Notio Aigaio, Peloponnisos, Sterea Ellada, Thessalia, Voreio Aigaio

LATVIA, LITHUANIA, CYPRUS

## Youth unemployment rate 2012



## Further information

Item	Data source
Youth Employment Initiative-Eligible Regions 2014-5	NUTS level 2 regions that had youth unemployment rates of more than 25% in 2012, and regions with youth unemployment rates of more than 20% in 2012 in Member States where youth unemployment rate had increased by more than 30% in 2012.
Youth unemployment rates	<u>Eurostat</u> . Youth unemployment rate shows unemployed persons aged 15 to 24 as a percentage of the active population. Reliability of data for the regions below is flagged as low: Belgium: provinces of West-Vlaanderen, Brabant Wallon, Luxembourg and Namur. Bulgaria: Severozapaden. Germany: Oberpfalz, Oberfranken, Bremen, Gießen, Kassel, Trier and Leipzig. Greece: Ionia Nisia and Voreio Aigaio. Spain: Ceuta, Melilla. France: Limousin, Corse, Guyane. Italy: Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste. Netherlands: Zeeland. Austria: Burgenland, Kärnten, Steiermark, Salzburg, Tirol and Vorarlberg. Poland: Podlaskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie and Warminski-Mazurskie. Finland: Åland. United Kingdom: Cumbria, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly, North Eastern Scotland and Highlands and Islands.

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## Coup de pouce européen en faveur des jeunes

Avec plus d'un jeune européen sur cinq au chômage, l'Union européenne (UE) a fait de l'insertion de sa jeunesse une priorité. Pour venir en aide aux 15-24 ans en difficulté, la mise en place d'une "garantie pour la jeunesse" – offrir à chaque jeune de moins de 25 ans un emploi de qualité, une formation continue, un apprentissage ou un stage dans les quatre mois suivant la fin de sa scolarité ou la perte de son emploi – constitue un nouveau dispositif phare.

### Une "génération perdue" ?

Les jeunes constituent la classe d'âge la plus touchée par la crise économique. En septembre 2013, on comptait [7,5 millions](#) de jeunes européens entre 15 et 24 ans ni étudiants, employés ou stagiaires, dénommés [NEET](#) ("not in education, employment, or training"). En janvier 2014, 5,6 millions étaient au chômage ([23,4 %](#)). Ce taux est plus de deux fois supérieur au taux de chômage moyen dans l'UE (10,8%). Le taux de chômage des 15-24 ans est extrêmement disparate d'un État membre (EM) à l'autre, allant de moins d'un jeune sur dix (Allemagne) à plus d'un sur deux (Grèce et Espagne).

### La "garantie pour la jeunesse"

Face à la dégradation de la situation des jeunes européens, les [initiatives politiques](#) à l'échelle de l'UE et des EM se sont multipliées. Parmi ces initiatives, la proposition de recommandation inscrite dans la Communication de la Commission européenne du 5 décembre 2012 (le "[Paquet sur l'emploi des jeunes](#)"), visant à mettre en place une "garantie pour la jeunesse", a fait florès. La Commission y invite chaque EM à présenter une offre de qualité à tous les jeunes sans emploi ou sans formation de moins de 25 ans dans les quatre mois suivant la fin de leur scolarité ou la perte de leur emploi.

Tout au long de l'année 2013, la mobilisation politique pour l'adoption et la mise en œuvre de cette "garantie pour la jeunesse" a été très active. Le 16 janvier 2013, le [Parlement européen](#) (PE) a invité les ministres de l'Emploi à adopter la proposition de la Commission. Le [Conseil européen](#) de février 2013 a décidé de la création d'une "[Initiative pour l'Emploi des Jeunes](#)" destinée à renforcer le soutien à l'emploi des jeunes (avec une aide de 6 milliards d'euros) et, notamment, à promouvoir la "garantie pour la jeunesse". Le 22 avril 2013, le Conseil de l'UE a adopté la [recommandation](#) portant création d'une "garantie pour la jeunesse". Les EM ont, ensuite, été invités à mettre en œuvre très rapidement cette initiative. Les partenaires sociaux les ont soutenus en présentant en juin 2013 un [Cadre d'action sur l'emploi des jeunes](#). En 2014, cette mobilisation ne faiblit pas tant au [niveau européen](#) qu'à celui des [États membres](#). Dans sa [résolution](#) du 25 février 2014, le PE a invité les EM à mettre en place un système adéquat de suivi de l'efficacité des mesures déployées et des ressources financières engagées.

### Bonnes pratiques et objectifs

Cette proposition de "garantie pour la jeunesse" s'inspire d'expériences positives menées dans plusieurs EM comme relevé par [l'Organisation internationale du Travail](#) et la Fondation européenne pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail ([Eurofound](#)). Les pays nordiques européens ont été les premiers à mettre en œuvre des mécanismes de garantie pour la jeunesse dès les années 1980: la Suède (1984), la Norvège (1993), le Danemark (1996) et la Finlande (1996). Plus récemment, d'autres pays ont créé des programmes similaires comme l'Allemagne (2004), l'Autriche (2004) ou la Belgique (2007).

Pour mettre en œuvre cette "garantie pour la jeunesse", quelques [grandes lignes d'action](#) ont été définies. Avant toute chose, il s'agit d'amener les jeunes à s'enregistrer auprès des services compétents afin d'identifier leurs compétences et leurs besoins. Une forte [coopération](#) entre les services publics de l'emploi, les établissements scolaires et professionnels, les centres d'information et d'orientation mais aussi les employeurs, les associations de jeunes et les syndicats étudiants est attendue pour mettre en place un

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véritable "filet de rattrapage". L'inscription dans le système assurée, trois grands axes d'intervention sont retenus:

- offrir aux jeunes une information complète sur les services et les aides disponibles;
- adapter et améliorer leurs compétences;
- aider concrètement à leur insertion sur le marché du travail.

## Mise en œuvre

Les EM sont en train de concrétiser ces priorités dans des plans appelés "[Plans Nationaux de mise en œuvre de la Garantie Jeunesse](#)". 19 parmi les 20 EM dont le taux de chômage des jeunes est supérieur ou égal à 25% avaient élaboré leur plan fin [février 2014](#). Les autres EM, avec un taux de chômage des jeunes moins élevé, devront avoir soumis leurs plans au printemps 2014. De [nombreux instruments](#) visent à permettre la mise en place rapide de la "garantie pour la jeunesse", en particulier:

- la nouvelle [Alliance Européenne pour l'Apprentissage](#), lancée en juillet 2013, qui vient appuyer les réformes nationales permettant d'augmenter l'offre d'apprentissage et sa qualité;
- la proposition d'un [Cadre européen pour la qualité des stages](#) (adoptée par la Commission européenne en décembre 2013) qui devrait soutenir la création de "stages"/"premiers emplois" décents tant quant au contenu de l'apprentissage qu'aux conditions de travail;
- le programme [Erasmus+](#) (2014-2020) qui continue de promouvoir la mobilité des jeunes *via* l'éducation et la formation tandis que l'initiative "[Ton premier emploi EURES](#)" soutient la mobilité, côté emploi.

## Financement européen et coût national

La "garantie pour la jeunesse" est, d'abord, financée par les EM. Cependant, elle bénéficie d'un soutien financier européen. L'[Initiative pour l'Emploi des Jeunes](#) a été dotée d'un budget de 6 milliards d'euros pour une période de deux ans (2014-2015). Sur la période budgétaire 2014-2020, au titre du budget communautaire, le Fonds social européen ([FSE](#)) constituera une autre source importante de financement. Sur la même période, le programme [Erasmus+](#) devrait, quant à lui, consacrer une part importante de son action aux [apprentis](#). Le programme [COSME](#) pour la compétitivité des entreprises et le programme pour [l'innovation et le changement social](#) contribueront également à la mise en place de la "garantie pour la jeunesse". Au budget communautaire s'ajoute le financement de la [Banque européenne d'investissement](#) (BEI) qui, avec son initiative "Compétences et emploi - investir dans la jeunesse", a déjà apporté une enveloppe de 6 milliards d'euros en 2013.

## Parties prenantes

Les [partenaires sociaux européens](#) se sont montrés très favorables à la mise en place de cette "garantie". Les associations de jeunes européens ont également été promptes à apporter leur soutien. Chacune d'entre elles fait, toutefois, l'une ou l'autre remarque. Ainsi, le Forum de l'étudiant européen ([AEGEE](#)) invite les États membres à véritablement associer les organisations de jeunesse. Le [Forum européen de la Jeunesse](#) souligne la spécificité - et la difficulté - d'un mécanisme qui crée un véritable droit à l'emploi. Le [FEPS Young Academics Network](#) rappelle l'importance d'adapter la "garantie pour la jeunesse" aux caractéristiques de chaque État membre.

Tout en marquant leur soutien, des voix s'élèvent pour demander l'extension du droit "garantie pour la jeunesse" aux 25-30 ans ([Parlement européen](#), [Comité économique et social européen \(CESE\)](#), [Comité des régions](#), [AEGEE](#)). D'autres voix, nombreuses, s'inquiètent quant à son financement. Les fonds alloués pourraient ne pas se révéler suffisants ([Parlement européen](#), [CESE](#), [AEGEE](#)) créant un risque de saupoudrage ([Sénat français](#)). D'autres voix plus critiques encore se font entendre. Face aux résultats parfois décevants des expériences pilotes de "garantie pour la jeunesse", le Centre pour la Politique Européenne ([CEP](#)) avance que la "garantie pour la jeunesse" ne fera pas progresser le taux d'emploi des jeunes et qu'une création d'emploi serait plus efficace via la réduction des coûts pour les entreprises ou des mesures fiscales. *In fine*, l'intitulé même du dispositif pose question notamment au [Sénat français](#). Le terme de "garantie" peut laisser croire que tous les jeunes [NEET](#) âgés de 15 à 24 ans pourraient, à court terme, disposer d'une proposition d'emploi ou d'un stage de qualité.





## Are universities fostering graduate employability?

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/NXLMgX>

EU faces a paradox: the [youth employment rate](#) stands at 23% while there are around [2 million unfilled vacancies](#) across Europe, and a high number of employers [cannot](#) find the right mix of skills in the job market, especially with regard to [e-skills](#).

Many employers [hold](#) the inability of the educational system to provide work-related skills responsible for this increasing '[mismatch](#)'. Higher Education (HE) Authorities around Europe [have put](#) employability at the centre of their national HE strategies. However students [contend](#) that higher education should be steered by the needs of society rather than that of the job market and [ask](#) whether employability should be part of the university mission. HE institutions and academics, asked to prove the relevance or utility of their teaching and research for societal and economic needs, [have concerns](#) about preserving academic freedom and autonomy.

The [EU strategy for Higher Education \(HE\)](#) supports HE institutions in keeping up with the job market through:

- benchmarking employability
- improving the quality of HE
- fostering cooperation between businesses and universities
- monitoring [skills needs](#) and [labour market evolutions](#).

This Keysource compiles a selection of resources on issues related to graduate employability.

### Overviews

[Quality and relevance in Higher education](#) / DG Culture & Education. Overview of European commission's actions in support of modernising education programmes.

[University Business Cooperation](#) / DG Culture & Education. Overview of EC support for cooperation between businesses and HE institutions.

[Graduate Employability: A Review of Conceptual and Empirical Themes](#) / Michael Tomlinson in *Higher Education Policy* (2012) 25, 407–431. This paper provides an overview of some of the dominant themes in the area of graduate employment and employability over the past decade.

### European Institutions

Communication on [Supporting Growth and Jobs—an Agenda for the Modernisation of Europe's Higher Education Systems](#) / European Commission, September 2011. The strategy aims to boost graduate numbers, to improve the quality and relevance of HE and to maximise graduates' employability.

[Council conclusions of 28 November 2011 on the modernisation of higher education](#). The Council calls for efforts to strengthen links between higher education institutions, employers and labour market institutions in order to take greater account of labour market needs in study programmes, to improve the match between skills and jobs, and to develop active labour market policies aimed at promoting graduate employment.

[Modernising Europe's higher education systems](#) / European Parliament, April 2012. The EP [resolution](#) calls on HE institutions to:

- create new fields of study that reflect the needs of the labour market and , develop programmes of study covering both general knowledge and specific professional skills

- monitor trends in labour market requirements in order to reflect more accurately future needs in terms of learning opportunities.

[Council conclusions of 11 May 2012 on the employability of graduates from education and training](#). Based on a [Commission proposal](#) the Council agreed that by 2020 the share of employed among the 20-34 year olds graduates having left education and training no more than three years before the reference year should be at least 82% as compared to 76.5% in 2010. This benchmark was [developed](#) by the Joint Research Centre's Centre for Research on Lifelong Learning.

[Report on Progress in Quality Assurance in Higher Education](#) / European Commission, February 2014. The report [highlights](#) that, although progress has been achieved, further reforms are needed to ensure a 'quality culture' so that teaching is more closely aligned with labour market realities and societal needs.

## Analysis

This list of selected publications on the topic provides references to studies, articles and reports available on the internet either by subscription only or based on open access principle.

[Student Advancement of Graduates Employability – SAGE](#). This pan-European project aims at increasing the knowledge of the effects of European higher education reforms implementation on the graduates' employability. The [summary of the results](#) of their survey of European students' unions was released in March 2014, other project reports [will be published](#) shortly.

[The Employability of Higher Education Graduates: The Employers' Perspective](#) / European Commission, October 2013. This study sets out to get beneath the surface of what employers' believe makes graduates employable – and why one graduate might have the edge over another.

[The employability of young graduates in Europe: Analysis of the ET2020 benchmark](#) / European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 2012. This report aims at analysing the determinants of the employability of the individuals targeted by the benchmark.

[Perspectives on Higher Education and the labour market. Review of international policy developments](#) / E. de Weert, Centre for Higher Education policy studies, December 2011. This report explores international policy trends regarding the relationship between higher education and the labour market, and considers developments in Germany, France, the UK, Scandinavian countries.

[Supporting Graduate Employability: HEI Practice in Other Countries](#) / UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, June 2011. This study explores the development of employability skills in the United Kingdom and in an international setting.

[Higher Education and Employability of Graduates: will Bologna make a difference?](#) / E. Edvardsson Stiwne, M. Gaio Alves (2010) in *European Educational Research Journal* 9 (1), 32-44. This article focuses on the relationship between higher education, employability of graduates and students' satisfaction with their studies, drawing on European statistics, as well as on data collected at national and/or institutional level in Portugal and Sweden.

[Universities Between the Expectations to Generate Professionally Competences and Academic Freedom Experiences from Europe](#) / U. Teichler (2010) in *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, v.77: 421–428. This article a close look at European debates on employability, revealing that there is no consensus emerging in favour of a subordination of the HE curricula to the current presumed demands of the employment system.

## Public opinion

[Employers' perception of graduate employability, Eurobarometer 304](#) / European Commission, December 2010. This Flash Eurobarometer provides insights into the needs and perceptions of graduate recruiters by monitoring the opinions of staff in companies throughout Europe with at least 50 employees across a range of business sectors.

## Young entrepreneurs

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1r4kWU5>



In the aftermath of the crisis, youth unemployment rates have reached new heights across Europe. In [January 2014](#), 23.4% of young Europeans were without a job. Following an EU wide initiative, 'youth guarantees' are being [implemented](#) in many EU countries. At the same time youth entrepreneurship is moving into focus, as entrepreneurship is [known](#) to be a driver for economic growth and job creation. While [only 4%](#) of 15-24 year-olds were self-employed in 2011, the interest in self-employment and entrepreneurship seems to be much higher according to a [Flash Eurobarometer Survey](#) from 2012. The survey found that around 44% of 15-24 year-old Europeans think that self-employment is feasible and would like to set up their own business. Lack of skills and financial resources are the most common barriers to youth entrepreneurship. In order to address these issues and encourage entrepreneurship a number of initiatives at both EU and National level have been introduced in recent years.

At national level, broad support is given to young entrepreneurs in most EU countries. National actions and initiatives vary from favourable conditions for start-ups to entrepreneurial learning schemes. Moreover, entrepreneurial education has gained wide recognition in curricula ([EU Youth Report 2012](#)).

At EU level, the [Small Business Act](#) called already in 2008 for an environment that supports youth entrepreneurship and fosters entrepreneurial spirit. Since 2009, the [Erasmus for Entrepreneurs](#) programme facilitates the exchange of young entrepreneurs to gain valuable learning experience in another business abroad. So far, [more than 1600 exchanges](#) have been organised with high satisfaction rates among both participants and hosts. Entrepreneurship education also became a key area in the [Rethinking Education strategy](#) and the [Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan](#) which encourages Member States to create entrepreneurial learning modules. Moreover, it offers financial support for young business starters through the [European Social Fund](#) (ESF). For several years the ESF has financed projects in the field, such as the learning network on inclusive entrepreneurship [COPIE](#). Further financial support comes through the [European Progress Microfinance Facility](#) which provides access to finance for SMEs. The European Parliament has passed several resolutions ([7 February](#), [11 September](#), [22 October](#) 2013) underlining the importance of investing in entrepreneurship education and skills for young people.

### Overview

[Policy brief on Youth Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial activities in Europe. OECD, European Commission/ 2012, 28 p.](#)

This policy brief analyses the potential impact of entrepreneurship on youth employment. The paper delivers a comprehensive first overview by analysing barriers for young people (such as lack of encouragement, skills and financial resources) and presenting successful policy examples from France, Scotland, the UK and Germany.

### Analysis

[Youth Entrepreneurship. A background paper for the OECD Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development/](#) Francis Greene, 2013. 35 p.

This paper describes the benefits of youth entrepreneurship and analyses the reasons for low entrepreneurship rates. It describes the characteristics of youth entrepreneurship, the impact of public policy and gives examples of assistance to young entrepreneurs. The author concludes that it is not clear whether active labour market policies are advantageous to youth entrepreneurship.

[The missing Entrepreneurs. Policies for inclusive Entrepreneurship in Europe/](#) OECD, 18 December 2013, 249 p.

This OECD study looks into inclusive entrepreneurship; a concept that supports equal opportunities to become an entrepreneur for all members of society. Those with "under-recognised potential" such as young people should be

targeted by particular policies. The study also presents rates of youth entrepreneurship and self-employment in several EU countries.

[Policy brief on Access to Business Start-Up Finance for Inclusive Entrepreneurship](#)/ European Commission & OECD, 11 March 2014, 34 p.

Lack of financial resources often hinders entrepreneurship, especially for young people who often rely on the support of family, friends and public authorities. This policy brief analyses the scale and nature of the financing challenge and lists new and emerging policy actions for financing business start-ups by low-educated and young people.

[Youth Entrepreneurship](#) / European Microfinance Network, 2012, 42 p.

This report is organised in three sections: the first part presents the current status quo of youth entrepreneurship policies, the second part focuses on key aspects for micro-finance institutions (MFI) to develop youth entrepreneurship programmes and the final part draws conclusions and gives recommendations for policymakers and MFIs.

## Good practice

[Shooting for the Moon: Good Practices in Local Youth Entrepreneurship Support](#)/ Andrea-Rosalinde Hofer, Austin Delaney, OECD, 1 September 2010, 40 p.

Following a good practice criteria list grouped by three dimensions (opportunity creation, entrepreneurship education, start-up support) this handbook brings together 28 local youth entrepreneurship activities from different countries that show a great variety of initiatives to support youth entrepreneurship.

[Young people and entrepreneurship: European good practice projects](#) / European Commission, 2013, 84 p.

Brings many different examples of successful young entrepreneurs across the EU which show the great variation of different projects.

[Entrepreneurial skills and competences for young people](#)/ European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2011, 110 p. See in particular chapter 3 on Entrepreneurial skills and competences for young people (p. 73ff).

The study focuses on skills are needed for entrepreneurial competence and how policy could be turned into practice by presenting several successful initiatives from Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece.

## Entrepreneurship education

[Entrepreneurial learning](#) / Anthony A. Gribben, policy briefing, 2013.

This short policy briefing by the European Training Foundation gives a short overview of entrepreneurial learning and draws some policy conclusions from it. It underlines policy partnerships and partner cooperation, national evaluated policies and the exchange of good practice.

[Promoting entrepreneurship through education](#)/ Ariane Debyser, EPRS briefing, 4 December 2013, 6 p.

This briefing looks into the role and scope of entrepreneurship education across the EU and the effects of school education on entrepreneurship. It then describes the EU's role and the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan which invites Member States to make entrepreneurship a key competence in curricula and to promote entrepreneurial training.

[Entrepreneurship Education at School in Europe. National Strategies, Curricula and Learning Outcomes](#)/ Eurydice, March 2012, 98 p.

This comparative overview looks into entrepreneurship education on primary and secondary education in public schools across Europe, based on the findings of a survey among 31 countries. It analyses national strategies and action plans and current practice in different EU Member States. The report finds that there is a wide recognition of the importance of entrepreneurship education both a primary and secondary school level.

[Enabling teachers as a critical success factor](#)/ European Commission, Report, 2011, 78 p.

This report describes entrepreneurship education and its aims. It looks into national strategies and assesses which steps still need to be taken at EU and national level as well as by regional/local authorities, schools, businesses and others. It concludes that wider changes are needed within the education system.

## Big data: opportunities and privacy concerns

As datasets grow larger and increasingly complex, tools for processing them have become indispensable. However, their growing use has serious implications for privacy. Hence a heated debate has arisen over "big data", with contrasting voices stressing either the gains or the risks involved and the difficulties in striking the right balance between the two.



### Sizeable datasets: processing and use

Big data is a catch-all phrase describing data collections which merge data from multiple sources into a single one, so large that it cannot be processed using standard techniques. Specific tools are thus needed to extract information and identify previously unseen patterns in "noisy" and often unstructured data. The essential part of such a process is known as data mining and consists, for example, in grouping similar elements or people (cluster analysis) or capturing the co-occurrence of items (association analysis).

The growth of digital data has accelerated exponentially in recent years. A 2012 [United Nations report](#) stated that between 2007 and 2020 the world's stock of data was expected to increase 44 times. More digitised data were created between 2012 and 2013 than in the rest of human history. A new unit of "yottabyte", corresponding to one septillion ( $10^{24}$ ) bytes, has been introduced to describe huge datasets.

The availability of such a massive amount of data presents numerous opportunities for public and private bodies alike. If efficiently processed, they may serve, and have already served, to improve many areas of human activity among which [healthcare](#), weather forecasting, urban planning, and crime fighting are cited most often. As it is impossible to predict all future uses of big data, many [argue](#) that it should be stored for very long, if not indefinite, periods of time.

### Privacy threats

In 2012, the press [reported](#) on the behavioural tracking practices of a retail company which used its customers' purchasing history to identify pregnant women. The company sent coupons for baby products to these customers, some of whom had not yet revealed their pregnancy to their families. This widely discussed case is one of many examples of how advances in data analysis may result in what is likely perceived by the individuals concerned as intrusions in their privacy. It is [suggested](#) that privacy threats brought about by big data may be divided into three broad categories: surveillance, disclosure and discrimination.

#### *Surveillance*

The feeling of being constantly monitored can seriously affect people's behaviour, discouraging them from adopting new technologies and searching for or reading certain materials over the internet. Moreover, surveillance may have a "[chilling effect](#)" on free speech, as it leads to individuals suspecting that a trace of everything said is kept somewhere and may be used against them in the future.

#### *Disclosure*

Disclosure may result from a failure to protect a data collection from a security breach (e.g. through hacking) or from the initial collector revealing information to a third party (secondary usage). Some companies allow the transfer of their clients' data to commercial partners, as illustrated by banking practices recently reported by the [Dutch](#) and [Belgian](#) press. Moreover, whereas data are mainly collected and stored by private entities, government agencies reportedly enjoy easy access to them, even in the absence of a suspicion of crime, let alone a court order, and without the individuals concerned being informed. This suspected easy access became front-page news with Edward Snowden's revelations concerning a [mass surveillance programme](#) operated by the US National Security Agency (NSA).

## *Profiling and discrimination*

People may be treated differently on the basis of information collected about them on account of a specific characteristic (which they might not be willing to reveal), such as religious convictions or sexual orientation. As a result, services could be refused to certain people or companies offer highly personalised pricing, which may amount to discrimination.

## EU policies and laws

### *An opportunity for Europe*

Most existing legislative and non-legislative instruments relevant to data in general and big data in particular are part of the EU's [open data policy](#). This policy focuses on the availability of information produced, collected and commissioned by the public sector in the EU. The legal framework in this field is provided by the 2003 [Directive](#) on the re-use of public sector information, substantially [amended](#) in 2013. The [European Union Open Data Portal](#) has been developed as the single point of access to data from EU institutions and other bodies. Moreover, relevant actions at national level are promoted and funded by the EU e.g. through the [Seventh Framework Programme for research](#).

When addressing big data, the EU institutions are however aiming well beyond open data. As evidenced by a recent [speech](#) by the Commission's Vice-President Neelie Kroes, EU leaders have recognised big data's potential for sparking technological innovation, creating new jobs and building up the knowledge-based economy. The Commission is developing a [strategic initiative](#) based on the concept of the data value chain, which refers to the life-cycle of data (generation, processing and use in new innovative products and services). The October 2013 [European Council Conclusions](#) confirmed a comprehensive approach to big data, linking it to developments in cloud computing and supporting the creation of a single market for big data.

### *Data protection issues*

Taking a strict position on privacy could arguably lead to restraining potential developments in science, which derives valuable insights from big data. Therefore [calls](#) have been made for a different approach, that of data empowerment – vesting individuals with the power to use their data in ways they wish – which could still be reconciled with the general public's interest in processing the data concerned.

However, existing laws need to be respected and the EU, compared to other parts of the world, has particularly strong data protection rules. The right to protection of personal data is a fundamental right, enshrined in [Article 8](#) of the legally binding [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU](#). The 1995 [Data Protection Directive](#) – which, in the absence of a compromise on the data protection [reform package](#), remains the key EU legal instrument in this field – provides for a series of specific privacy principles including:

- **Purpose specification and limitation:** data are to be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and cannot be further processed in a way incompatible with these. However, in general, further processing for historical, statistical or scientific purposes should not be considered incompatible with the initial purpose, provided that Member States ensure appropriate safeguards.
- **Transparency and consent:** individuals are to be informed about the processing of their data, which requires explicit consent that can be withdrawn at any time.
- **Data minimisation:** data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed;
- **Limited retention:** keeping data in a form which permits identification of a person only as long as it is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed.

The Directive equally protects individuals whose personal data are clearly linked to their name in the dataset concerned and those described in a way which enables identification through further research. The latter situation has become more common, with big datasets combining information from a variety of sources.

The robustness of the EU framework aside, it is important to note that the right to data protection has its limits. According to the [Court of Justice of the EU](#) the right to data protection is not "an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society", a position which underscores the need for a balanced approach when addressing opportunities and risks of big data analysis.





## EU approach to cyber-security

Fighting cross-border crime affecting information and communications networks (cybercrime) is a priority in the EU's internal security strategy. To counter so-called cyber-attacks in a borderless space, the European Union and the Council of Europe have drawn up common strategies, operational measures and legislation.

### Crimes beyond national borders

#### *National security issues*

The internet has opened up information flows, but has also made possible a range of new transnational crimes. Criminals can threaten the security of nation states and/or the civil liberties of their citizens. Organised criminals exploit cyberspace to steal money or to commit fraud. They also break into computer networks in order to steal data or business secrets or simply to destroy documents. Cybercrime can damage essential infrastructure on which society depends, affecting health, safety, or security, but also infrastructure vital for economic or social well-being (such as power plants, transport networks and government networks).

#### *International protection*

The first global instrument aimed at deterring action directed against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems, networks and computer data was the [2001 Budapest Convention](#) promoted by the Council of Europe. This legal instrument aims to facilitate detection, investigation, criminalisation and prosecution of such activities at both domestic and international levels. This Convention has been supplemented by a Protocol on acts of xenophobia and racism committed through computer systems.

### The EU strategic and operational approach

The EU has set out its approach against cybercrime with actions developed at strategic, legislative and operational levels.

**At strategic level**, the 2009 Stockholm Programme includes a number of measures to counteract cybercrime. Europol's 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment ([SOCTA](#)) considers cybercrime to be an ever-increasing threat to the EU in the form of large-scale data breaches, online fraud and child sexual exploitation, while profit-driven cybercrime is becoming an enabler for other types of criminal activity.

The Justice and Home Affairs Council of [6-7 June 2013](#) designated cybercrime as one of nine EU priorities in the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and 2017. The [Council Conclusions](#) of 25 June 2013 on the EU Cybersecurity Strategy help to shape the EU's general strategy in this domain.

**At operational level**, the creation of the European Network and Information Security Agency ([ENISA](#)) in 2004 was followed more recently with the creation of the [European Cybercrime Centre](#) (EC3). Hosted by Europol, EC3 is intended to become the main point in the EU's fight against cybercrime, by supporting Member States and the European Union's institutions. It started its activities in January 2013. Cybercrime has also become one of the priorities of the [EU mutual evaluation mechanism](#) on fighting organised crime: all Member States' capabilities in this field will be examined in the seventh round of evaluations, starting in late 2014.

#### *The "Cyber-attacks" Directive*

**At legislative level**, several measures against cybercrime have been adopted, such as the [2011 Directive](#) on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography (to have been transposed into national law in the Member States by 18 December 2013). Particularly relevant is the [2013 Directive](#) on attacks against information systems, which replaces a [2005 Council Framework Decision](#) and has

to be transposed before 4 September 2015. This Directive sets out minimum rules concerning definitions of criminal offences in this field and sanctions for those found guilty of them.

The main crimes defined in the Directive are illegal access to information systems, illegal interference with systems or data, and illegal interception of data transmissions. In particular, stricter criminal sanctions are required for so-called "[botnet](#)" attacks, in which a large number of computers are infected in order to control them remotely, performing tasks automatically without users' knowledge. Large-scale cyber-attacks can thus spread rapidly over the internet. Penalties can also be imposed on legal persons, such as companies, in case of criminal acts from which they benefit. The Directive, however, aims to take a balanced approach in order to prevent possible over-criminalisation.

## *Operational cooperation and legislation*

The Directive also improves operational cooperation between Member States' national law enforcement services and relevant EU agencies (Eurojust, Europol and its European Cybercrime Centre, as well as ENISA). Member States have to respond within eight hours to an urgent request related to a cyber-attack. EU agencies will conduct threat assessments and strategic analyses of cybercrime on the basis of the information submitted by Member States. All such activities have also to comply with existing EU legislation on privacy and electronic communication and data protection, which is an essential part of the comprehensive approach to effectively counteracting cybercrime.

## *The "NIS" directive*

With the goal of shaping a new EU cybercrime strategy, the European Commission proposed, in February 2013, a [directive](#) concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security (NIS) across the Union. Due to the interconnectedness of network and information systems, significant disruptions of these in one Member State can affect other Member States and the Union as a whole. The resilience and stability of network and information systems as well as the continuity of major services are essential for the smooth functioning of the internal market, in particular for further development of the digital single market. This directive would require all Member States to set up [Computer Emergency Response Teams](#) (CERTs) and to adopt national NIS strategies and cooperation plans. As a major innovation, the proposed directive requires obligatory notification by market operators of incidents which have a significant impact on the security of core services.

The European Parliament [voted](#) in March 2014 on amendments to the proposed directive, based on the report of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (rapporteur Andreas Schwab, EPP, Germany). The new legislature will then have the task of securing agreement with the Council on the final shape of the directive.

## **Cybercrime and the impact of the Snowden revelations**

The EU strategy on cyber-security will also be influenced by the outcome of the European Parliament's inquiry into the revelations in the wake of the Edward Snowden affair. According to the [report](#) adopted in plenary in March 2014 based on the inquiry of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (rapporteur Claude Moraes, S&D, United Kingdom), the EU's cyber strategy should be extended to cover malicious state behaviour and to strengthen IT security and resilience of IT systems. According to the Committee's report, Europol's mandate should be enhanced in order to allow it to launch its own investigations following suspicions of a malicious attack on network and information systems. The EU should, however, avoid amendments to Article 32 of the [Council of Europe's Cybercrime Convention](#). The latter makes trans-border access by law enforcement authorities to servers and computers located in other jurisdictions legally possible without recourse to multilateral agreements and other instruments of judicial cooperation. Moreover, by December 2014, the Commission, ENISA and Europe's standardisation bodies should develop minimum security and privacy standards and guidelines for IT systems, networks and services, including cloud computing services, in order to better protect EU citizens' personal data and the integrity of all IT systems. It encourages the United States to accede to the [Council of Europe's Convention](#) for the protection of individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108), as it has acceded to the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, thus strengthening the shared legal basis for transatlantic relations in this field.



## Digital opportunities for education in the EU

The world of education is currently undergoing massive transformation as a result of the digital revolution. In the European Union (EU), children become active online from the age of 7, and 76% of EU households have access to broadband Internet. However, research shows that early use of digital technologies is not necessarily linked to good digital competencies. As jobs are becoming more 'knowledge and digital skills-intensive', continued investment in upgrading education and training systems will be instrumental to maintaining the EU's competitiveness and attractiveness.

### Background

Skills and qualifications are one of the key factors determining the economic success of the EU. Yet more than half the EU countries have [reduced](#) their investment in education and training between 2008 and 2011. It has been [estimated](#) that by 2015, 90% of all jobs will need at least basic computer skills. Paradoxically, 49% of EU citizens have [no or low computer skills](#). A recently launched EU initiative - [Opening up education](#) - aims to bridge this skills gap by bringing the digital revolution into education. In February 2014, the 28 EU ministers responsible for education [confirmed](#) this strategy, encouraging Member States to exploit the potential of new technologies and digital content to complement traditional educational approaches.

### Keeping pace with the digital revolution: pros and cons

Digital learning is expected to offer [multiple advantages](#) enabling people of all ages to [learn at their own pace](#). The potential benefits include diverse knowledge sources, often provided for free, no geographical limits, flexible timetables and methods that can be easily personalised, and the possibility for teachers to share and create content with colleagues and learners from different countries. Most importantly, digitally supported learning is believed to reduce costs for educational institutions and for students. There is, however, little scientific evidence of the concrete contribution of ICTs to the learning process. Studies tend to find [small positive educational outcomes](#). Moreover, the cost advantage of digital learning is disputed. A recent comparative study (2012) [suggested](#) that the idea that online learning is less expensive is based more on intuition than on fact, since most existing studies lack rigorous control and use self-reported data.

### Taking advantage of digital learning opportunities

Transforming education [requires](#) pedagogical, organisational and technological innovation. The increased use of ICT, particularly the Internet, brought in a new era in course design and delivery in ways never before experienced in the mainstream model of traditional education. That is particularly true

#### Helping teachers keep pace

An EU-wide survey [shows](#) that while 70% of teachers recognise the importance of digitally-supported methods, only 20% of students are taught by digitally confident teachers and the percentages of teachers using information and communication technologies (ICT) in more than 25% of lessons has not increased since 2006. Although ICT training forms part of initial teacher instruction in over half of EU countries, implementation varies according to the higher education institutions providing the training, and in a large portion of EU countries those institutions are free to adopt their own approach.

There is a debate on whether the major obstacle to ICT use is inadequate ICT infrastructure and technical support or pedagogical considerations. However, the authors of the survey argue that for infrastructure to be used effectively, digitally competent and supportive teachers are needed. In other words, policies and actions to increase ICT use in schools are essentially a matter of teachers' professional development as well as global strategies at school level about the relevance of ICT use.

The majority of EU countries have online platforms, blogs, fora or other social networking sites facilitating the sharing of experience and exchange of materials between teachers. One such example at EU level is the [Learning Resource Exchange for Schools](#) which offers more than 200 000 open educational resources based on language, subject, source type, and age range.

In a recently adopted [resolution](#), the members of the EP's Culture and education committee urged EU countries to help teachers acquire and maintain the necessary high level of digital literacy.

for [open educational resources](#) (OERs) and [massive open online courses](#) (MOOCs). Statistics [suggest](#) that while EU universities took more time to get involved, they now account for approximately one-third of MOOCs in the world (see fig. 1). [Open Education Europa](#), the EU portal for quality OERs produced in the EU, indicates that in March 2014 there were over 450 MOOCs. Generally, there seems to be a very strong interest in MOOCs in Spain, and also in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

The **Spanish** [Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia](#) has a significant share of the more than 150 MOOCs in Spain. The latest platform - [Miríada X](#) - is designed to facilitate exchanges and cooperation between Spanish and Latin American institutions. The **British** platform [FutureLearn](#), led by the Open University, comprises 26 partners in total, including the British Library, the British Museum and the British Council. In France, the Government has launched [France Université Numérique](#), the first **French** digital learning portal. Its MOOC platform is one of the 18 actions in a five-year strategic plan for the digitalisation of learning and teaching in France. The **German** platform for online teaching - [iversity](#) - offers MOOCs in German and English, and has [announced](#) that two higher education institutions from its platform will award [ECTS credits](#). So far, there is not much information about MOOC development in Eastern Europe.

The pan-European MOOC platform [OpenupEds](#) set up by the European Association of Distance Teaching Universities unites partners from 11 countries and currently provides access to over 60 free courses in 12 different languages. Recently, the media group Euronews and the Compostela Group of Universities, set up the ['Euronews Campus' initiative](#) intending to use audiovisual content as a tool for online education.

Press sources [indicate](#) that an increasing number of business schools in the EU are entering online education. Interestingly, seven of the [top ten](#) online and distance MBA programmes are offered by European schools. A MOOC offered by the French business school [HEC Paris](#) via Coursera drew over 30 000 students to its debut class ['Understanding Europe'](#), 60% of whom came from outside Europe.

A growing number of European schools are developing [1:1 computing projects](#) involving mobile devices such as laptops, notebooks, and netbooks (1:1 stands for one device per user). Different communities of practitioners exist at EU level to provide solutions for exchanging good practice. One such example is the [Open Discovery Space](#) which offers an open multilingual learning interface to encourage the adoption of e-learning resources.

Figure 1 - European MOOCs



Data source: [EU open education portal](#), March 2014.

## Criticism of OERs and MOOCs

Concerns linked to OERs include [quality assurance](#), [accreditation](#), and [sustainability](#). Criticism has also been [voiced](#) over the fact that many MOOCs are not truly innovative, but use fairly traditional learning approaches, and are therefore just an attempt to further commercialise higher education. Creating a MOOC platform requires considerable [financial and technical resources](#). This accounts for the increasing pressure on MOOC platforms either to transfer costs to course participants or to generate income from other sources.

## Doing more with less

From 2009, the economic downturn and the underlying need to cut back spending led many EU countries to reduce investment in education and training. However, the European Commission [stresses](#) that while it is important to choose appropriate funding mechanisms, considerations of efficiency should go in parallel with concerns on equity and access to education. The degree to which EU students are expected to contribute directly to the cost of their higher education remains widely [debated](#). However, in contrast to the United States where the [cost of higher education](#) has surged 1 120% over the past 35 years, in the EU, tuition fees are generally low or non-existent. Experts [argue](#) that it is very hard to assess the return on investment from the use of ICT for learning purposes. They warn that costly investments in educational technologies take funding away from alternative investments in education, and it is therefore essential that the return on investment from ICT-based learning be at least as valuable as alternative forms of educational investment.



## The role played by social media in political participation and electoral campaigns

Complete e-version – <http://bit.ly/1e3GZjD>

Social Media [has rapidly grown in importance](#) as a forum for political activism in its different forms. Social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube provide new ways to stimulate citizen engagement in political life, where elections and electoral campaigns have a central role.

Personal communication via social media brings [politicians and parties closer to their potential voters](#). It allows politicians to communicate faster and reach citizens in a more targeted manner and vice versa, without the intermediate role of mass media. Reactions, feedback, conversations and debates are generated online as well as support and participation for offline events. Messages posted to personal networks are multiplied when shared, which allow new audiences to be reached.

Although the presence of social media is spreading and [media use patterns are changing](#), online political engagement is largely restricted to people already active in politics and on the Internet. Other audiences are less responsive. For example, television news together with print and online newspapers are still [the most important sources of political information](#) in most EU Member States.

Social media has reshaped [structures and methods](#) of contemporary political communication by influencing the [way politicians interact with citizens and each other](#). However, the role of this phenomenon in increasing political engagement and electoral participation is neither clear nor simple. The [upcoming European Parliament elections](#) in May will give an indication of the impact of social media in European wide elections with national and European dimensions.

### Overviews

[12 papers on social media and political participation](#) / seminar organised by La Pietra Dialogues LPD, New York University at Florence. Villa La Pietra, May 10-11 2013

This website includes twelve papers on social media and political participation presented at a seminar in Florence organised by New York University (La Pietra Dialogues) in May 2013. This seminar covers themes such as democracy and the internet, use of social media in political campaigns, power to mobilise collective actions and mass protests. Presentations study both the US and the European experiences. They give a comprehensive overview of the impact of the changing media landscape to patterns of political participation and the impact of social media in political campaigns.

### Analyses

This section presents publications available online without subscription, covering different aspects of the relationship politics has with social media. The publications look at new models of electoral campaigning and the changes social media has introduced to communication strategies of politicians and political parties. Some studies analyse the impact social media has on political participation, focusing especially on its ability to engage young people.

[Strengthening European Democracy: Citizens' Participation. Which challenges do we face at the European Elections of 2014?](#) / Joseph H. H. Weiler (note 1), Claes H. de Vreese (note 2), European Parliament Policy Department C, PE 493.036, 2013, 38 p.

This publication includes two notes. The second note focuses on citizen participation in voting. The evolution of media communication and its relation with politics is illustrated by the presentation of various studies on the media coverage of previous European elections. Consequently, factors influencing media attention and voter turnout are listed.

Professor Claes H. de Vreese also provides an analytical overview of new forms of political participation on the internet i.e. social media.

[Members of the European Parliament Online: The Use of Social Media in Political Marketing](#) / Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic, Centre for European Studies (CES), 2013, 42 p.

This study explores the use of social media in political marketing with a focus on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). It examines how the increasing use of the internet is reflected in political communication strategies. It touches on possible reasons for the disengagement of citizens in politics and the low level of voting turnout in European Elections. The author also studies attitudes towards the use of social media and views on its importance for European politics today. To conclude, it presents suggestions on how social media tools could be used in EU-level political campaigns.

[New political actors in Europe: Beppe Grillo and the M5S](#) / Jamie Bartlett, Mark Littler, Duncan McDonnell, Caterina Froio; DEMOS; 2013, 70 p.

The M5S Movement in Italy has evolved rapidly to become a significant political player by using social media to engage like-minded people in virtual and real life political action. This study examines the phenomenon of Beppe Grillo and M5S by studying Beppe Grillo's Facebook followers. In addition, it looks more broadly at the relationship between politics and new forms of communication provided by various social media platforms.

[Virtually Members: The Facebook and Twitter Followers of UK Political Parties](#) / Jamie Bartlett, Sid Bennet, Rutger Birnie and Simon Wibberley; A CASM Briefing Paper; April 2013 DEMOS

This study examines Facebook and Twitter followers of the main UK political parties. Transformation of political communication is analysed by mapping similarities and differences in online communication strategies between the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. The study describes and examines a new concept of virtual political support. Compared to social media, more traditional forms of political communication seem to lack appeal, especially among young people. According to this study, social media is used increasingly to get people involved in political activities and keep them engaged.

[Youth Participation in Democratic Life](#) / London School of Economics, EACEA 2010/03, 2013, 234 p.

This is a thorough study on young peoples' motivation and readiness to participate politically. The study covers youth (13-30 years old) in Europe. It is divided into six themes, including one on young people and electoral participation.

[Women in decision-making the role of the new media for increased political participation](#) / European Parliament Policy Department C, study, PE 493.010, 2013, 122 p.

This study examines through case studies how social media could increase female participation in political discussion. It explores barriers hindering women's willingness to get engaged in politics. Case studies highlight standards and best practices in the use of new media, with a focus on European political groups, national parties and individual MEPs. Opportunities, weaknesses, strengths and risks of new media in political communication are presented.

## Public opinion and statistics

[Europeans' Engagement in Participatory Democracy](#) / Flash Eurobarometer 373, Report, March 2013, 63 p. [Summary](#)

[European Youth: participation in democratic life](#) / Flash Eurobarometer 375, Report, May 2013, 83 p. [Summary](#)

[Media use in the European Union: report](#) / Standard Eurobarometer 78, European Commission, Autumn 2012, 55 p.

[Internet access and use in 2012: More than half of internet users post messages to social media... ..and over 60% read news online](#) / Eurostat news release, December 2012

[Individuals using the Internet for posting messages to social media sites or instant messaging](#) / Eurostat dataset details

## EU subsidiarity check by National Parliaments

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1eeblQQ>



The position of national parliaments in the EU was strengthened in various ways by the Lisbon Treaty in order to enhance democratic legitimacy. [Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty](#) introduced a mechanism of subsidiarity scrutiny by national parliaments on draft EU legislation. The so called early warning system including the yellow and orange card procedures give them a direct role in assessing compliance of draft legislation with [the principle of subsidiarity](#) (TEU art. 5). The chambers of national parliaments may each give a reasoned opinion and collectively they can influence the legislative procedure if a certain threshold is attained in the set time limit.

National parliaments have [so far twice collectively opposed](#) to European Commission proposals by giving a yellow card. The first time, the [threshold was reached](#) in May 2012 in the case of the Commission's legislative proposal on the right to strike (Monti II). The Commission withdrew the proposal some months later. In November, national parliaments [objected to the proposal](#) to establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office.

### Overviews

[The conduct of subsidiarity checks of EU legislative proposals by national parliaments: analysis, observations and practical recommendations](#) / Philipp Kiiver, ERA-Forum: scripta iuris europaei 2012 v. 12, n. 4 March, p.[535]-547

The possibility to collectively raise subsidiarity-based objections to new EU legislative proposals has significantly enlarged the role of national parliaments in EU-level decision-making. Both legal and empirical dimensions of the early warning system are examined in this study. It concentrates on the principle of subsidiarity and other principles to be addressed in opinions of national parliaments.

[National parliaments within the EU polity: no longer losers but hardly victorious](#) / Adam Cygan, ERA-Forum: scripta iuris europaei 2012 v. 12, n. 4 March, p. [517]-533

This article focuses on the improved position of national parliaments in EU policy-making by analysing the yellow and orange card procedures. It highlights that national parliaments have so far had a tendency to emphasise domestic scrutiny and ministerial accountability rather than trying to influence directly at EU level, and it estimates that the impact of these new arrangements on accountability and legitimacy will be modest.

[COSAC is the Conference for Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU](#). It involves the European Parliament and Committees of European Affairs in Member State parliaments. The national parliaments of EU candidate countries may also participate. COSAC holds biannual meetings and publishes reports on EU procedures and practices. For the latest (20th) report and other related information, see [the COSAC website](#).

[IPEX is the platform for EU inter-parliamentary information exchange](#). It is the tool used by national parliaments to share information on EU affairs and coordinate the procedures for monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity principle. Among other features IPEX contains a database with national scrutiny pages related to legislative proposals and consultation documents.

### European institutions

**The European Parliament** [Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments](#) has its internet site, which, among other topics, provides information on the subsidiarity check by national parliaments.

**The European Commission's website on national parliament opinions** offers information on the dialogue between the Commission and national parliaments. See for example:

- [National Parliament opinions on draft legislation and Commission replies](#)
- [European Commission: Annual report on the relations with national parliaments 2012](#)



The Committee of the Regions (CoR) has established a [Subsidiarity Monitoring Network](#) and [a website which provides diverse information on subsidiarity](#). It contains separate subsections on its role in EU decision-making, including different policy areas, and its evolution from the Maastricht to Lisbon Treaties.

Furthermore the CoR website hosts the [REGPEX database](#), which enables regional parliaments to better coordinate their participation in subsidiarity analysis in the context of the early warning system. It contains procedural files with basic information on the procedure and related opinions of regional parliaments.

## National and regional mechanisms

[National Parliament's internal procedures for subsidiarity check](#) / DG Presidency Directorate for relations with national parliaments, April 2013, 19 p. This document presents the internal procedures followed by each national parliament/chamber for the adoption and transmission of reasoned opinions. These procedures and related additional information are presented in table form.

[National Parliaments and EU law-making: how is the 'yellow card' system working?](#) / Vaughne Miller, House of Commons Library Standard Note:SN/IA/6297, 12 April 2012, 20 p.

This text explains the enhanced role of national parliaments in EU-level policy-making after the Lisbon Treaty, with a special focus on the yellow card mechanism and UK parliamentary procedures related to it.

[Subnational parliaments in EU policy control: explaining the variations across Europe](#) / Karolina Boronska-Hryniewiecka, EUI RSCAS; 2013/38, 2013, 29 p.

The scope of this study is the parliamentary activity of subnational legislative chambers in the post-Lisbon institutional context. The early warning system is in the spotlight but other more informal forms of participation are also examined. Comparative approach covers Germany, Spain and the UK. The aim of this study is to discover factors explaining different levels of engagement among subnational parliaments in EU subsidiarity scrutiny mechanism.

[The role of Regional Parliaments in the Process of Subsidiarity Analysis within the Early Warning System of the Lisbon Treaty](#) / Gracia Vara Arribas, Delphine Bourdin, European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) and European Center for the Regions (ECR), the study has been commissioned by the Committee of the Regions, 2011, 202 p.

This study analyses the early warning system with a focus on the participation of regional parliaments.

## Analysis

This list of selected publications on the topic provides references to articles and books available on the internet either by subscription only or based on open access principle.

[Bicameral or Tricameral? National Parliaments and Representative Democracy in the European Union](#) / Ian Cooper, ARENA, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway, Journal of European integration, 2013, v. 35, n. 5, p. 531-546, 17 p.

[National Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: The EU's Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity](#) / Marta Zalewska and Oskar Josef Gstrein, Bruges Political Research Papers - College of Europe, 40, 2013

[The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity : constitutional theory and empirical reality](#) / Kiiver, Philipp, London: Routledge, 2012

[Subsidiarity : A Political and Legal Analysis](#) / Paul Graig, Journal of common market studies, 2012, v. 50, n. 1, p. 72-87, 16 p.



## L'initiative citoyenne européenne

Premier instrument de démocratie participative transnationale au monde, l'initiative citoyenne européenne (ICE) a été instaurée en 2009 par le Traité de Lisbonne. Elle vise à permettre aux Européens de participer plus activement à la vie démocratique de l'Union européenne (UE) et à renforcer la légitimité démocratique de celle-ci. Concrètement, l'ICE octroie aux citoyens un droit d'initiative législative similaire à celui dont disposent le Parlement européen et le Conseil de l'UE conformément aux articles 225 et 241 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'UE (TFUE).

### Initiative citoyenne européenne

"Des citoyens de l'Union, au nombre d'un million au moins, ressortissants d'un nombre significatif d'États membres, peuvent prendre l'initiative d'inviter la Commission européenne, dans le cadre de ses attributions, à soumettre une proposition appropriée sur des questions pour lesquelles ces citoyens considèrent qu'un acte juridique de l'Union est nécessaire aux fins de l'application des traités".

Source: [Traité sur l'Union européenne](#), art. 11, paragraphe 4.

### Aperçu général

L'ICE (voir encadré) est venue compléter l'éventail de [moyens](#) par lesquels les citoyens européens peuvent s'adresser à l'Union (parmi ces moyens figurent, notamment, la possibilité de soumettre une [pétition](#) au Parlement européen ou de déposer une [plainte](#) auprès du Médiateur européen).

Les modalités de mise en œuvre de ce nouvel instrument ont été fixées par le [Règlement \(UE\) n° 211/2011](#) qui est applicable depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> avril 2012. Aux termes de celui-ci, les principales caractéristiques de l'ICE sont les suivantes:

- les organisateurs d'une initiative doivent former un "[comité des citoyens](#)" composé d'au moins sept citoyens de l'UE résidant dans au moins sept États membres différents;
- la Commission européenne vérifie si la proposition remplit les [conditions](#) d'enregistrement (notamment relever des compétences de la Commission, ne pas être manifestement abusive, fantaisiste, vexatoire ou contraire aux valeurs de l'Union). En cas de refus d'enregistrement, elle informe les organisateurs des motifs de sa décision et des voies de recours possibles (ex. saisir la Cour de Justice de l'UE ou introduire une plainte auprès du Médiateur européen);
- une fois l'enregistrement confirmé, les organisateurs disposent d'un an pour recueillir le **million** de "[déclarations de soutien](#)" nécessaires, sur papier ou sous forme électronique;
- tous les citoyens de l'UE en âge de voter aux élections européennes peuvent soutenir une initiative;
- afin de garantir qu'une initiative est représentative d'un intérêt européen, les citoyens qui la soutiennent doivent provenir **d'au moins un quart des États membres** (soit sept États membres);
- un nombre minimum de signatures provenant de chacun de ces États membres est prévu (la Fig. 1 présente les seuils fixes par État membre);
- la Commission [dispose](#) de trois mois pour examiner l'initiative ayant recueilli le nombre requis de signatures et décider de la suite à lui donner. Un rôle important est prévu pour le Parlement européen au cours de ce délai d'examen, l'art. 11 du Règlement (UE) n° 211/2011 prévoyant la possibilité pour les organisateurs de présenter leur initiative lors d'une audition publique organisée au Parlement. Celle-ci doit servir de plateforme pour les débats entre les députés européens, les organisateurs de l'initiative et les représentants de la Commission.

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Service de recherche du Parlement européen

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## Dans la pratique

L'ICE a été lancée le 1er avril 2012.

### Les défis du départ

Les organisateurs des premières initiatives ont rencontré des [difficultés](#) liées à la mise en place de leurs [systèmes](#) de collecte de signatures en ligne (utilisation du [logiciel](#) de la Commission et difficultés de trouver des hébergeurs privés adéquats). La Commission a alors [décidé](#) de prolonger le délai de collecte des signatures pour certaines initiatives. Elle a, en outre, [offert](#) d'héberger gratuitement, à titre temporaire, les systèmes de collecte en ligne sur ses propres serveurs.

Les organisateurs ont également [alerté](#) sur le fait que des citoyens européens vivant en dehors de leur État membre d'origine se voient parfois privés de la possibilité de signer des initiatives et que l'exigence d'un numéro d'identification personnel imposée par la plupart des États membres joue un rôle dissuasif. Afin de simplifier les informations requises par certains États membres pour vérifier l'identité des signataires, la Commission a [adopté](#) des [modifications](#) aux annexes du règlement relatif à l'ICE.

### État des lieux

En mars 2014, sept initiatives citoyennes étaient [ouvertes](#) à la collecte des déclarations de soutien. Pour six autres, les collectes sont [clôturées](#). Certaines demandes d'enregistrement, ne remplissant pas les conditions requises, ont été [refusées](#) par la Commission. Quelques initiatives ont été [retirées](#) par les organisateurs, tandis que d'[autres](#) n'ont pas réussi à obtenir le nombre requis de signataires dans le délai prescrit.

L'initiative relative à la reconnaissance de l'eau comme bien public "[L'eau et l'assainissement sont un droit humain](#)" est la première ICE à répondre aux exigences formelles et à être signée par suffisamment de citoyens. Elle appelle la Commission à proposer une législation visant à garantir que les citoyens aient accès en suffisance à de l'eau saine et potable et à l'assainissement des eaux. Après avoir obtenu 1 659 543 signatures, cette initiative a été présentée à la Commission en décembre 2013. Une [audition publique](#) s'est tenue au Parlement européen le 17 février 2014. La Commission donnera sa réponse d'ici le 20 mars 2014. Si elle décidait de présenter une proposition législative, la procédure législative formelle serait lancée. La deuxième ICE présentée à la Commission (et répondant aux conditions) "[Un de nous](#)" concerne la protection des embryons humains (1 721 626 signatures; ICE présentée le 27 février 2014, en cours d'examen).


## Le Parlement européen

Dans sa [résolution du 7 mai 2009](#), le Parlement avait invité la Commission à soumettre une proposition législative relative à l'ICE et formulé une série de recommandations. Par ailleurs, en tant que co-législateur, le Parlement a joué un [rôle](#) très important dans la mise en place du [Règlement \(UE\) n° 211/2011](#). Les députés ont, en particulier, [veillé](#) à rendre l'usage de l'ICE aisé et plus convivial pour les citoyens: par exemple, via l'introduction des "comités des citoyens" et l'organisation d'auditions publiques pour assurer une meilleure visibilité des initiatives. Enfin, une modification du règlement intérieur du Parlement a permis d'y incorporer les dispositions pour l'organisation de ces auditions (articles [197 bis](#) et [203 bis](#)).

## Les parties intéressées

Sur la base des premières expériences de l'ICE, les organisations [European Citizen Action Service](#), [Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe](#) et [Democracy International](#) ont mis au point une série de [recommandations](#) en soulignant la nécessité d'une plus grande sensibilisation des citoyens à ce nouveau droit, d'une meilleure infrastructure de soutien et d'une simplification de la réglementation. Par ailleurs, la "[Journée de l'ICE 2013](#)" a permis aux parties prenantes d'évaluer la première année d'application de l'ICE et de débattre de possibles améliorations.

Figure 1 - nombre minimum de signataires par État membre (en milliers)



Source des données: [Commission européenne](#)





## Towards an EU-US trade and investment deal

The European Union (EU) and United States (US) are currently negotiating a trade and investment deal, which would create the world's largest free trade area. But the many challenges faced and increasing public opposition put successful conclusion of an agreement in doubt.

### Background

In February 2013, EU and US leaders [announced](#) the start of procedures for negotiating an ambitious and comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), following the [final report](#) of the EU-US High-level Working Group (HLWG). After a positive [impact assessment](#) by the European Commission (EC), the Council [approved](#) the EC's [proposed mandate](#) for negotiations in June 2013. Talks, led by the EC and the US Trade Representative (USTR), started in July 2013; a [fourth round](#) was completed in March 2014 and a fifth will be held before summer. Observers are sceptical however about the 18 to 24 month [timeframe](#) to reach an deal. Legally, the Council would conclude a deal with the consent of the European Parliament, with ratification by all EU Member States (MS) also required. In the US, Congress is responsible for international commerce; a [bill](#) to grant the President [Trade Promotion Authority](#) (i.e. right to negotiate and sign trade agreements which Congress then approves or rejects, but cannot change) is not [certain](#) to be approved.

### TTIP's potential benefits

The stated [aim](#) of TTIP is to expand trade and investment across the Atlantic, increase employment and competitiveness, as well as enable a [common approach](#) to rules for global trade, which third countries could also adopt. Another goal is to strengthen [overall EU-US relations](#). The [EU-US trade and investment](#) relationship is considered the largest and most important in the world. The two economies accounted for nearly half of global gross domestic product (GDP) and 30% of world trade in 2012; with US-EU [trade flows in goods](#) totalling €497 billion, and [in services](#) €315 billion. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is even greater, with [total FDI stocks](#) of €3.2 trillion in each other's' economies. The transatlantic economy sustains about 15 million [jobs](#).

Nevertheless, TTIP's proponents claim there is [untapped potential](#) in the relationship. The EC argues that significant [gains](#) would arise from further liberalising transatlantic trade. An EC-commissioned [study](#) (a [new analysis](#) is foreseen for end-2014) asserts a comprehensive and ambitious TTIP would bring overall annual GDP gains of 0.5% for the EU (€119 billion) and 0.4% (€95 billion) for the US, once fully implemented (2027). That is, an extra €545/EU household/year. Reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and further liberalising services and public procurement would [constitute](#) around 80% of the benefits. TTIP would positively [affect](#) global GDP (€100 billion) and labour markets. Other [studies](#) also point to major benefits for income and jobs in the EU and US, but also to those countries which stand to lose from TTIP. TTIP would also create opportunities for [small and medium-sized enterprises](#) (e.g. through trade facilitation).

### Scope of negotiations and controversial points

Negotiations [cover](#): 1) **market access**, comprising elimination of tariffs for goods and new access to services and public procurement; 2) **regulatory convergence and NTBs**; and 3) **rules for global trade**. [March 2014](#) talks reportedly saw progress on all three. Yet obstacles to a deal are visible in [the US](#) and [EU position papers](#).

**Tariffs** are considered the easiest issue to tackle, as they are low (3-4%), although higher in some sensitive sectors (dairy products, sugar, meat, tobacco, textiles). TTIP's [aim](#) is to substantially eliminate tariffs upon entry into force and phase out the most sensitive ones in a short time frame. Both parties are said to benefit from a zero-tariff agreement, given the size of EU-US trade and the added costs to intra-firm trade ([representing](#) 1/3 of transatlantic trade). Tariff offers have been exchanged, although the EC [criticised](#) the US offer as inferior. Services and procurement offers are in [preparation](#). Both parties seek new market access to

**services**, by addressing long-standing barriers, while recognising the sensitive nature of some sectors. The EU [intends](#) to secure (mutual market) access to **US maritime shipping and air services**, which might prove contentious in the US. The Council has already [excluded](#) **audiovisual services** from the EU negotiating mandate. [Disagreement](#) on **financial services** is visible: the EU [aims](#) to include financial regulatory cooperation in TTIP, besides market access, but the US is [concerned](#) this might affect restrictions in the [Dodd-Frank law](#) and prefers separate discussions. The EU side has since [indicated](#) some flexibility. TTIP talks are also expected to address digital trade, including regulatory issues on **e-commerce**, and [cross-border data flows](#). Nevertheless, this might be another difficult point, given the [connection](#) with privacy protection issues (which the EU wants to keep out of TTIP). Moreover, European concerns about US laws and practice related to data protection have increased with revelations of National Security Agency (NSA) spying. The European Parliament, which recently [voted on](#) a new [EU data protection regulation](#) and a [resolution on NSA spying activities](#) makes its consent to TTIP conditional on respect of the right to privacy. Further liberalisation of **public procurement** markets, accounting for about 15% (US) and 20% (EU) of GDP, is another challenging objective. The EU [aims](#) at countering US domestic preference rules (e.g. [Berry Amendment](#), [Buy American Act](#)) and obtaining access at sub-federal level in the US, as federal commitments on government procurement in foreign trade deals are optional for sub-federal entities. Conversely, the US seeks "fair, transparent and predictable" rules and non-discriminatory treatment in the EU and its MS.

**Regulatory NTBs** to trade (e.g. divergent standards, sanitary requirements) are seen as the core of the deal, yielding most benefits, but among the [most difficult issues](#) to address. Most EU-US [regulatory differences](#) stem from different public preferences and values, as well as different risk management approaches (e.g. the EU's [precautionary principle](#) considers not only scientific facts but also socio-economic and environmental effects of future laws). The negotiators are [discussing](#) how to ensure compatibility of existing and future regulations, so as to reduce unnecessary costs and red-tape, while "achieving the levels of health, safety, and environmental protection each side deems appropriate." In particular, five aspects are highlighted: [sanitary and phytosanitary](#) (SPS) issues (food safety, animal and health regulations); [technical barriers to trade](#) (technical regulations, conformity assessment and standards); **specific sectors** of goods and services (e.g. pharmaceutical, [medical devices](#), [automobile](#), chemical); [cross-cutting disciplines](#) and **transparency**; and a framework for **future regulatory cooperation**. However, observers already [conclude](#) there is deadlock on regulatory issues. The US stresses the horizontal and transparency issues, while the EU prioritises the sector-specific pillar. Moreover, a US [proposal](#) to allow business more input earlier in EU rule-making, implying significant unreciprocated changes to the EU regulatory system, is opposed by the EC and [European business](#) alike. Another difficult [topic](#) is [agriculture](#): the US denounces EU policies and [measures](#) on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), hormone-treated beef, pork fed with ractopamine and chlorine-washed poultry as unjustified scientifically and a barrier to US exports. Therefore, the US seeks to eliminate EU SPS barriers to [US meat exports](#). EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht has [pledged](#) EU law on GMOs or hormone-treated beef will not change with TTIP. Moreover, the chief EU negotiator has ruled out mutual recognition on [chemicals](#).

Finally, TTIP is intended to set **rules** on investment protection, trade facilitation, intellectual property rights (IPR), labour and environment, [energy and raw materials](#) etc. which may eventually set global standards. Of these, inclusion of **Investor-State Dispute Settlement** (ISDS) provisions seems the most [contentious](#). Facing growing [opposition](#), the EC [adapted](#) its position and announced the suspension of ISDS talks, pending a three-month public [consultation](#) from March 2014. On IPR, **EU geographical indications** (GIs) – e.g. parmesan or feta cheese – are a potential stumbling block, as many in the US [reject](#) protection for EU GIs in TTIP.

## General criticism

The main criticisms of [trade unions](#), [consumer groups](#), [NGOs](#) and [citizens](#) on both sides of the Atlantic, refer to the fear of lower standards to the benefit of large businesses and [lack of transparency](#) in the talks (including some [EU MS](#)). TTIP could be an important issue in the [European elections](#). The EC seeks to [respond](#) to these concerns, and is setting up an [expert advisory group](#) to provide stakeholder input to the talks.

**The European Parliament** adopted a [Resolution on EU trade and investment with the US](#), endorsing the launch of negotiations (May 2013). The EP asked for an ambitious agreement binding on all levels of government, and called for the exclusion of cultural and audiovisual services from the talks; strong protection of personal data; inclusion of rules on financial services; strong protection of IPR, GIs and of the EU's precautionary principle; full access to public procurement markets and lifting of US restrictions in maritime and air transport services.



## Lutte de l'UE contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales

La fraude et l'évasion fiscales pèsent sur les budgets et les contribuables de l'Union européenne (UE) car, en permettant à certains de ne pas payer ou de moins payer d'impôts, elles privent les budgets de recettes fiscales. Pour réintégrer les recettes fiscales non perçues, la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales doit être coordonnée, puisque les flux d'argent ne connaissent pas de frontières, ni nationales ni communautaires. L'UE organise cette lutte par l'établissement et le renforcement d'un cadre fondé sur la transparence, la coopération et la coordination.

### Fraude et évasion fiscales: optimisation individuelle et coût collectif

1 000 milliards d'euros par an, c'est le coût budgétaire évalué de la fraude et de l'évasion fiscales à l'échelle de l'UE. C'est une part de recettes qui manquent aux budgets des États membres (EM) et de l'UE, un manque à gagner particulièrement lourd en période de consolidation budgétaire pendant laquelle les recettes sont réduites.

A situation similaire, certains acquittent moins d'impôts que d'autres et obtiennent donc un gain (au niveau individuel) économique, voire concurrentiel, s'agissant d'entreprises. Cette "économie" réalisée par certains contribuables est une perte pour les ressources budgétaires (au niveau collectif), qui affecte l'équité fiscale et, par ricochet, la confiance des contribuables et des citoyens.

La fraude et l'évasion fiscales existent dans toutes les branches de la fiscalité, notamment la fiscalité de l'épargne, la TVA ou encore la fiscalité des sociétés (par exemple en organisant la réduction de la base imposable, couvrant par exemple la pratique d'érosion de la base d'imposition et transfert de bénéfices, ou BEPS ("base erosion and profit shifting").

### Terreau propice à la fraude et à l'évasion: absence de coordination et de coopération

La juxtaposition de régimes fiscaux nationaux, en l'absence de coordination et de coopération, rend possible le développement de comportements (ou de stratégies) permettant l'application, pour un contribuable donné, du régime fiscal le plus avantageux pour lui, et donc le moins disant. Cela se fait aux dépens des autres régimes fiscaux nationaux et en particulier de celui ou de ceux qui, à défaut d'une telle stratégie, auraient été applicables. Cela génère une concurrence fiscale.

Dans une économie mondialisée, où, désormais, les transactions sont rapides, voire fugaces ou opaques, les régimes fiscaux nationaux ne peuvent pas appréhender l'ensemble des transactions transfrontalières, ni les transactions dans leur entièreté. La concurrence fiscale est, alors, dommageable et a été reconnue comme un problème mondial.

### Réduire le terrain de la fraude par la coordination et la coopération internationales

Au niveau international, l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) ainsi que le G8 et le G20, en particulier, traitent de la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales. Le Forum mondial sur la transparence et l'échange de renseignements à des fins fiscales constitue une enceinte dédiée à la coopération fiscale réunissant 120 États dont ceux membres de l'OCDE. Elle promeut la transparence et l'échange d'informations fiscales dans un cadre multilatéral, et organise un mécanisme permettant l'échange de renseignements, ce qui réduit les niches d'opacité dans lesquelles certaines opérations peuvent s'abriter. Les actions coordonnées portent, notamment, sur la planification fiscale agressive, la préservation de la base

d'imposition, la lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent, les prix de transfert, les structures hybrides, les paradis fiscaux et le secret bancaire.

L'UE et ses EM soutiennent et participent, selon des configurations adaptées à chaque enceinte internationale, aux travaux et efforts contre la fraude fiscale au niveau mondial. Dans ses relations avec le reste du monde, l'UE encourage l'application de normes minimales de bonne gouvernance dans le domaine fiscal avec les pays tiers et lutte aussi contre la planification fiscale agressive.

## Action au niveau de l'Union européenne

Pour l'UE, développer, soutenir et organiser les [moyens concrets](#) de la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales constituent une priorité, qui requiert la contribution et la participation des institutions de l'UE et des États membres (qui conservent en matière fiscale un rôle important indispensable pour mettre en œuvre ces moyens). Une [coordination](#), au niveau de l'UE, et l'adoption d'outils sont nécessaires, notamment pour identifier les fraudes et aussi pour les rendre économiquement non intéressantes.

Le [plan d'action](#) de l'UE pour renforcer la lutte de l'Union contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales, présenté par la Commission européenne en décembre 2012, comprend une trentaine d'actions pouvant être menées à court terme et moyen terme. Il porte sur la bonne gouvernance fiscale (par exemple un numéro d'identification fiscale de l'UE pour identifier les personnes physiques ou morales engagées dans des opérations transfrontières) et la transparence fiscale, la lutte contre les pratiques dommageables, la mise à jour de la réglementation relative à la TVA et la coordination des accords fiscaux internationaux au niveau de l'UE. Faisant suite à ce plan d'action, la Commission a créé en avril 2013 une [plateforme pour la bonne gouvernance fiscale](#).

Le Parlement européen, ainsi qu'il l'a exprimé dans sa [résolution](#) sur la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales et les paradis fiscaux, soutient et encourage les mesures contribuant à lutter contre la fraude fiscale et défend les outils opérationnels tels que, par exemple, l'établissement d'une liste noire européenne recensant les paradis fiscaux.

Enfin, l'UE se dote de [dispositions](#) concernant l'échange d'informations fiscales (notamment en matière d'épargne) et la coopération fiscale et procède à la mise à jour d'accords fiscaux avec des pays tiers, frontaliers en particulier (Suisse, Monaco, Andorre, Liechtenstein et Saint-Marin). Le [Conseil européen](#) du 20 mars 2014 a accueilli avec satisfaction l'état d'avancement de ces négociations avec les pays tiers européens et a demandé à ces pays de s'engager pleinement à mettre à œuvre la nouvelle norme mondiale unique relative à l'échange automatique de renseignements, mise au point par l'[OCDE](#) et approuvée par le G20, et à souscrire à l'initiative prévoyant l'adoption rapide de cette nouvelle norme. Il a demandé à la Commission de faire avancer rapidement les négociations, de manière à ce qu'elles puissent être achevées avant la fin de l'année.

Le Conseil de l'UE a par ailleurs adopté lors de sa réunion du 24 mars 2014 la [directive modifiée en matière de fiscalité des revenus de l'épargne](#), suivant les conclusions du Conseil européen du 20 mars. Cette directive vise à permettre aux EM de mieux réprimer la fraude et l'évasion fiscales.

Le Conseil européen a aussi invité le Conseil à faire en sorte que, avec l'adoption de la directive relative à la [coopération administrative](#) d'ici la fin 2014 (qui vient renforcer les règles de l'UE concernant l'échange d'informations), la législation de l'UE soit pleinement alignée sur la nouvelle norme mondiale.

## Pour approfondir

[Politique fiscale: généralités](#) (Fiches techniques sur l'UE), Parlement européen, 2013

[Tax policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal sustainability](#), Commission européenne, 2013

[Taxations trends in the EU](#), Eurostat, 2013

"European initiatives on eliminating tax havens and offshore financial transactions and the impact of these constructions on the Union's own resources and budget" - [étude](#), Parlement européen, 2013

"[The role of tax policy in times of fiscal consolidation](#)", Economic Papers 502, DG ECFIN, Commission européenne, 2013

"[Legislative package on shadow banking](#)", Keysource, Parlement européen, 2014

## Secure, clean and affordable energy for Europe

The EU is developing energy policies that aim to ensure security of supply, affordable energy for households and industry, and a reduction of carbon emissions in line with EU climate commitments.

### A new global energy landscape

The global energy landscape keeps changing. Electricity from renewable sources has been gaining market share, but there are concerns that the higher cost of renewables brings electricity price increases. Solar and wind energy are variable, weather-dependent sources that need to be backed up by conventional power plants for as long as affordable large-scale energy storage is not available. The use of agricultural products for biofuels is considered to be playing a role in rising food prices.

[Higher oil prices](#) have made costly oil production methods (drilling in the deep sea and the Arctic, exploitation of tight oil and tar sands) economically interesting. Oil demand in developing countries has risen, with China now the world's largest oil importer. International political developments, such as conflicts involving oil-producing and gas-transit countries, give rise to concerns about security of imports.

Fracking technology has enabled increased gas production and lower prices in the US. Higher energy prices in the EU raise concerns about the international competitiveness of energy-intensive EU industries.

Worldwide greenhouse gas emissions from energy continue to rise. Reductions in energy demand resulting from energy efficiency are offset by growing energy use in developing economies. The use of coal – more polluting than oil or gas combustion – keeps growing, especially in developing countries, but also in countries like Germany and Japan that shut down nuclear power plants in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.

Within this global context, the EU and its Member States (MS) face the challenge of ensuring a secure supply of affordable energy to households and industry, while meeting its commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 80-95% by 2050.

### Internal energy market

A recent [report on energy prices and costs](#) shows higher energy costs in the EU than in many other regions, and a widening gap. Inside the EU, there are significant differences in energy prices between MS and industrial sectors. Rises in electricity prices are driven mostly by taxes and levies, and network costs.

Completion of the internal market for energy would have tangible [benefits](#), as increased competition among energy suppliers should lead to lower prices. With an interconnected '[smart grid](#)', electricity could be more easily exchanged between EU regions in case of demand peaks or surplus production from variable renewables. An integrated gas network, in which gas flows could be reversed, would contribute to convergence of gas prices and help reduce the dependence of some MS on a single gas supplier.

A liberalisation of the [EU gas and electricity market](#) between 1996 and 2003 set up common market rules, enabled new gas and electricity suppliers to enter MS markets and allowed consumers to choose their energy suppliers. The [third energy package](#), adopted in 2009, focuses on unbundling the business of energy production and supply from the operation of electricity transmission grids and gas pipelines.

The European Parliament (EP) [resolution of 10 September 2013](#) on the internal energy market emphasises the need for consumer protection, and stresses that modernising energy infrastructure is essential. The [European Council of 20-21 March 2014](#) reconfirmed the objective of completing the internal energy market by 2014, and accelerating the connection of all MS to Europe-wide gas and electricity networks.

In 2013, the European Commission (EC) published [guidance](#) for state interventions in electricity markets, such as renewable energy support schemes. Currently, it is scrutinising German exemptions from the [renewables surcharge](#) for energy-intensive industries, and [UK measures supporting nuclear energy](#).

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## Climate and energy: the 20-20-20 targets and beyond

Europe is in the midst of a debate about medium-term (2020-30) climate and energy policies that would promote further decarbonisation and reduce uncertainty for investment in long-life energy infrastructure.

*Targets for 2020:* The current policies, part of the Europe 2020 strategy, are focused on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), in order to avoid dangerous manmade climate change. The targets for 2020 are a 20% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990, a 20% market share for renewable energy sources, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency. These so-called "20-20-20" targets were agreed by EU leaders in 2007 and enacted through legislation set out in the [2009 climate and energy package](#). The EU Emissions Trading System ([ETS](#)) is the main instrument for GHG reductions in the energy sector.

The 20-20-20 targets have so far had mixed results. With an 18% reduction in GHG emissions by 2012, the EU is likely to achieve its 20% target for 2020. In 2011, 13% of final energy consumption came from renewable sources. While some MS are on track to achieve their targets for the market share of renewables, others will have to make additional efforts. Only a 17% improvement in energy efficiency by 2020 is expected from measures under the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive.

*Objectives for 2050:* In 2009, the [European Council](#) agreed the long-term objective of reducing EU GHG emissions by 80-95% by 2050, compared to 1990. To outline the path towards such a low-carbon future, the EC presented roadmaps for a [competitive low-carbon economy](#), [resource efficiency](#), [transport](#) and [energy](#).

*Policies for 2030:* In January 2014, the EC proposed a [policy framework](#) for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030. It proposes a binding GHG reduction target of 40% and a binding target of 27% for the EU-wide market share of renewable energy sources, but so far no energy efficiency target.

On 5 February 2014, the [EP](#) voted in favour of three binding targets for emissions reductions, renewable energy sources (*at least* 30% with binding national targets for MS) as well as energy efficiency, referring to the EC proposal as "short-sighted and unambitious". The March 2014 [European Council](#) called on Council and EC to develop an energy efficiency framework.

## Security of supply: energy imports and indigenous sources

The EU is dependent on [energy imports](#) – 54% of its energy consumption came from imports in 2012. For example, two-thirds of the natural gas consumed and 85% of oil are imported. Security of energy supply is thus an important concern, in particular for MS that have few indigenous energy sources and depend on a single supplier for most of their energy needs.

While oil and coal are globally traded commodities that are shipped around the world, most gas is transported by pipelines that link particular exporters and importers. Although the EU has diversified its gas supply in recent years, almost three-quarters of [EU gas imports](#) in 2012 came from just three countries: Russia (31.9%), Norway (29.4%) and Algeria (13.8%). Less than half of Russian gas exports to Europe pass through Ukraine, which is bypassed by pipelines to Poland through Belarus, and to Germany under the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream pipeline, opened in 2011). A planned pipeline from Russia to south-east Europe via the Black Sea (South Stream) faces delays due to [contractual issues](#) and [economic sanctions on Russian firms](#). The planned TANAP and TAP pipelines would further [diversify supplies](#) by bringing gas from the Caspian region (Azerbaijan) to southern Europe via Turkey. As an alternative to pipelines, [liquefied natural gas](#) (LNG) can be transported by ship. Several EU ports have import terminals for LNG. To obtain better prices for its ample shale gas supplies, the US is expected to start exporting LNG in the coming years. Energy trade is also a subject of the [negotiations](#) of an EU/US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

The [Energy Community](#), established in 2005, extends the EU internal energy policy to the Western Balkan countries, Ukraine and Moldova. Georgia is a candidate for membership.

Indigenous fossil, nuclear and renewable energy sources, as well as efficiency measures that reduce energy use, contribute to reducing dependence on imports. Further exploration is needed to assess the potential of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) for energy production in Europe. In January 2014, the EC adopted a non-binding [Recommendation](#) concerning the environmental aspects of fracking, broadly in line with the EP resolutions of 21 November 2012 on the [industrial](#) and [environmental](#) aspects of shale gas and oil.

The March 2014 [European Council](#) called on the EC to present, by June 2014, a comprehensive plan for reducing EU energy dependence. It also urged further action to increase the transparency of intergovernmental agreements between individual MS and energy suppliers.

## Overfishing and employment in fisheries

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1fatSIR>



What news about overfishing? According to the FAO report [World review of fisheries and aquaculture 2012](#), "most of the stocks of the top ten species, which account in total for about 30 percent of the world marine capture fisheries production, are fully exploited and, therefore, have no potential for increases in production". Unfortunately, this is not a recent observation.

Facing this problem of overfishing, the European Union has put in place measures to fish in a more sustainable way in previous years. However, these measures have had an impact on employment: between 1990 and 1997 employment in the fishing industry declined by 19% in the EU (from 313,000 to 252,000). The fall was the result of measures taken to conserve stocks and reduce the extent of overfishing by modernising the fishing fleet.

According to 2009 figures, the fisheries sector is still important for the EU, generating 139 023 jobs in 2009 (measured in full-time equivalents). Spain accounts for 26% of the total, followed by Italy (18%), Greece (17%), Portugal (13%) and France (9%). About 82% of employment in EU fisheries is concentrated in these countries.

In its [resolution of 12 September 2012 \(2011/2291\(INI\)\)](#), the EP stressed "the need for a balance between the ecological and the economic and social situation in each fishery while acknowledging that without plentiful fish stocks there will be no profitable fishing industry".

This keysource gathers several sources on overfishing and employment in fisheries sector both at the international level and European level. The first part gives an overview and two studies are presented in the second one, the third part is dedicated to stakeholders' views on these issues and some examples by countries are given in the fourth part. This file is completed by a statistical part and a little bibliography.

### Overviews

#### Overfishing

[Impacts of fishery activities](#) / FAO

This FAO page presents in a synthetic way the impact of fishery activities and in particular overfishing.

[Too Few Fish: A regional assessment of the World's fisheries](#) / Oceana, 2008, 24 p.

This report provides a global perspective on the state of the world's fisheries resources, followed by a region by region analysis. In particular, it focuses on the scope for further growth in fisheries (or the lack thereof) in the different regions of the world.

[Overfishing and other threats to aquatic living resources](#) / UNEP, 2006, 16 p.

Excessive fishing effort and the employment of destructive fishing practices are attributed to a complex web of root causes, including the common pool nature of fisheries resources, poverty, insufficient knowledge regarding the status of the fisheries, inappropriate subsidies, a lack of appropriate incentives and weak enforcement of fisheries regulations.

#### Employment

[Identifying fisheries dependent communities in EU coastal areas](#) / Marine Policy, November 2013, Volume 42, 17 p.

This paper adopts a geographical approach to identify EU coastal communities relying on fisheries using accessibility analysis, principles at the basis of gravity models and disaggregated population and employment statistics. The dependency on fisheries is calculated comparing estimated employment from fisheries at each port with general employment in the areas of accessibility surrounding the port.

[Studies for carrying out the Common Fisheries Policy: Lot 3 Socio-economic dimensions in EU fisheries](#) / MRAG, Poseidon, Oceanic, Irepa, Octobre 2013, 141 p.

This report presents the results from a study that has applied a common methodological framework in selected locations within four fisheries-dependent maritime regions of the EU: Galicia (Spain), Sicily (Italy), Brittany (France) and Shetland (UK). This study is intended to make a contribution to understanding local processes of development and diversification and the role of fisheries in coastal communities through the collection of primary data at the local level.

[Report Employment on board](#): Employment analysis and socio-economic impact of Spain's present fisheries model / Greenpeace, May 2013, 11 p.

This summary shows how the fishing industry has evolved over recent decades and the effects this evolution has had on employment. It also looks at the part small-scale methods play in sustaining fishing communities, and at the extent to which these methods are in danger.

[Regional social and economic impacts of change in fisheries-dependent communities](#) / MRAG, Oceanic, Lamans, IFM, IEEP, Poseidon, March 2011, 47 p.

The main aims of the study were: to review current statistical data and socio-economic indicators for EU fisheries regions; to support the discussion about the future CFP, in particular as regards future financial support for the purpose of coastal development. In completing this the study team compiled existing statistical data and socio-economic indicators for 24 case study locations to provide a broad picture of economic and social impacts on local and regional coastal communities brought about by the fisheries sector, disaggregated into catching, processing, support services, and aquaculture sub-sectors.

## Analysis

[Contribution of marine fisheries to worldwide employment](#) / L. C. Teh and U. R. Sumaila, Fish and Fisheries, 2013, vol. 14, n° 1, 12 p

Marine fisheries contribute to the global economy, from the catching of fish through to the provision of support services for the fishing industry. General lack of data and uncertainty about the level of employment in marine fisheries can lead to underestimation of fishing effort and hence over-exploited fisheries, or result in inaccurate projections of economic and societal costs and benefits. To address this gap, a database of marine fisheries employment for 144 coastal nations was compiled. Gaps in employment data that emerged were filled using a Monte Carlo approach to estimate the number of direct and indirect fisheries jobs.

[Paying for overfishing - Why subsidizing new vessel construction is bad news for EU taxpayers and our oceans](#) / Carpenter, Griffin; Esteban, Aniol, The new economics foundation (NEF), 2013, 4 p. Available versions in FR, ES, IT, PL.

Consistent overfishing in European waters has led to smaller catches, lower revenues and fewer jobs than if our fish stocks were properly managed. Consumers across the EU now effectively pay three times for their fish: for the value of the landings, the societal costs of overfishing, and for the subsidies received by the fishing industry.

[Jobs lost at sea - Overfishing and the jobs that never were](#) / New Economics Foundation (NEF), 2012, 12 p.

Fish stocks deliver huge benefits to society. They are a source of jobs, a source of profits, and a source of affordable food. But European fish stocks are delivering much less than they could if they were managed at sustainable levels. For the good of society, restoring fish stocks from current levels to their maximum sustainable yield should be at the heart of European fisheries management. The reform of the Common Fisheries Policy is an ideal opportunity to put an end to this waste.



## The European Central Bank: stable money

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1fnmErl>



The [European Central Bank](#) has a growing portfolio of responsibilities, but its essential job is to keep our common currency stable. The ECB has been responsible for the monetary policy of the euro area since 1999. On the 1st of January of that year, 11 national central banks transferred this power to the ECB. In the following years more countries joined them: Greece in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011 and Latvia in 2014.

The legal basis for EU monetary policy is the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The European System of Central Banks comprises all national central banks of all the EU member states and the ECB, not to be confused with the co-existing Eurosystem, which includes the 18 countries of the euro area and the ECB.

### Overviews

[Monetary policy](#) / ECB, updated: 5 February 2014.

These recently updated slides and the corresponding notes cover topics from price stability as an objective of the Eurosystem through monetary policy strategy to the ECB's response to the crisis.

[The Role of the European Central Bank](#) / Alessi, Christopher; Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, September 2012.

To introduce the European Central Bank, this page offers a historical overview of the ECB and describes its mandate and function. This is followed by a description of the bank's response to the crisis and the evolving role of the institution.

[The European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the European System of Central Banks](#) / ECB, 2011, 34 p.

This document by the ECB gives a detailed introduction to the development of the European Monetary Union, describes the structure and tasks of the ECB, and sheds light on its monetary policy.

### (New) tasks of the ECB

[European Central Bank accountability: how the monetary dialogue could be improved](#) / Claey's, Grégory; Hallerberg, Mark; Tschekassin, Olga; Bruegel Policy Contribution, iss. 2014/04, 3 March 2014.

Monetary dialogue takes place during a quarterly meeting between the president of the ECB and the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs committee. The authors describe the accountability practices, comparing and assessing them and make recommendations.

[The European Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Markets](#) / De Grauwe, Paul; CESifo Economic Studies 59 (3), 2013, pp. 520-535

In this article the author argues that the central bank should be lender of the last resort in government bond markets as well as the banking system to prevent countries from suffering from a self-fulfilling crisis of high interest rates, recession, budgetary problems and solvency issues. De Grauwe evaluates this new role of the ECB and discusses arguments brought up by those who are against this role.

[The various roles of the ECB in the new EMU architecture](#) / Darvas, Zsolt et al.; DG Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy; Monetary Dialogue, IP/A/ECON/NT/2013-03, 23 September 2013, 100 p.

Papers in this collection study the responsibilities of the ECB and the place the ECB occupies in the structure of the EMU.

[Limits and opportunities for the ECB in the multi-tier governance](#) / Repasi, René; EP DG for Internal Policies Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2012, 24 p.

Under the unique system of governance of the European System of Central Banks, tasks are shared between the national and the EU level and decentralisation is a crucial characteristic. While the EU level determines the extent to which national bodies are competent, the decision-making body itself is made up of members representing the national level.

## Activities during the crisis

[The German Constitutional Court's ruling on the ECB's bond buying decision](#) / Poptcheva, Eva-Maria; European Parliament Research Service Briefing, 11 February 2014

Germany's Federal Constitutional Court considered the legality of the ECB's purchase of government bonds on secondary markets through the Outright Monetary Transactions programme.

[The European Central Bank's response to the crisis](#) / Malo de Molina, José Luis, Banco de España, Economic Bulletin, July-August 2013, pp. 37-45

This article addresses the challenges for the ECB at the beginning of the crisis, describes the uniqueness of the institution and discusses the liquidity that the ECB has injected into the system since the start of the crisis. A section is devoted to "monetary expansion and the zero interest rate bound", another to "Fragmentation of the euro area and breakdown of the transmission mechanism of the single monetary policy". The banking union is briefly mentioned.

[The eurozone crisis: action taken by the European Central Bank \(ECB\)](#) / Thompson, Gavin, UK Parliament, Commons Library Standard Note SN06448; October 2012, 14 p.

This note describes measures taken by the ECB during the crisis.

[European Central Bank \(un\)conventional policy measures](#) / Jong, Willemijn de; European Parliament Library Briefing, October 2012

## Outsider views

[Unpalatable choices](#) / The Economist, 4 January 2014

[Is the European Central Bank Failing Its Price Stability Mandate?](#) / Ubide, Angel; Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), Policy Brief 14-5, February 2014, 20 p.

[ECB: Independence at risk?](#) / Weber, Christoph S.; Forschner, Benedikt; In: Intereconomics, vol. 49, no. 1, 2014, pp.45-50

## Asylum and irregular immigration in the EU: state of play

Recent events in the Mediterranean have seen many migrants dying off the shores of Italy, Malta and Spain. Many voices call for a more coherent approach to asylum and irregular immigration in the EU to achieve a balance between the legitimate interests of people seeking security and/or better living conditions, and the need to keep national infrastructure from being overwhelmed, as well as to ensure citizens' trust in an area of free movement without internal borders.

### Common European Asylum System (CEAS)

Major progress was made towards greater harmonisation of asylum rules across the EU in 2013, with the completion of the second phase of the CEAS after five-year negotiations. Five key acts were amended in this second asylum package: the [Qualification Directive](#) (2011), [Reception Conditions Directive](#), [Asylum Procedure Directive](#), [EURODAC Regulation](#) and [Dublin III Regulation](#). The package sought to address the challenges resulting from massive migratory pressure on certain Member States due to their geopolitical situation. In addition, these countries have been particularly hard hit by the economic crisis, while the conflicts in North Africa also added to the complexity of the situation.

The [Dublin II Regulation](#) was seen as one of the structural problems of EU asylum policy. It established that, by default, the first Member State an asylum-seeker entered is responsible for examining their application for international protection. This means that an asylum-seeker who moves to another Member State is automatically transferred back to the Member State at the EU's external borders. The 2013 [Dublin III Regulation](#) takes account of judgments of the [European Court of Human Rights](#) and the [Court of Justice of the EU](#) demanding that asylum-seekers are not transferred to a Member State with [systematic deficiencies](#) in asylum procedures or in the reception conditions of asylum-seekers. Although no agreement could be reached on a formal procedure for suspending such transfers, the European Parliament [succeeded](#) in including an express reference to protection of asylum-seekers' human rights. Moreover, an early-warning mechanism was established to prevent pressure on the asylum systems of Member States experiencing difficulties coping with a surge of migrants. The new Dublin Regulation entered into force in January 2014.

Despite these positive developments, [commentators](#) agree that the 'Dublin system' of responsibility for asylum applications in the EU has not been radically changed, so that Member States at the EU's external borders remain burdened. Many argue that this [structural shortcoming](#) will not be resolved by the new [early warning mechanism](#). However, [experts](#) point to the need now to focus on effective implementation of the newly adopted legislation in the Member States, rather than making further modifications. In addition, there have been [calls](#) to give asylum-seekers the possibility to apply for asylum from outside the EU, preventing them from undertaking dangerous journeys. The European Commission has [proposed](#) that 'humanitarian corridors' for the provision of humanitarian visas to people in danger be set up at Member State consulates in third countries. The creation of legal channels for EU entry has also been [demanded](#) by Parliament.

**Asylum-seeker:** A person claiming international protection due to the [risk of prosecution](#) in their home country. (Article 1 A (2) UN Geneva Refugee Convention)

**Irregular immigrant:** A third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the [conditions](#) of entry, stay or residence in the Member State concerned.

### Irregular immigration: need for a holistic approach

The EU's legal framework for irregular immigration is scattered over many legal instruments. Those which apply at the point of a migrant's arrival focus on border surveillance, [return](#) of irregular immigrants and cooperation on [readmission](#) with third countries of origin and transit, as well as on preventing irregular

immigrants departing to Europe. [Cooperation with third countries](#) plays a major role in the EU's action against irregular immigration. Mobility partnerships (e.g. with Tunisia and Morocco) seek to commit third countries to increasing the surveillance of their coastlines and to prevent boats with irregular immigrants from departing. In return, visas are made easier to obtain. Moreover, the EU has allocated development aid to address the causes of immigration, with migration and development being a priority area of the [Global Approach to Migration and Mobility](#) (GAMM) initiative. EU law also provides for penalties for those facilitating the unauthorised access of migrants to EU territory, *inter alia* through smuggling and trafficking, in the [Facilitation Directive](#), the [Directive on Trafficking in Human Beings](#) and the [Carrier Sanctions Directive](#).

The focus on security concerns of these EU instruments has led many to claim that the EU is becoming "[Fortress Europe](#)". [Experts](#) claim that EU immigration policy is one-sided and demand more coherent EU policy as well as EU-wide channels for legal labour migration to meet Member States' demographic challenges. The European Parliament has [called](#) for a more holistic approach to migration in order to ensure that issues linked with migration can be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. However, the issue remains highly controversial. Many defend a predominantly national approach and point to an influx of immigrants overburdening national infrastructure, a problem exacerbated by the economic crisis.

## Mixed migration and 'push-backs'

Due to [mixed flows](#) of asylum-seekers and irregular immigrants, it is often difficult for national authorities to establish on immigrants' arrival or interception at sea whether they are irregular immigrants or persons entitled to seek international protection. Asylum-seekers cannot be refused entrance at borders nor be returned to a third country if there is a risk of persecution or other serious harm. This is the principle of non-*refoulement* established by the [1951 Geneva Refugee Convention](#) and incorporated into EU law ([Article 78\(1\) TFEU](#)). Commentators and NGOs criticise 'push-backs' at sea and the refusal of entry at borders as possibly violating the principle of non-*refoulement*. Member States claim however that 'push-backs' at sea do not violate the principle of non-*refoulement* as the potential asylum-seekers have not yet arrived at their borders. Parliament and Council [agreed](#), after long negotiations including Parliament's complaint before the [Court of Justice of the EU](#), on search and rescue rules for operations coordinated by [Frontex](#). Parliament is [credited](#) with reinforcing the principle of non-*refoulement* by prohibiting 'push-backs' of intercepted migrants to unsafe countries. The fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and immigrants will also be strengthened, *inter alia* through the obligation to identify intercepted migrants to ensure protection of vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied minors and victims of trafficking.

## Support from the EU and solidarity between Member States

Despite the progress of the second asylum package, many [claim](#) that the structural problems leading to an overburdening of some Member States can be tackled only by greater EU support and solidarity from those less affected. Solidarity however remains subject to the conflicting interests of Member States. In this context, Mediterranean Member States have repeatedly called for fair distribution of asylum-seekers among Member States. Currently there is an ad hoc intra-EU relocation programme in place for Malta ([EUREMA II project](#)) with Member States volunteering, but only reluctantly, to take asylum-seekers. Calls from the EP, e.g. the 2012 [report](#) of the Civil Liberties Committee (rapporteur Kyriacos Triantaphyllides, GUE/NGL, Cyprus), to establish a permanent relocation mechanism, have met opposition from several Member States which fear that relocation might become a pull factor for migrants.

The EU provides support to Member States under pressure of migration through its [Frontex](#) agency and the [European Asylum Support Office](#) (EASO). Frontex coordinates [joint operations](#) and, if requested by a Member State, can deploy rapid border interventions ([RABIT](#)) through European Border Guard Teams. EASO supports practical cooperation on asylum among Member States and helps them eliminate deficiencies in their asylum systems. The EU also provides financial support to Member States under particular migration pressure. The four funds in this area, including the [External Borders Fund](#) and the [European Refugee Fund](#), will be replaced by a new [Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund](#) (AMIF) (rapporteur Sylvie Guillaume, S&D, France) with a total budget for 2014-20 of €3.1 billion. Member States will be obliged to allocate at least 20% of the funds to asylum measures and another 20% to support legal migration and promote the integration of migrants. In a [statement](#) accompanying the AMIF regulation, Parliament stresses that the fund, as well as other instruments, need also to be based on the principle of solidarity, enshrined *inter alia* in [Article 80 TFEU](#).

## 50/50 formula – gender balance

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1di5lYe>



Equality between women and men is one of the European Union's main values and reaches back to 1957 when the principle of equal pay for equal work became part of the [Treaty of Rome](#). The European Union's efforts in fostering gender balance have helped to change the lives of many Europeans for the better. Although many inequalities still exist, progress over the last decades can be seen. This is mainly thanks to equal treatment legislation; gender mainstreaming (integration of the gender perspective into all other policies); and specific measures for the advancement of women.

This Keysource brings together a selection of studies on gender balance in education and research, career, politics and family life.

### Overviews

[Is the Knowledge Society Gendered?](#) / Sylvia Walby, In: Gender, Work & Organization; January 2011, Vol. 18, Issue 1

The article presents theoretical and empirical work on **gender and the knowledge society** and introduces the articles of the special issue. It introduces three ways in which the knowledge society and economy are gendered: the gendering of human capital; the gendering of networks; and the gendering of the definitions of the knowledge society.

[Key actions and latest figures on Gender Equality](#) / European Commission Factsheet, March 2014

This factsheet reflects on how Europe is boosting progress in achieving equality between women and men.

**EPRS Keysource [Gender stereotyping](#)** / Ülla Jürviste, European Parliament Research Service, February 2013

Gender stereotyping, as defined in a CoE [study](#), means preconceived ideas whereby males and females are arbitrarily assigned characteristics and roles determined and limited by their sex. Sex stereotyping can limit the development of the natural talents and abilities of boys and girls, women and men, as well as their educational experiences and life opportunities.

[Women report workplace sexism: 'They think I can't hear them but I can'](#) / Guardian, 21 March 2014

It's 2014, yet from the level of discrimination professional women are still experiencing, you might assume it was 50 years earlier. The article reflects 10 reports of everyday sexism.

### Education and Research

[Gender and Education](#) – UNESCO Institute for Statistics site

Global education patterns are changing. Within formal education systems, from the primary to the tertiary levels, opportunities are expanding, literacy levels are improving and enrolment is rising. Data indicate that progress towards gender parity at the primary school level continues, yet the [gap between boys and girls remains wide](#). The [UNESCO eAtlas of Gender Equality in Education](#) allows you to visualize the educational pathways of girls and boys through indicators on all levels of education for more than 200 countries and territories. Updated annually, the eAtlas includes maps and ranking tables that can be used to evaluate the extent to which educational disparities between the sexes are changing over time. (See also [documents and sources](#))

[In 2012, 40% of young women had completed tertiary education compared with 32% of men](#) / EUROSTAT Newsrelease, 8 March 2014

[The Nordic region : a step closer to gender balance in research? Joint Nordic strategies and measures to promote gender balance among researchers in academia](#) / Solveig Bergman, Linda M. Rustad, Nordic reference group, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2013

The **Nordic countries** are often presented as a “gender equality paradise”, but the degree of gender balance among **researchers** in academia does not differ noticeably from that of other European countries. This study looks at the situation in **Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden**. About 80 per cent of professors in the Nordic countries are men.

[Study on Combating Gender Stereotypes in Education](#) / Maureen Bohan, DGI Human Rights and Rule of Law, Council of Europe, 2011

The study includes issues and consequences associated with gender stereotyping in education.

## Career

[Gender balance on corporate boards: Europe is cracking the Glass Ceiling](#) / European Commission Factsheet, March 2014

Although today 60% of new university graduates are female, women are outnumbered by men in leadership positions in the corporate sector in the EU. On average, a mere 17.8% of board members of the largest publicly listed companies in the EU are women.

[Moving mind-sets on gender diversity: McKinsey Global Survey Results](#) / McKinsey Global Survey, January 2014

To ensure that corporate culture supports the ability of women to reach top management, companies must address mind-sets and develop a more inclusive, holistic diversity agenda.

[Workshop on gender balance in corporate boards and top-management member states without legislation on quotas : three case studies : notes](#) / Elena Doldor, Katja Langenbucher, Beáta Nagy; European Parliament Policy Department C, PE 474.409, Brussels: European Parliament, 2013

The following notes present the main characteristics of the national situations regarding the gender balance in top management positions and corporate board diversity in three of these Member States: UK, Germany and Hungary.

[Achieving Geographical and Gender Balance in the European External Action Service](#) / Simon Duke, Sabina Kajnc Lange; European Parliament Policy Department for External Policies, Brussels: European Parliament, 2013

This study explores the current state of affairs within the European External Action Service (EEAS) regarding geographical and gender balance.

## Politics

[Female Political Representation – the use of Electoral Gender Quotas](#) / Irene Hennigan, European Parliament Research Service Keysource, March 2014

[Women in parliaments](#) / European Parliament Research Service, At a Glance, March 2014

The InfoGraphic “Women in parliaments” provides information on the proportion of women in national parliaments, compares representation of women in national parliaments with their numbers in the European Parliament and shows the number of women in the EP by political group.

[Empowering Women for Stronger Political Parties: A Good Practices Guide to Promote Women’s Political Participation](#) / NDI and UNDP study, 2012

This publication identifies targeted interventions for promoting the stronger presence and influence of women in political parties as well as advancing gender equality issues in party policies and platforms.

## Family life

[Work-life balance: Measures to help reconcile work, private and family life](#) / Ron Davies, EPRS Briefing, 2013

In Europe, more than one worker in five expresses dissatisfaction with their work-life balance. Achieving work-life balance can be made easier by family-oriented policies such as social benefits, employment-protected leave for parents and affordable formal arrangements for family care.

[Great expectations: Exploring the promises of gender equality](#) / Tess Lanning; IPPR 2013

Through this report, the authors explore changes in women’s aspirations and expectations over time and from generation to generation, and debate about the priorities for the next era of gender politics.

[The influence of working time arrangements on work-life integration or ‘balance’: a review of the international evidence](#) / C. Fagan, C. Lyonette, M. Smith, A. Saldana-Tejeda; ILO Working paper, 2012

This paper examines the link between different aspects of working time and outcomes in terms of work-life “integration” or “balance”, which includes but is not limited to the reconciliation of work and family life.



## Food versus fuel

E-version (more extensive) – <http://bit.ly/1rJK12>



Biofuel production that uses plants otherwise available for consumption is a debate that requires caution. Some studies gathered in this keysource see a direct link between both and the reason for food price increases (leading to hunger), but a lot of other studies underline the complexity of their relationship. On 17/10/2012, the European Commission published a proposal for Directive ([COM\(2012\) 595 final](#)) that recommended "the introduction of a limit to the contribution made from biofuels and bioliquids produced from food crops" and also "an enhanced incentive scheme to further promote sustainable and advanced biofuels from feedstocks that do not create an additional demand for land". Land use change is an indirect way of increasing food prices as land previously dedicated to consumer food production is shifted to plants for energy production. On 11/09/2013, the EP amended the Commission's proposal, leading to the [Fuels and energy from renewable sources: transition to biofuels to deliver greenhouse gas savings](#) resolution (2012/0288(COD)), awaiting the Council's first reading.

### Overview

[Sustainable biofuels and the indirect land use change \(ILUC\) issue](#) / European Parliamentary Research Service  
Keysource, 2013

### Analysis

[Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter. Final report: The transformative potential of the right to food](#) / *United Nations*, 24/01/2014, 28p.

"The Special Rapporteur has called for abandoning mandates on the consumption and production of biofuels and for improving international cooperation in this area, to mitigate the impacts of increased levels of agrofuel production on the prices of foodstuffs".

[Biofuel cropping systems: carbon, land, and food](#) / Langeveld, Hans; Dixon, John; Keulen, H. van, London: Routledge, 2014, xix + 274 p.

This book is very critical of the analyses made regarding biofuel so far, including the under-valuation of by-products generated in biofuel production.

[Global Food Security. Challenges for the food and agricultural system](#) / *OECD*, 2013, 162p.

This OECD analysis offers a balanced view of the debate as it considers that "the challenge of eliminating global hunger is more about raising the incomes of the poor than an issue of food prices".

[Impacts of the EU biofuel policy on agricultural markets and land use](#) / Hélaine, Sophie, M'barek, Robert and Gay, Hubertus for *JRC IPTS* (Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies), 09/2013, 25p.

This study proposes three different ways of biofuel production compared with the current situation and analyses their effects on feedstock prices and EU commodity balances.

[Biofuels and food security](#) / *The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition*, 06/2013, 132p. Chapter 3: Biofuels, food prices, hunger and poverty. The experts consider that "there are links between biofuels and food security". They recommend that biofuel policies "integrate food security as a major concern".

[The Long Run Impact of Biofuels on Food Prices](#) / Chakravorty, Ujjayant; Hubert, Marie-Hélène; Moreaux, Michel; Nostbakken, Linda for *CESifo* [the Center for Economic Studies (CES), the Ifo Institute and the CESifo GmbH (Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research)] Working Paper Series: 3876, 2012, 50p.

The authors develop a balanced view on the debate.

[Can biofuels policy work for food security?](#) / Durham, Chris, Davies, Grant and Bhattacharyya, Tanya for *Defra*, (UK Government's Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs), 2012, 29p.

This study does not link biofuels and food price increase.

[The Impact of Biofuels on Commodity Food Prices: Assessment of Findings](#) / Zilberman, David, Hochman, Gal, Rajagopal, Deepak, Sexton, Steve and Timilsina, Govinda for *the Energy Biosciences Institute* and *the World Bank*, 7/06/2012, 7p.

"This paper argues that the time-series analysis linking food and fuel prices shows that biofuel prices are increasing with both fuels and food prices, but it also shows that changes in biofuel prices have little impact on food prices."

## Stakeholder views

### International Organisations' views

[2012 Global Food Policy Report](#) / *IFPRI*, 2013, 142p.

"Energy markets are having a greater impact on food security thanks to growing biofuel markets and the increasing share of energy in agricultural costs".

[UNCTAD Commodities and Development Report 2012](#) / *UNCTAD*, 2012, 33p. Chapter 3: The direct effects of the recent commodity boom: poverty and food insecurity. This report considers that biofuel quotas are, along with other elements, the reason for the food supply reduction that caused price hikes, affecting health and social well-being to many living in the poorest parts of the world.

### NGOs' views

[Understanding the Biofuel Trade-offs between Indirect land use change \(ILUC\), Hunger and Poverty](#) / Searchinger, Timothy for *Friends of the Earth Europe*, 07/2013, 17p.

Biofuels are forcing poor people to eat less food.

[Nourriture contre carburant: Quels sont les éléments du débat?](#) / Hubert, Marie-Hélène in *Revue Tiers Monde*, 2012/3 n°211, p. 35-50.

The author reviews the results of several fuel vs. food studies. She clearly concludes that food's price increase was due to unrestricted rise of biofuel production.

[Agrocarburants et souveraineté alimentaire: une autre transition agricole](#) / Holt-Giménez, Eric and Shattuck, Annie in *Alternatives Sud*, volume 18-2011/1. Mythe 4: les agrocarburants ne sont pas responsables de la faim. The authors argue against the "myth" stating that biofuels are not responsible for hunger.

### Financial Institutions' view

[The impacts of biofuel targets on land-use change and food supply : a global CGE assessment](#) / Timilsina, Govinda R., Beghin, John C., van der Mensbrugghe, Dominique and Mevel, Simon for *The World Bank*, 2010, 71p.

"The expansion of biofuels would cause a reduction in food supply. Although the magnitude of the impact on food supply at the global level is not as large as perceived earlier, it would be significant in some developing countries".

### Producers' views

[Biofuels and food security: Risks and opportunities](#) / Hamelinck, Carlo for *ECOFYS Netherlands*, 08/2013, 23p.

This report by the company ECOFYS, "a leading expert in sustainable energy solutions", offers a comprehensive overview of the main aspects of the interrelation between food and biofuels and summarises previous research on the subject.

### Competitor's view

[How can climate change and the development of bioenergy alter the long-term outlook for food and agriculture?](#) / Fischer, Günther - commissioned by the *Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID)* - in "Looking Ahead in World Food and Agriculture: Perspectives to 2050" / *FAO*, 2011, 563p.

"This paper reports on a large number of scenario experiments conducted to improve the understanding of how climate change and expanding bioenergy use may alter the long-term outlook for food, agriculture and resource availability."

### EU programmes and projects

[Research on bioenergy](#) / European Commission, DG Research and Innovation

[Energy Theme](#) / the 7th EU Framework Programme: [75 research projects](#)