RESOLUTION

on the future of the Trio Plus Strategy 2030: building a future of Eastern Partnership

9.12.2019
Resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly on the future of the Trio Plus Strategy 2030: building a future of Eastern Partnership

The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly,


– having regard to the Association Agreements between the EU on one side and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the other side, in particular the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA);

– having regard to the European Commission and External European Action Service Joint Staff Working Document of 9 June 2017 on "Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 focusing on key priorities and tangible results",

– having regard to Art. 9.3 of the Rules of procedure;

A. whereas the EU has proved its enormous transformative power through the Enlargement Policy, as confirmed by the success of the Central and Eastern European countries in their development from post-totalitarian regulated economies to European style democracies via the process of EU integration;

B. whereas significant progress in reforms and harmonisation of national legislations with EU standards in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova has already been achieved;

C. whereas this transformative power by enlargement shall be used in the Western Balkans and in Eastern Partnership countries, willing to join the EU;

D. whereas the process of EU enlargement has potential benefits to Eastern Partnership countries and would be beneficial for the EU, because, as the EU Commissioner J. Hahn has said, "We have to become smarter at exporting stability. If not, Europe will keep importing instability";

E. whereas this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, which has proven to be effective tool for providing tailored support based on the more for more and less for less principles linked with the implementation of reforms;

F. whereas the Eastern Partnership policy is a tailor-made concept of cooperation for all six countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and their further progress on the European path is dependent on compliance with European values and standards, to which these countries have committed;

G. whereas signing of CEPA and ratification of it by the Armenian Parliament in April 2018 is considered an evidence of an alternative to gain an enhanced and strategically reinforced partnership between Armenia and EU;

H. whereas according to the International IDEA’s report The Global State of Democracy 2019: “Armenia is the only country in Europe to transition from being a hybrid regime in 2017 to a democracy in 2018”;

The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly,


– having regard to the Association Agreements between the EU on one side and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the other side, in particular the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA);

– having regard to the European Commission and External European Action Service Joint Staff Working Document of 9 June 2017 on "Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 focusing on key priorities and tangible results",

– having regard to Art. 9.3 of the Rules of procedure;

A. whereas the EU has proved its enormous transformative power through the Enlargement Policy, as confirmed by the success of the Central and Eastern European countries in their development from post-totalitarian regulated economies to European style democracies via the process of EU integration;

B. whereas significant progress in reforms and harmonisation of national legislations with EU standards in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova has already been achieved;

C. whereas this transformative power by enlargement shall be used in the Western Balkans and in Eastern Partnership countries, willing to join the EU;

D. whereas the process of EU enlargement has potential benefits to Eastern Partnership countries and would be beneficial for the EU, because, as the EU Commissioner J. Hahn has said, "We have to become smarter at exporting stability. If not, Europe will keep importing instability";

E. whereas this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, which has proven to be effective tool for providing tailored support based on the more for more and less for less principles linked with the implementation of reforms;

F. whereas the Eastern Partnership policy is a tailor-made concept of cooperation for all six countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and their further progress on the European path is dependent on compliance with European values and standards, to which these countries have committed;

G. whereas signing of CEPA and ratification of it by the Armenian Parliament in April 2018 is considered an evidence of an alternative to gain an enhanced and strategically reinforced partnership between Armenia and EU;

H. whereas according to the International IDEA’s report The Global State of Democracy 2019: “Armenia is the only country in Europe to transition from being a hybrid regime in 2017 to a democracy in 2018”;

The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly,


– having regard to the Association Agreements between the EU on one side and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the other side, in particular the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA);

– having regard to the European Commission and External European Action Service Joint Staff Working Document of 9 June 2017 on "Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 focusing on key priorities and tangible results",

– having regard to Art. 9.3 of the Rules of procedure;

A. whereas the EU has proved its enormous transformative power through the Enlargement Policy, as confirmed by the success of the Central and Eastern European countries in their development from post-totalitarian regulated economies to European style democracies via the process of EU integration;

B. whereas significant progress in reforms and harmonisation of national legislations with EU standards in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova has already been achieved;

C. whereas this transformative power by enlargement shall be used in the Western Balkans and in Eastern Partnership countries, willing to join the EU;

D. whereas the process of EU enlargement has potential benefits to Eastern Partnership countries and would be beneficial for the EU, because, as the EU Commissioner J. Hahn has said, "We have to become smarter at exporting stability. If not, Europe will keep importing instability";

E. whereas this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, which has proven to be effective tool for providing tailored support based on the more for more and less for less principles linked with the implementation of reforms;

F. whereas the Eastern Partnership policy is a tailor-made concept of cooperation for all six countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and their further progress on the European path is dependent on compliance with European values and standards, to which these countries have committed;

G. whereas signing of CEPA and ratification of it by the Armenian Parliament in April 2018 is considered an evidence of an alternative to gain an enhanced and strategically reinforced partnership between Armenia and EU;

H. whereas according to the International IDEA’s report The Global State of Democracy 2019: “Armenia is the only country in Europe to transition from being a hybrid regime in 2017 to a democracy in 2018”;

The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly,


– having regard to the Association Agreements between the EU on one side and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the other side, in particular the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA);

– having regard to the European Commission and External European Action Service Joint Staff Working Document of 9 June 2017 on "Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 focusing on key priorities and tangible results",

– having regard to Art. 9.3 of the Rules of procedure;

A. whereas the EU has proved its enormous transformative power through the Enlargement Policy, as confirmed by the success of the Central and Eastern European countries in their development from post-totalitarian regulated economies to European style democracies via the process of EU integration;

B. whereas significant progress in reforms and harmonisation of national legislations with EU standards in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova has already been achieved;

C. whereas this transformative power by enlargement shall be used in the Western Balkans and in Eastern Partnership countries, willing to join the EU;

D. whereas the process of EU enlargement has potential benefits to Eastern Partnership countries and would be beneficial for the EU, because, as the EU Commissioner J. Hahn has said, "We have to become smarter at exporting stability. If not, Europe will keep importing instability";

E. whereas this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, which has proven to be effective tool for providing tailored support based on the more for more and less for less principles linked with the implementation of reforms;

F. whereas the Eastern Partnership policy is a tailor-made concept of cooperation for all six countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and their further progress on the European path is dependent on compliance with European values and standards, to which these countries have committed;

G. whereas signing of CEPA and ratification of it by the Armenian Parliament in April 2018 is considered an evidence of an alternative to gain an enhanced and strategically reinforced partnership between Armenia and EU;

H. whereas according to the International IDEA’s report The Global State of Democracy 2019: “Armenia is the only country in Europe to transition from being a hybrid regime in 2017 to a democracy in 2018”;
I. whereas the Eastern Partnership countries, especially the ones demonstrating willingness to join the EU, continue to face aggressive hybrid threats by the Kremlin to keep them in the sphere of its influence and to impede the process of EU integration by not allowing them to become successful European countries;

J. whereas there are enormous challenges to international security environment and human rights dimension triggered by dynamic changing international system;

1. Underlines soft power instruments of the Eastern Partnership, such as introduction of a visa-free travel, to sustain political motivation for reforms and notes the progress made by its countries on the implementation of the 20 Deliverables for 2020 while the new guidelines are now being discussed for the next decade to 2030;

2. Notes the success of Eastern Partnership initiative of supporting EU associated countries in letting them move more rapidly with reform implementation and deeper political and economic integration with the EU;

3. Emphasises that today we find ourselves at a crucial juncture where we should add new additional long-term instruments in our strategy to help more advanced Eastern Partnership countries to keep their motivation and momentum for reforms for the next decade to 2030 and stresses that EU needs to upgrade and reform its policy instruments in order to match the progress done by our Eastern Partners;

4. Asks to initiate a discussion on forward-looking Eastern Partnership strategic agenda for the next decade to move forward in promoting a more ambitious use of differentiation, more for more and less for less principles, and to present a New Flagship Initiative – the Trio Plus Strategy 2030;

5. Suggests that the Trio Plus Strategy 2030 would establish the European Trio Process with deeper integration instruments for the EU and its associated countries, as it was done by the Berlin Process initiated in 2014, which aimed to strengthen the EU leadership and a coalition of like-minded EU Member States for the integration of Western Balkan countries into the EU; furthermore suggests an active EU open door policy for those EaP countries that achieve a significant and valuable progress;

6. Urges the Trio Plus Strategy 2030 will be an ambitious European geopolitical instrument employing a new generation of institutions and policies, sustainable trade and stabilisation agreements and their instruments (EU Support Group for the Trio, Trio Investment Platform, European Green Deal, Digital Europe, Promoting European Way of Life and European Democracy, ACAAs, Connectivity Agenda, TEN, Horizon 2020, Conference of the Future of Europe, and other EU initiatives);

7. Stresses that further setbacks to democracy, reforms and the rule of law and the erosion of a European orientation in Trio countries will jeopardise the Trio Plus Strategy 2030, as described above;

8. Underlines that the Trio Plus Strategy 2030 should be complementary to the Eastern Partnership instruments, will not aim at replacing the existing initiatives in this area and will contribute to the discussion on how we can make the Eastern Partnership policy more effective;

9. Suggests more comprehensive and enlarged strategic format Trio + 1 with the inclusion of Armenia - based on the principles and positions reaffirmed in the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership agreement between Armenia and the European Union;
10. Notes that the success of implementing EU integration reforms by the EU associated Trio countries will create new incentives for the remaining Eastern Partnership countries to choose an ambitious path of European integration;

11. Emphasises that the Trio Plus Strategy 2030, supported by the European Trio Process, will have a major positive transformative impact on opinion of Russia's ordinary people in helping them to strive for an open democratic European country;

12. Calls for the urgent development of joint mechanisms to withstand Kremlin hybrid threats undermining EU unity and security in those EaP countries striving for approximation with the EU;

13. Notes that the success of the Eastern Partnership with inclusion of the European Trio Process and the Trio Plus Strategy 2030 will be crucial for both the Eastern Neighbourhood countries and the EU, because it is the best input for the creation of a Europe that is “whole, free and at peace”, and that this success will eradicate the dividing lines on the European continent, which still separate Eastern Partnership countries from the rest of the EU;

14. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the President of the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the Eastern European partner countries.